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This volume is the result of a two-year German-American Project on
Mutual Learning, organized by members of the Industrial Relations Section at
the Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  The
project was launched by Tom Kochan and Richard Locke, with help from
Nicholas Ziegler and me.  We benefited from cooperation and collaboration
with Frieder Naschold and various other colleagues at the Science Center
(Wissenschaftszentrum) in Berlin.
In two conferences, in Washington, D.C. in 1994 and Berlin in 1996, we
brought together researchers in comparative industrial and employment rela-
tions and comparative political economy.  The conferences yielded stimulating
dialogue about the processes by which social actors in advanced capitalist
economies might learn from each other.  Some of the conference papers have
been revised for this volume.  Our aim was to encourage explicitly compara-
tive debates and written work and to go beyond the intellectual and practical
insights of research focused on single-country cases.  We were interested in
bringing to the surface and clarifying key analytical and policy insights, based
on empirical research in a variety of political economic arenas in both coun-
tries.  It was our goal that these insights would inform our understanding of
how practitioners and policymakers in different countries might learn from
each other.
The areas of comparison covered in this volume are far from exclusive.
The constellation of arenas explored here results in part from design and in
part from circumstance.  Our initial aim was not to impose a set of issues for
comparison, but rather to bring together scholars focusing on a range of issues
related to employment relations.  We believed these meetings would make
clear which empirical areas were most germane to the strategic shifts and dis-
locations occurring in both countries today.  To some extent, then, the content
of this volume was determined by the subjects of interest to the scholars we
brought together under the aegis of the German-American Project.
For this reason, this book does not cover, among other things, the differ-
ent ways in which women and men experience employment relations dynam-
ics and outcomes.  In our effort to capitalize on the best available research in
comparative political economy, we could find no natural selection criteria, and
it was perhaps inevitable that important areas of political economic activity
would be left out.  It is our hope that the breadth and sweep made possible by
our loose methodological approach will compensate for this weakness.
We are indebted to the German-American Academic Council Foundation




Fund of the United States and the Center for European Studies at Harvard
University, which also helped fund this work.  The project’s aims and the con-
ferences are discussed fully in our proposal and in the interim and final reports
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Comparative social scientists have never quite explained how eco-
nomic and political practitioners and decision makers in different
countries learn from each other.  The question has gained policy rele-
vance over the past two decades with the transformation of the assem-
bly line and mass production, the rise of new service industries, and the
globalization of most domestic economies.  With Japan still recovering
from its severest social and economic shock in the postwar period, it
makes intuitive sense to shift our focus to the United States and Ger-
many for cues.  Both appear to be in better political economic shape
than Japan in a variety of ways noted in this volume.  Both countries
have apparently intransigent and hardly insignificant shortcomings.
Both because of and in spite of these problems, we believe than com-
parisons between the German and American models are especially illu-
minating.
The chapters in this book compare sectoral and firm-level adjust-
ment processes, modes of innovation, and processes of change, focus-
ing on examples of and possibilities for cross-border and cross-sectoral
learning in Germany and the United States.  In one way or another,
each chapter also explores the proposition that the benefits of German
coordinating institutions and of the United States’ more decentralized
political economy each entail trade-offs that may be necessary and are
certainly politically unpleasant.
Cross-border and cross-sectoral learning are as difficult to under-
stand as to undertake.  Piecemeal learning is hampered by the intercon-
nectedness of political economic systems, with changes on one
dimension necessarily affecting, and affected by, others.  At the same
time, the wholesale transfer of institutional systems is unlikely in the
absence of major political displacement caused by war and occupation.




loose scholarly consensus that considerable transfer of some sort is
occurring across national borders generally, and especially between
Germany and the United States.  Certainly it is not the case that prac-
tices identified in one setting, such as the German apprenticeship train-
ing system or different types of “lean production,” are being quickly,
easily, or completely lifted across national borders and copied.
Instead, corporate actors, powerful individuals, policymakers, or poli-
cymaking bodies are engaged in iterative, experimental, and partial
efforts at transferring and adapting certain concepts and practices.
Institutional/organizational transfer takes a back seat to various
dynamic, even volatile, processes of learning, compromise, adjust-
ment, and innovation, usually among actors “on the ground” rather
than in the context of national competitiveness policies.  Therefore,
what we can learn from previous work in this area is limited.
Indeed, much past research and theorizing in both countries has
focused on how institutions can be transferred at the macro (national)
level (Jacoby 1997).  In the United States, such debates—for instance,
about importing apprenticeship training institutions or works coun-
cils—have never gained a great deal of momentum, not least because
of the obvious and numerous obstacles posed by the functioning of and
relationship among U.S. banks, companies, workers, unions, and the
environment in which they operate.  In Germany, debates about the
decentralization of industrial and employment relations and the dereg-
ulation of markets (including the labor markets) have continued to
bump up against the strategic resistance of unions as well as large seg-
ments of the employer community, and more recently against the small
but growing influence of the European Union’s social policy agenda.
Meanwhile, however, individual actors are busy establishing new oper-
ations, managing joint ventures and collective interests, developing
labor–management innovations, and learning from each other’s suc-
cesses and failures.
A great deal has been written about the benefits to labor and busi-
ness of Germany’s coordinated institutionalized system of employment
relations (see, e.g., Wever 1995; Turner 1991).  Yet one important
unanswered question for Germans is how to minimize the constraining
aspects of this system while maximizing the supportive aspects of
national and sectoral institutional frameworks.  For instance, can indus-
try-wide coordination of employment relations, which takes some of
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the costs of labor out of competition among employers, be combined
with vigorous local innovations?
Germany’s framework institutions have been famous for address-
ing market failures which individual local actors may not want or be
able to address, but which ultimately detract from the common good.
The training system is the most obvious case in point.  Can local U.S.
actors make the practical distinction between the problematic (time-
consuming) and the beneficial (cost-sharing) aspects of Germany’s
framework institutions?  Can the latter be supported in an environment
that naturally bypasses or compensates for the former?
It is widely agreed that by international standards the Americans
are especially good at rapidly developing and executing impressive
innovations—from labor–management relations to the reorganization
of production/service delivery or the training of managers—because of
the diverse and decentralized nature of the country’s political economy.
Not surprisingly, Germans are examining which aspects of the decen-
tralized U.S. system spur innovation.  What is undoubtedly more com-
plicated is disentangling these from the forces that can inhibit
innovation, or its diffusion across settings, or the diffusion of its social
and economic benefits.  How much and what kind of institutional
framework do we need to avoid these problems, and what will it cost
whom?  Recent pressures in Germany to rein in public spending and
lower unemployment, deriving in part from the consolidation of the
European Union’s economic agenda, bring new urgency to this issue.
Finally, how much room is there for cross-sectoral learning, both
among and within countries?  Could innovations in interfirm coopera-
tion in the German electronics sector and in more flexible employment






) help map out how local
actors might accommodate changes in what is negotiated, by whom,
and how?  Could companies in the United States develop loose frame-





 lessen pressures for head-to-head competition, and ultimately
produce more highly skilled workforces?  Could such framework insti-
tutions be structured so as to adapt themselves to changing external




INSTITUTIONS, IDEAS, AND 
THE IMPETUS FOR LEARNING
 
Mutual learning takes place at the intersection of institutions, ideas
or cultures, and actors’ often competing strategies.  Lessons reside in
the great strengths and weaknesses of both countries in various politi-
cal economic arenas.  The authors of this volume share the view that
significant mutual learning between the two countries will require care-
ful consideration of the contexts that structure how actors think about
and carry out the strategies they perceive to be available; of how actors
can, at least in principle, change those institutions; and of what cross-
national and subnational/cross-sectoral (or cross-case) comparisons
imply about the malleability of institutions and actor strategies.  Exam-
ining these areas has become increasingly important in recent years,
because change, adjustment, and innovation—whether indigenous or
transferred from abroad—have all taken on increasingly pressing rele-
vance to political economies and therefore to policymakers and practi-
tioners throughout the advanced capitalist countries.
Why should social actors in the United States and Germany be
especially interested in learning from each other?  Germany and the
United States remain the two most powerful western economies and
have over several decades been ranked the world’s number one and two
exporters.  Germany’s core economy remains sound, notwithstanding
still-high unemployment in the east.  Indeed, many of Germany’s prob-
lems can be traced directly to the still-astronomical costs of unification.
The United States economy remains fundamentally robust, despite the
slowdown that began near the end of the year 2000, and its low unem-
ployment levels are the envy of many advanced capitalist countries.
But the 1980s and 1990s have exposed cracks in the foundations of
Germany’s social market economy and of the more free market United
States approach.  Germany is experiencing far greater difficulties in
integrating the eastern and western economies and societies than was
anticipated at the time of unification in 1990.  Official unemployment
in eastern Germany remains well over the EU average (which is hover-
ing between 8 and 12 percent), and social tensions have spawned polit-
ically disruptive and even frightening debates about underlying causes.
Many employers insist the problems are chiefly related to high labor
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costs and centralized bargaining.  Yet studies have found significant
organizational and managerial rigidities, which surely play into the
slow pace of change that contributes to Germany’s competitiveness
problems, especially in the service and high-technology sectors (Wal-
genbach 1993; Lane 1989).  Similarly, it has become common to criti-
cize the German economy for its lack of easily available venture capital
and for various other innovation-inhibiting features of its financial sys-
tem.
In the United States, macrolevel indicators of overall economic
competitiveness have long been paralleled by extreme disparities in
earnings and wealth.  These disparities are starkly visible in certain
regions, sectors, and subsectors, which remain extraordinarily underde-
veloped by the standards of the advanced capitalist world.  Inequality is
perpetuated by and reflected in the fragmented nature of employment
relations: well-paying union and nonunion jobs in strong manufactur-
ing and service industries exist alongside extremely insecure, low-pay-
ing, mostly nonunion jobs in smaller, weaker companies and
industries.  Such inequalities would not arise in Germany because of
the presence of strong, central coordinating institutions in the areas of
employment relations and related aspects of the political economy.
Closely linked to this patchwork quilt of work and employment in the
United States is the extremely uneven quality of workers’ and manag-
ers’ skills, which has alarming implications for even medium-term
national competitiveness.
Our focused comparisons of specific political economic domains
in these two countries allows us to avoid what Hyman (1994, p. 1)
calls “the crude juxtaposition of superficial and ill-digested data . . . or
else a gauche imposition on national experience of preset taxonomies.”
These chapters report on original research by scholars who share a
loose, institutional analytical approach and an interest in understand-
ing work and employment relationships in their political economic
contexts.  We focus on four contemporary arenas of political economic
change: telecommunications deregulation and privatization, manage-
ment development systems, supplier relations, and employment rela-
tions.
Much comparison—especially of the United States and Ger-
many—has had an implicit bias toward one or another model.  In the




democratic institutions are good per se and that we should all learn
from countries like Germany.  In fact, of course, institutions will
always constrain some actors while supporting others, and precisely
which actors are constrained or supported changes over time.  For
example, in the 1930s and early 1940s, the United States employer
community saw itself as benefiting from the Wagner Act, which gov-
erned union–management relations in most sectors.  This act appeared
to guarantee labor peace and far-ranging managerial prerogatives.
Today, most employers and even some unionists are actively hostile to
that legal framework.  In 1952, German unions and employers were
extremely anxious about the effects of the Works Constitution Act
which regulated codetermination at the workplace by instituting the
most powerful works councils in Europe.  Currently, many German
employers are positively inclined toward the councils and most unions
see them as powerful allies at the point of production.  In short, institu-
tions per se are not good or bad, but the functions they perform for
society and the economy at a given point in time certainly can be (see,
for example, Dore 1973; Maurice, Sellier, and Sylvestre 1986; see also
Berger and Piore 1980).
The idea of “best institutions” has its analog in that of “best prac-
tice,” according to which firm-level flexibility is good in and of itself,
and which implies that everyone should learn from the United States.
Throughout the 1980s, the business press promoted certain corporate
practices as more or less context-independent solutions to common
international pressures (see, for instance, Hamel and Prahalad 1994;
Kotter and Heskett 1992; Womack, Jones, and Roos 1991).  Since the
collapse of the Soviet system, business consultants and scholars have
broadened their prescriptions to encompass “best” economic institu-
tions as well (Naisbitt 1997; Porter 1998).  In greater or lesser measure,
these works are premised on the notion that there are single best ways
for corporations to organize work, production, and service delivery
and, at least by implication, for societies to structure national econo-
mies.
In fact, however, learning is not about strategic choices of best
practices.  Even at the company level, learning is very conditional: Jap-
anese-style lean production looks very different in Germany than it
does in the United States.  Institutions can constrain and/or support
strategies and practices, but the reverse is true as well—strategies and
 
Mututal Learning with Trade-Offs 7
 
practices can also affect institutions.  It remains as important to ask
who has the power to exercise strategic choices as it does to determine
how these choices can be exercised and how people think about them.  
Finally, we need to add to our explanatory framework not just insti-
tutions, organizations, and the strategies and practices that make sense
within the contexts they establish, but also the ways in which
entrenched ideologies (often translated into strategies) may not reflect
any natural interests of either employers or the collective representa-
tives of labor.  Differing ideas—for example, about best practice or
appropriate ways of negotiating conflicting interests—can both ener-
gize learning by offering breadth and impede it when certain poten-
tially constructive ideas are ruled out.  This added dimension is so
extraordinarily difficult to define that we do not attempt to do so.  How-
ever, it can be discerned throughout the dynamics we analyze here.
While it is the least developed dimension of our comparative studies,




Since the 1990s, social scientists have often placed Germany and
the United States at more or less opposite ends of a conceptual contin-
uum, with the institutionally coordinated German Social Market Econ-
omy and its employment relations system at one end and the U.S.
political economy, with its decentralized system of labor–management
relations, at the other.  We try to play on the strengths of this heuristic
without getting caught up in it, staying open to ways in which it may
not fit the comparison.  By pointing up strengths and weaknesses at
each end, these chapters throw curves, possibly loops, into the concep-
tual continuum.
We develop the German-American comparison by placing employ-
ment relations side-by-side with related areas of political economic
activity.  This contextualization is unconventional.  It does not system-
atically examine the role of the state or the historical development of
institutions; neither does it offer traditional sectoral comparisons of
employment relations.  Therefore, we sacrifice some theoretical ele-




gain something we believe is more important: a sometimes messy but
empirically rich examination of key arenas of political economic
change, each of which either directly or indirectly influences and
reflects industrial and employment relations in the two countries.  Tak-
ing four different points of departure, we focus on the intersection
between the strategies and practices of employers, unions, and
employer associations (among other actors) and the cultural and insti-
tutional frameworks within which they operate.
Chapter 2, by Rosemary Batt and Owen Darbishire, analyzes the
deregulation and privatization of the telecommunications industries in
the United States and Germany, emphasizing the interplay between
organizational and institutional change and labor–management rela-
tions.  Batt and Darbishire place the break-up of AT&T and the deregu-
lation and privatization of Deutsche Telekom at opposite ends of a
continuum.  At the U.S. end of the continuum we see virtually no polit-
ical constraints on private-sector strategies.  In Germany, however, the
Postal Workers Union succeeded in slowing organizational change and
protecting workers in the process.  In both cases, but especially in Ger-
many, it is not clear that consumers have benefited substantially from
the reorganization of the industry.  However, it is clear that in Germany
labor has not (yet?) become a “loser” in this transformation, while the
U.S. change has resulted in mass layoffs and a weakening of the
unions.  Nevertheless, significant variations in labor–management rela-
tions and negotiations within this sector in the United States illustrate a
relatively wide range of possible outcomes.
David Finegold and Brent Keltner’s chapter on management devel-
opment (Chapter 3) draws attention to how the strengths of each coun-
try are mirrored by weaknesses in the other.  The authors argue that the
Germans are good at providing a high floor of technical competence in
managerial development.  They also show, however, that functional
specialization and organizational rigidity are supported by narrowly
defined university training curricula as well as management career
paths.  In the United States, by contrast, we find broadly skilled manag-
ers who are flexibly deployed in organizations.  However, in smaller
firms, the quality of management development (especially in technical
areas) is highly uneven, and the “floor” of management skills is lower
than in Germany.  This chapter sheds light on the advantages and dis-
 
Mututal Learning with Trade-Offs 9
 
advantages of each country’s institutions and approaches to manage-
ment as a field, and thus management development.
In Chapter 4, Steven Casper compares two efforts at mutual learn-
ing and innovation in the area of supplier relations.  He analyzes the
implementation of Japanese just-in-time (JIT) inventory systems in
Germany and the United States and the significant implications for
changing relationships among firms.  In Germany, we learn just how
cumbersome institutional change can be in the face of preexisting legal
arrangements of corporate governance.  In the United States, Casper
shows the obstacles to the diffusion of innovations such as JIT in a set-
ting in which corporate law allows private sector firms far greater lati-
tude than in Germany.  Both the concerted employer action in Germany
and the company-by-company strategies in the United States have
advantages and disadvantages, and here again, variations within each
country suggest learning possibilities not just between the two coun-
tries but among industries and even firms within them.
Finally, in Chapter 5, Lowell Turner, Michael Fichter, and I exam-
ine contemporary employment relations in the two countries.  Because
employment relations are so deeply embedded in national and lower-
level institutional structures, this chapter follows from the others and
most clearly illustrates the interconnected nature of the various facets
of the two political economies.  We characterize Germany as struggling
with a crisis of the “high road”: high wages, high-level skills, and high
labor-value-added in a highly institutionalized labor market.  The
United States faces a crisis of the “low road,” with relatively stagnant
wages, income inequality, continuing union decline, and highly frag-
mented and competing systems of employment relations embedded in
an extremely diverse political economy.  Given the very different
nature of the problems facing the two countries, we suggest very differ-
ent policy prescriptions for approaching those crises, based in large
measure on the mirror image conceptualization noted earlier.
The political economic spheres of activity analyzed here either
directly involve or are closely interwoven with the relationship
between labor and employers.  Batt and Darbishire, in their chapter on
telecommunications, explicitly analyze the impact on labor–manage-
ment relations of this sector’s reorganization.  Finegold and Keltner’s
chapter on management training systems in the two countries has indi-




managers are trained has a great deal to do with how organizations are
run.  How managers are trained can not be disentangled from the con-
tent and effectiveness of management’s labor and human resource
strategies.  Relations among employers, such as the supplier relations
analyzed by Casper, tell us a great deal about the functioning of differ-
ent versions of capitalism (e.g., the social market versus the free mar-
ket variant).  These differences have important implications for the
scope of collective action in labor–management relations.  Finally, the
Turner, Fichter, and Wever analysis of employment relations in Chapter
5 explains how labor, management, and the employment relationship




Powerful social actors cannot afford to and/or do not want to wait
for national political processes to solve urgent political economic prob-
lems; but they can benefit from the mutual learning process, and—as
the chapters of this volume show—to some extent they do.  Yet there
remains much to be done.  The German telecommunications industry
still appears far too constrained by the nature and tenor of labor–man-
agement relations to meet customers’ needs.  Institutional change, such
as the introduction of JIT, is hampered by the legal arrangements of
corporate governance.  Functional specialization and organizational
rigidity within firms are supported by narrowly defined university
training curricula and management career paths.  German employment
relations severely tax many struggling companies in the eastern states
and, increasingly, smaller companies in the west.  The U.S. case also
offers a mixed picture.  As the JIT story illustrates, the lack of mecha-
nisms in the United States for coordinating employers’ actions is not in
their collective interest.  Telecommunications deregulation has forced
more rapid firm-level adjustment than has been possible in Germany,
but the economy has also suffered from a lack of industry-wide coordi-
nation, which has in turn led to arguably unnecessary technological
investments and to suboptimal outcomes for labor and customers.
Especially in smaller U.S. firms, the uneven quality of management
development (particularly in technical areas) results in substantial mea-
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sure from the lack of coordinated skills and training standards above
the level of the individual firm.  Perhaps the most glaring example of
the problems associated with a lack of institutional framework supports
is found in employment relations and the resulting stagnant wages,
income inequality, union decline, and associated social problems.
In many regards, the U.S.-German comparison suggests an analogy,
with the strengths of each country reflected in the weaknesses of the
other.  While the U.S. economy is doing well by macroeconomic indi-
cators, the social costs of U.S.-style growth are significant.  If the Ger-
man social fabric remains fairly stable, fears about competitiveness,
especially in the high-technology and service sectors, combined with
continuing high levels of unemployment, present the opposite picture:
social stability at high economic cost.  There appears to be a trade-off
between the so-called employment miracle of the United States and the
relatively more even distribution of wealth and income (in part due to a
significant social wage) in the German social market economy.
We find evidence of trade-offs in each of the instances of political
economic change analyzed in this volume.  As illustrated by Batt and
Darbishire, in the German telecommunications industry, workers con-
tinue to maintain high levels of employment.  However, Deutsche Tele-
kom has been extremely slow to adopt new technologies and organi-
zational strategies, such that services long considered standard in the
United States remain limited or unavailable to German customers.  On
the other hand, rapid technological and organizational change in the
United States have benefited (especially business) consumers while
entailing considerable wage and work-rule concessions and mass lay-
offs among the industry’s workers.
The trade-off with respect to management development systems in
the two countries leaves most German firms with technically compe-
tent but functionally specialized managers, as shown by Finegold and
Keltner.  The high floor of technical competence appears to be gained
at the cost of the development of broadly skilled managers who could
be deployed cross-functionally in high-performance organizations (see,
for example, Applebaum and Batt 1994; Berg 1997).  In the United
States, by contrast, high-performance innovation is common in compa-
nies with strong market positions, while smaller, less competitive firms
are left to choose from a labor market pool of managers with relatively




A similar contrast emerges in Casper’s analysis of supplier rela-
tions.  Here again, German institutional rigidities, in this instance in the
form of legal frameworks structuring interfirm relations, create barriers
to innovations in how suppliers and final producers distribute the risks
associated with the introduction of JIT.  The relatively unconstrained
nature of interfirm contracting relationships in the United States stands
in marked contrast.  However, the result in the United States is that
weaker market players, in this case supplier firms, are to some extent
forced to accept the terms of stronger final assemblers.  While some
U.S. assemblers have developed stable, long-term relations with sup-
pliers that mitigate some of the effects of this imbalance of market
power, many have not.  Meanwhile, historically rooted legal frame-
works in Germany work to protect suppliers at the expense of end pro-
ducers to the extent that the former require on-site inspection of
supplied parts at delivery—precisely the sort of time-consuming pro-
cess that JIT is designed to avoid.  As Casper points out, the familiar
institutional rigidity/market flexibility trade-off holds in this arena as
well.  The coordinated innovation of new legal frameworks within
trade associations in the German electronics industry (now apparently
diffusing to other industries) represents an exception rather than a rule.
Finally, the trade-off appears as one between stability and innova-
tion in Chapter 5 on employment relations.  The segmented U.S. sys-
tem, with multiple competing models of industrial, labor, and employ-
ment relations, is characterized by everything from internationally
impressive innovations in labor–management partnerships to low-trust,
low-skill, low-wage cases and industries.  Strong market players can
hire and retain skilled workers or train workers that they hire.  They can
also develop high-performance work organizations that capitalize on
workers’ skills, including their ability to participate directly in manage-
ment decision making, which in turn bolsters these companies’ overall
competitiveness.  Smaller and/or weaker companies, often lacking the
resources to train workers adequately, and often confronting a labor
pool of relatively unskilled workers (or workers whose skills do not
match their needs), are generally unable to pursue what Turner, Fichter,
and I call “high-road” employment strategies.  This further weakens
their overall market position.  Workers may “win” if they are employed
by “winning” companies or, in some cases, if they are represented by
unions that can induce firms to pursue high-road strategies.
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Undoubtedly some of these are unavoidable trade-offs between a
socially negotiated and a more unilateral market-oriented approach to
political economic change and adjustment.  However, it does not follow
that anything gained by mutual learning entails an equal and opposite
loss.  In the cases analyzed here, we find both necessary trade-offs and
trade-offs that may simply reflect articles of ideological faith that are
difficult to alter but are not in any way naturally determined.  We hope
that this book will help illustrate how these trade-offs can be finessed.
To do so, actors in each country will have to pay closer attention to the
difference between institutional constraints—ideologically unaccept-
able in the United States and increasingly onerous to some social actors
in Germany—and institutional supports.  Such supports  provide at least
the potential for balancing social and economic interests, as illustrated
by Germany’s spectacular postwar economic miracle.  
The Germans are probably at an advantage in that they already
have in place a set of institutions that can contain debates about new
and emerging issues of substantive change.  For instance, regional col-
lective bargaining among employer associations and large industrial
unions provides a forum for renegotiating which issues will be ham-
mered out between individual firms and their works councils and
which will be negotiated at the meso-level.  In the United States, local
and regional actors in a few places have begun to create such institu-
tions but these are as yet young and far from robust (Parker 1997).  Yet
in a different way, the United States is in a better position than Ger-
many: Americans seem to have a peculiar talent for seeing the need for
change, reorganizing and recombining resources (including human
resources) to accommodate shifting contexts, and then remaining open
and flexible.  It remains to be seen which—if either—of these compar-








 is the German term for the new states of the former East Germany.
2. Employers “poach” when they hire employees away from firms that have already
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The telecommunications services industry provides a particularly
useful and interesting lens for considering the issue of mutual learning
between the United States and Germany.  As noted in Chapter 1 to this
volume, most learning in the field of industrial relations has tended to
be a one-way street, with U.S. researchers and practitioners advocating
the replication of successful components of the “German model,” such
as the apprenticeship system or works councils, which undergird high
levels of skill and productivity in manufacturing.  The experience of
the telecommunications industry, however, provides the opportunity
for Germany also to learn from the United States because the United
States continues to lead the world in providing high-quality universal
service.  Mutual learning is particularly important in this industry
because it employs 1–2 percent of the workforce in both countries
(Katz 1997) and provides a critical infrastructure for the competitive-
ness of firms and “information-based” economies.   
Historically and currently, the leadership role of the United States
in telecommunications grows out of its technological innovations, with
early pioneering work in information technologies and systems engi-
neering at AT&T’s Bell Labs and with the later deployment of cellular,
satellite, and other advanced technologies by new entrants such as
Microwave Communications Inc. (MCI).  The availability of alterna-
tive wireless communications systems from MCI and others, in turn,
convinced U.S. regulators that the AT&T monopoly was not viable,
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leading to deregulation of the long-distance and equipment markets by
1984.
 
1   
 
In response to deregulation and new low-cost competitors,
AT&T reoriented its corporate strategies and structures to serve differ-
entiated market segments, invested heavily in fiber-optic cable and dig-
ital transmission and switching systems, and reengineered operating
systems.  These innovations brought significant cost reductions in
equipment and long-distance service; dramatic improvements in
response time, quality, and speed of transmission; and diversity of
product offerings.  Business customers, who were heavy users of
equipment and long distance, particularly benefited.  In anticipation of
local deregulation (finally legislated in 1996), the regional Bell operat-
ing companies (RBOCs) mimicked AT&T’s strategies.  The U.S. case,
therefore, serves as an example of how organizational restructuring
improved performance of an industry that is vital to national economic
competitiveness (both directly and as an important input into other
goods- and service-producing industries). 
By contrast, in spite of a historically high level of technological
competence within Deutsche Telekom (Telekom), the nature and path
of adjustment in response to the pressures of competition and reform
have been significantly different, and slower.  Deutsche Telekom was
privatized in 1994 but still retained a monopoly in providing telephone
and cable TV.   Deployment of digital systems considerably lags
behind that in the United States, and consumers receive slower service
and fewer product offerings and pay higher prices.  Telekom has strug-
gled to reorganize itself by copying the corporate strategies, organiza-
tional structures, and work practices of U.S. firms.  
Because of the slower pace of reform, however, Telekom also
stands to learn from the mistakes made in the United States, where
deregulation has led to increased inequality among consumers and
workers.  For consumers, the restructuring has benefited businesses
because they no longer pay rates that subsidize universal residential
service.  Both business and high-end retail customers can take advan-
tage of falling prices for long-distance calling, high-speed networks, or
enhanced features such as voice messaging.  For lower-income con-
sumers, however, the basic costs of local service have risen, and these
consumers are less likely to be able to take advantage of new products
or enhanced features, even if they are less costly than before (Keefe




placed employees and reduced union strength, but it has also created
more unequal labor market conditions both within and between union
and nonunion segments.  To the extent that Germany wishes to pre-
serve equality for consumers and workers, this chapter provides an
analysis of how inequality in U.S. outcomes has occurred.  
The United States stands to learn from Germany as well.  In
response to real and anticipated deregulation, former Bell companies
downsized rapidly, depleting their embedded skill base, demoralizing
their workforce, and paying large severance or early retirement pack-
ages.  As an unintended consequence, those packages subsidized the
labor costs of competitors because competitors often hired former Bell
employees whose pension and health insurance were already covered
by their retirement packages.  Moreover, from 1996 on, Bell compa-
nies failed to anticipate the explosion in demand for Internet access and
new products, and they found themselves understaffed and scrambling




  This chapter demonstrates how
the slower pace and continued monopoly status of Telekom allowed it
the opportunity to retrain its workforce and shift employees from tradi-
tional to growth segments of the market without incurring the substan-
tial costs of turnover and displacement, which negatively affect both
management and labor.
These differences in paths to restructuring are more striking
because U.S. and German telecommunications monopolists have quite
similar starting points.  This similarity is in contrast to manufacturing,
where mass-production systems in the United States were considerably
more developed than in Germany.  Historically, most countries oper-
ated public telephone monopolies with quite similar organizational
structures.  These companies were highly regulated, quasi-public enter-
prises providing a basic service to the public.  While Deutsche Telekom
operated as part of the Bundespost, which included the national post,
bank, and telecommunications, under the auspices of the Federal Min-
ister of Posts and Telecommunications, AT&T was regulated by the
(functionally similar) Federal Communications Commission (FCC).
Generally, telephone companies were large bureaucratic organizations
offering lifetime employment with high wages and benefits to employ-
ees who either considered themselves public servants or who were offi-
cially part of the civil service.  In other words, the internal labor market
rules governing work and employment relations in different countries
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(beyond just the United States and Germany) appear to have been
remarkably similar.  Equally, unionization rates in the industry were
very high among eligible workers.  Under these circumstances, one
might expect the United States, Germany, and other countries to follow
similar paths to deregulation, with similar corporate strategic responses
and stakeholder outcomes.
Other unique features of the industry argue for the adoption of par-
allel adjustment paths among countries.  To be globally competitive,
most former national telecommunications monopolies need to pursue,
and have pursued, joint ventures in order to enter each others’ markets,
such as AT&T with its World Partners and Deutsche Telekom with
France Télécom and Sprint.  These companies are laying global net-
works of cable to provide integrated voice, video, and data services to
worldwide customers.  The integrated nature, or “systemness,” of net-
work technology requires compatibility of systems across regional and
national boundaries.  Moreover, because of the concentrated structure
of the industry in each country, in which former monopolists continue
to be the dominant players, the strategic choices of a handful of players
significantly shape the direction of industrial change.  The key players,
who include Deutsche Telekom, AT&T, and the regional Bell operating
companies in the United States, closely watch and learn from each
other’s experience.  In contrast to manufacturing, where decentralized
production units are more viable, this predilection to watch and learn
again increases the likelihood that the transfer of technology and the
borrowing of work organization strategies among countries will be
substantial.
Yet in spite of the similarity of initial starting points and underly-
ing pressures for change, the trajectory of the telecommunications
industry in the United States and Germany has diverged.  We argue that
the different paths of restructuring in the two countries reflect classic
underlying differences in governance structures and industrial relations
systems.  There is also variation within the United States, however,
which reflects the weak institutionalization and fragmentation in gov-
ernment regulatory bodies and labor market institutions at the national
and state levels.  Thus, we argue that differences in national and
regional industrial relations systems play a central role, both in shaping
regulatory policy and in shaping corporate strategy and work organiza-




ent outcomes for stakeholders: consumers, firms, employees, and
unions.  We distinguish cases along a continuum from the highly
unconstrained, “market-driven” example of AT&T, to the intermediate
“consumer-driven” cases of two RBOCs, to the highly constrained,
“labor-mediated” approach of Germany.
On the product market side, deregulation and reregulation are the
result of political contests within existing institutional structures and
are therefore not exogenous.  In the AT&T case, market reform was
evolutionary and did not occur through legislative or “overtly political”
action.  Rather, MCI, backed by corporate constituents, used the FCC
and the courts to create a “free market.”  In an interesting twist on the
historic use of the courts to undermine labor’s power, the MCI coali-
tion used the courts to undermine the power of the unionized employer
and create a nonunion alternative.  The resulting policy was one of
“regulatory asymmetry” that privileged new entrants, ensured that
AT&T would lose market share, and prohibited former Bell system
companies from entering certain product markets (local and cable TV
in the case of AT&T and long distance, equipment, and cable TV in the
case of the RBOCs).  This structure, in turn, created the incentive for
reregulated Bell companies to shift the costs of restructuring to their
unionized workforce.  In sum, the evolutionary transformation of the
product market was a response to corporate constituents who pushed in
a pluralistic (or fragmented) institutional environment not for complete
market deregulation but for reregulation that would favor new entrants.
In contrast to AT&T, the RBOCs enjoyed a longer time horizon
and more favorable conditions for restructuring because they served
local markets, which were not as lucrative for new entrants.  More
importantly, politically elected regulators and legislators were con-
cerned about the potential negative effects of restructuring on the mass
of citizen consumers—their political base. The RBOCs were and con-
tinue to be regulated by state Public Utility Commissions (PUCs),
elected bodies whose purpose is to keep rates low for consumers and to
ensure universal service.  Product-market liberalization occurred incre-
mentally, on a state-by-state basis.  In exchange for guarantees of low
rates and continued quality service, some state PUCs replaced fixed
rates with more market-oriented, “incentive” rates—rates that allowed
RBOCs to retain some of the profits from efficiency-enhancing innova-
tions.  In the two cases here, BellSouth was successful in this strategy
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 was not.  In addition, rather
than oppose deregulation as AT&T had done, all of the RBOCs united
to use their political strength in states and communities across the
country to gain U.S. Congressional support for a version of deregula-
tion that favored incumbent local providers, the bill that finally passed
in 1996.   
In the German case, it was the powerful Deutsche Postgewerk-
schaft (DPG) union that successfully pressured the national govern-
ment to approach deregulation at a much slower and more cautious
pace and in ways that have privileged and protected Deutsche Telekom
in the intervening period.  In this case, the “regulatory asymmetry,”
which favors Telekom and the unionized workforce, is not a response
to business (as in the AT&T case) or to consumers (as in the RBOC
case), but to labor.  As Germany privatizes and deregulates the tele-
communications industry, for example, Telekom has been allowed to
continue monopoly control of the cable TV market, potentially giving
it a substantial strategic and competitive advantage.  The DPG was able
to exercise significant influence and protect employee and union inter-
ests because it operated in a neocorporatist framework within a “semi-
sovereign state” (Katzenstein 1987).  That is, within the German sys-
tem, political power is dispersed between large, encompassing social
groups and decentralized states.  The integration of peak economic
interests into the formulation of economic policy constrains unilateral
decision making and promotes cooperation and consensus.  Privatiza-
tion and reregulation have, consequently, occurred in a framework
designed to perpetuate union and employee rights.
Differences in labor market institutions and managerial strategic
choice provide a parallel story.  AT&T’s market-driven approach has
been characterized by unilateral action on the part of management, a
failure to jointly develop work reorganization strategies, and a reliance
on technology and reengineering, rather than human resource strate-
gies, to achieve organizational reform and competitiveness.  As a
result, the workforce has borne the major costs of restructuring.  The
restrictions on entering new markets, coupled with the economies of
scale of new technology and cost pressures from new nonunion
entrants, led AT&T to downsize its nonmanagement workforce by 60




The RBOCs have imitated many of AT&T’s strategies, but with a
longer time horizon and under the constraints of state PUCs.  While the
mission of the PUCs is not to protect union or workers’ rights, unions
have been able to leverage the concern of the PUCs for consumer wel-
fare to gain decisions that also benefit workers.  For example, unions
have united with consumer groups to block rate reform unless accom-
panied by higher staffing levels to ensure good customer service.  They
also have induced the RBOCs to agree to union rights in their new sub-
sidiaries in exchange for not opposing RBOC petitions before state
utility commissions.  Thus, the strategic use of PUC oversight by
unions has had an indirect positive effect on worker welfare and union
rights, an effect that varies among states.
The German approach, by contrast, has been a “mutualist,” or
labor-mediated, one.  The DPG has slowed the pace of deregulation
while simultaneously seeking to protect union and employee interests
through detailed involvement and participation in the reorganization of
work and corporate structures.  Equally, until late 1995, the DPG
restricted the possibility of downsizing, while it also influenced corpo-
rate strategies to encourage the development of an expanded range of
services to ease the impact of digitalization on the workforce.  How-
ever, the slower pace has translated into slower adoption of new tech-
nologies, work practices, and corporate structures.  The quality and
availability of new services has suffered.  Consequently, consumers
rather than workers have absorbed more of the costs of restructuring.
The remainder of this chapter elaborates the details of the above argu-
ment by presenting the evidence of the U.S. cases and the German





The events surrounding the breakup of the Bell System in 1984
have been well documented (Coll 1986; Temin 1987; Stone 1989;
Teske 1990; Cohen 1992).  The attack on AT&T’s monopoly was in
response to a series of regulatory decisions, in the 1940s through
1960s, which meant that AT&T’s high long-distance rates were
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increasingly subsidizing local calls.  This created an incentive for new
competitors to enter the lucrative long-distance market, offering ser-
vices at costs lower than AT&T but above “market-clearing” prices.
After winning a 1969 lawsuit that allowed it to provide private-line ser-
vices, MCI spent the next decade building an anti-AT&T coalition
comprising other new entrants, the computer industry led by IBM, and
major corporate users, particularly multinational financial services and
airline corporations (Aronson and Cowhey 1988; Teske 1990; Cohen
1992).  A series of FCC decisions in the 1970s, coupled with court rul-
ings which favored the anti-AT&T coalition, progressively undermined
the structure of the Bell system.
Divestiture occurred with very little political support.  Over 70 per-
cent of telephone customers opposed the 1984 breakup of the Bell sys-





  Even the Reagan administration
opposed the breakup.  However, the pluralistic structure of the U.S.
government meant that “interested parties could approach that part of
the government most sympathetic to their cause” (Temin 1987, p. 341).
In the early 1980s, MCI, IBM, and business customers achieved their
goals through the Department of Justice and the courts, having become
frustrated with Congress and temporarily blocked by the FCC.
The court order that dismantled the Bell system in 1984 responded
to the interests of the anti-AT&T coalition: MCI and other alternative
providers gained access to long-distance markets; multinational corpo-
rate users obtained reductions in the cost of long distance and equip-
ment inputs.  AT&T retained its long-distance and equipment operation
but was forced to compete in a system of “asymmetric regulation,”
which ensured that AT&T’s long-distance market share dropped
steadily.  By 1994, this share amounted to 60 percent (FCC 1992/
1993).  AT&T’s 22 local telephone companies were merged into the
seven RBOC monopolies, which were barred from participation in
equipment production.  They could only enter other markets providing
they did not use their monopoly position to do so. 
Stakeholders, such as unions, employees, and residential custom-
ers, were entirely excluded from the deregulatory process and were
unable to promote either the status quo or the security of union institu-
tions, a sharp contrast to Germany.  In spite of the fact that Bell system




workforce, neither job security nor the future of collective bargaining
structures was addressed in the divestiture process (Darbishire 1997b).
In the following sections, we assess the variation in processes and
outcomes of restructuring in the cases of AT&T and of the RBOCs
BellSouth and NYNEX, to illustrate how variation in product and labor
market institutions have shaped firm strategies and stakeholder out-
comes.  The variation reflects differences in the extent and rapidity of
deregulation, differences between local and long-distance product mar-
kets, and differences in the political embeddedness of the enterprises
and union strategic responses.  More fundamentally, the extent of vari-
ation reflects the fact that institutions such as labor unions and
employee and consumer groups that might have strengthened the posi-
tions of their members were weak, and this weakness left room for sub-




The AT&T case represents a strong example of managerial prerog-
ative in which the company focused on converting itself from a public
service bureaucracy to a lean, sales-maximizing global enterprise.
Three factors shaped AT&T’s business and labor strategy during this
period: its strategic focus on global over domestic markets, its lack of
political constraints or local service requirements, and its need to
immediately compete in an asymmetrical regulatory environment
against new low-cost competitors such as MCI and Sprint.  Union
influence on AT&T’s strategy has been limited to maintaining high rel-
ative wages and negotiating generous severance and early retirement
packages in exchange for labor peace.  Although joint labor–manage-
ment work-design initiatives received considerable publicity in the
1990s, they had little impact on actual management practices. 
First, with respect to globalization, AT&T focused on the “natural”
extension of its long-distance market and leveraged this competitive
advantage to create international networks, reshaping itself into a glo-
bal corporation.  Global service means providing an integrated set of
voice, data, and video services though a seamless international net-
work, particularly for multinational businesses.  This global strategy
has included political efforts to reduce international trade barriers,
including a strong push to deregulate public monopolies in all coun-
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tries.  The RBOCs, by contrast, have entered international markets by
leveraging their expertise in local service provision to form joint ven-
tures with national monopolists to improve basic services, particularly
in developing countries.
Second, AT&T and the RBOC’s historic division of the long-dis-
tance and local market within the United States means that AT&T
largely has indirect contact with its massive customer base.  AT&T’s
long-distance service is provided through access to local networks
operated by the RBOCs, who themselves have a more direct and ongo-
ing relationship with customers.  AT&T continues to be regulated by
the FCC, but it does not have political ties to states or regions and is not
constrained by state PUCs.  AT&T has taken advantage of its national
structure to consolidate and move operations to whatever location
offers the lowest cost. The RBOCs, by contrast, cannot move opera-
tions out of their state jurisdictions without state PUC approval.   
Finally, in 1984 (just after the deregulation of the long-distance
and equipment markets), AT&T immediately began competing against
new nonunion, low-cost entrants in long distance in the asymmetric
regulatory environment.  The cost advantages of these new competitors
derived from the following: they did not inherit bureaucratic organiza-
tional structures, they began with more maintenance-free technologies,
they did not have sunk costs in obsolete technologies or have to reengi-
neer complex systems, and they were operating with a younger, non-
union workforce with labor costs of roughly half those of the Bell
companies.
To respond to these cost pressures, AT&T reorganized into cross-
functional business units targeting distinct market segments: large busi-
ness, small business, and residential customers.  To achieve segmented
marketing strategies, business unit reorganization, and geographic con-
solidation, AT&T relied primarily on its traditional strengths of tech-
nology and engineering to achieve economies of scale rather than on
human resource strategies.  It anticipated significant gains in cross-
functional coordination through reengineered information systems that
flow horizontally.  These technology and reengineering strategies were
designed to maximize the multiple goals of reducing costs, increasing
the speed and quality of transmission, expanding the variety of services




On the network side, AT&T upgraded its long-distance network by
replacing copper with fiber-optic cable and completing the digitaliza-
tion of switching and transmission systems.  Together these technolo-
gies created a system that is largely maintenance-free and has greater
capacity to transmit voice, video, data, and higher quality service.  Dig-
italization allows employees to remotely diagnose and repair network
systems.  This capability has reduced the demand for blue-collar craft
workers with high levels of traditional electromechanical skills.  They
have been replaced by a much smaller number of white-collar com-
puter specialists and systems analysts and a much larger number of
computer-monitoring clerks paid at 80 percent of former craft wages.
Central office switching was consolidated into two major centers—one
serving customers east of the Mississippi and one serving those to the
west, plus a handful of remote regional centers (MacDuffie and Mac-
coby 1986).
On the sales and service side, AT&T cut costs and labor by consol-
idating hundreds of local operator and customer service offices into a





 it has used new computer and software infor-
mation systems to create repetitive jobs that are machine-paced, elec-
tronically monitored, and functionally specialized.  This strategy,
however, varies significantly by market segment.  Automatic call distri-
bution systems determine the call volume of customers and automati-
cally link them to the appropriate labor market segment. College-
educated managers handle large business customers and provide on-
site, “one-stop shopping.”  Nonmanagement service consultants serve
small business customers, handling 25–30 calls per day.  Residential
service reps serve the mass of consumers; unlike “universal service
reps” of the past, these employees are now functionally specialized into
sales, billing, collections, and repair.  Furthermore, they are tied to
computers driven by expert systems and handle roughly 80–90 calls
per day.  Management and union representatives alike agree that these
have become the most stressful jobs in the industry because of intense
pressure to sell, to handle customers courteously, and to turn over calls
quickly, all within the context of ongoing electronic monitoring. 
In sum, the market segmentation strategy increases inequality in
service among customer segments according to the ability to pay; the
strategy also increases labor market segmentation within companies, as
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the design of jobs, skill requirements, and wage levels are equated to
the customer segment being served (see Batt 2000a for a broader dis-
cussion of these segmentation strategies and outcomes).  This segmen-
tation strategy, coupled with the downward pressure on wages from
nonunion competitors, particularly at the lower end, has led to
increased labor market inequality within occupations, companies, and
the industry as a whole.  Between 1984 and 1994, for example, wage
inequality within customer services more than tripled (Batt and
Strausser 1998; Batt and Keefe 1999).
Two additional effects of these strategies on the workforce have
been paramount: labor displacement and declining morale.  While ini-
tially viewed as a temporary strategy, downsizing became an increas-
ingly routine part of business for AT&T in the decade following
deregulation.  AT&T reduced its domestic nonmanagement workforce
by 60 percent between 1984 and 1995 (from 250,000 to 100,000); it




  As downsizing continued,
involuntary rather than voluntary separations came to represent an
increasing proportion of the terminations, with later rounds of down-
sizing offering employees smaller severance or early retirement pack-
ages.  In the first two years of postdivestiture operations, for example,
AT&T reduced its head count by 56,000 positions.  Only 25 percent
involved layoffs; the remainder left through attrition, voluntary sever-
ance, early retirement, transfers within AT&T, or transfers back to the
RBOCs.  Between 1984 and 1992, 58 percent of separations in the
unionized workforce involved layoffs, while 42 percent involved vol-
untary separations.  In the company’s 1996 announcement of another
round of downsizing, it indicated that most separations would occur
through layoffs (see Keefe and Batt 1997).
For the survivor workforce, restructuring has had profound effects
on morale.  While in 1981, 68 percent of the nonmanagement employ-
ees felt that the company provided job security and only 8 percent did
not, by 1991, the opposite was true: 73 percent said there was little job
security while less than 4 percent felt there was any job security.  Sixty-
six percent felt unable to affect the course of events at AT&T, and 80
percent had little confidence in management’s ability to lead the corpo-
ration (Keefe and Batt 1997).  Career opportunities also fell.  Whereas
in the past, employees would follow job ladders in local communities,




promotion opportunities.  A 1991 study surveyed workers who had sur-
vived several rounds of downsizing at AT&T.  Those workers whose
jobs had been “surplused” (eliminated) and who had stayed at AT&T
by transferring to other positions found themselves in the “surplus” sta-
tus on average 2.5 times in a five-year period (Keefe and Boroff 1994,
p. 328).  Some 87 percent of the survey respondents said they wanted
to keep their current jobs until they retired, but less than 10 percent
believed that there was any opportunity for advancement at AT&T
(Keefe and Boroff 1994, p. 328).
AT&T’s cost-cutting labor strategy also included shifting from a
predominantly unionized (67 percent) workforce in 1984 to a predomi-
nantly nonunionized one (42 percent) in 1995.  This was accomplished
by downsizing the unionized core, expanding the workforce in non-
union enterprises, and increasing the number of management job titles,
which are ineligible for union representation.  AT&T established two
nonunion subsidiaries, American Transtech (the largest U.S. telemar-
keting service) and AT&T Universal Card (the second largest U.S.
credit card company).  It acquired two nonunion equipment manufac-
turers, Paradyne (data communications equipment) and National Cash
Register (NCR).  American Transtech and NCR were subsequently
spun off as separate companies.  In addition, new jobs requiring more
technical or professional skills related to new technologies were often
defined as managerial and exempt from union representation.  As a
result, the percentage of the workforce defined as managerial grew
from 29 percent in 1984 to over 50 percent in 1995 (Keefe and Batt
1997). 
Labor–management relations, historically cooperative, collapsed
under these pressures, as did the Quality of Worklife (QWL) program
negotiated in 1980.  Beginning in the late 1980s, AT&T initiated some
joint union–management experiments in total quality management
(TQM) and self-managed teams.  However, most fell apart in the 1990s
when the company initiated downsizing and reengineering, which
undermined employee morale and the stable relationships between
workers and managers necessary to make these innovations successful.
In 1992, a negotiated pact, “Workplace of the Future,” was designed to
reestablish cooperative labor–management relations by involving the
union and workers in work innovations at several levels of the organi-
zation, from the strategic business units to the workplace.  Successful
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adoption, however, depended on managerial choice at decentralized
business units, and few managers chose to participate.  Today, many
managers, workers, and trade unionists remain highly skeptical about
top management’s commitment to this effort.  They cite AT&T’s his-
tory of presenting positive public relations images but not following
through on the implementation.
 
The Regional Bell Companies: 
BellSouth and NYNEX 
 
The political debate and approach to regulatory reform surround-
ing the RBOCs has been considerably different than that for AT&T
because of the RBOCs’ central role in providing basic universal ser-
vice.  The issue of consumer welfare figured more prominently in the
debate over deregulating local markets among both national and state
officials, and as elected officials responded to their constituents, labor
often benefited as an unintended consequence.  While long-distance
service is viewed as unessential, local service is considered a necessity
for emergency medical and life-threatening circumstances.  Because
costs exceed revenues in local service, regulators historically ensured
universal service by requiring AT&T to help subsidize local service by
paying an access fee to connect to the local Bell infrastructure, a
requirement extended to all long-distance companies after 1984.  
The central problem in local service deregulation, therefore, was to
figure out how to ensure continued universal access, particularly in
small towns and rural areas.  A “free market” solution would have
resulted in dramatic price increases for basic service, an unacceptable
political solution.  This, in fact, did occur as a result of long-distance
deregulation, where long-distance rates dropped by 40 percent and call
volume doubled, but basic residential rates increased by more than 60




The RBOCs, therefore, continued their monopoly in local service
in the decade after divestiture while regulators considered alternative
solutions.  This longer time horizon also benefited consumers as well
as employees by allowing the RBOCs to reduce their workforce
through attrition, early retirement offerings, or through retraining and
replacement in growth sides of the business, particularly cellular.




pushed through its version of legislative reform in the U.S. Congress, a
“fast track” version that favored incumbent providers over AT&T,
MCI, and new entrants.  In this version, local companies could offer
long-distance service as soon as they opened their markets to competi-
tors; but because of their established base, the RBOCs were considered
to have a competitive advantage.  Moreover, in May 1997, FCC regula-
tors finally issued rules to handle the cross-subsidy problem.  While a
comprehensive agreement on universal service was not reached, an ini-
tial compromise gave the RBOCs transition time by phasing in reduc-
tions in access charges over a five-year period, a longer time horizon
that will ease the negative effects on labor adjustment.  The long-dis-
tance lobby (AT&T, MCI, Sprint, and others) had sought complete,
immediate reductions.  FCC regulators also protected low-end users,
raised monthly rates by $1.50 for second lines to residences (e.g.,
higher-end consumers) and $3.00 for business consumers, and created
a special fund to subsidize Internet access to schools and public librar-
ies (Landler 1997).
Meanwhile, at the state level, the ongoing oversight of PUCs con-
strained the RBOCs’ business strategies in ways that directly favored
consumers, and indirectly, labor.  In the first half of the 1990s, for
example, PUCs cited several RBOCs for poor service delivery (Bell
Atlantic, NYNEX, and U.S. West), and in some cases (e.g., Bell Atlan-
tic and U.S. West) required the companies to increase staffing levels to
meet consumer demands.
State PUCs differ considerably in their standards and policies, and
BellSouth and NYNEX represent opposite ends of the spectrum.
While NYNEX has historically faced a “tough” New York state utility
commission (with respect to rate setting and service standards), Bell-
South has faced a more lenient one in its several-state area.  BellSouth
and NYNEX also operate under distinct labor laws; BellSouth operates
almost entirely in “right-to-work” states, with laws that weaken union
institutional security.  Thus, differences in the political role of the regu-
lators and in labor laws create a distinct institutional framework at the
regional level.  However, institutional variation does not fully explain
the regional variation in restructuring processes and outcomes.  In light
of weak regional institutional structures for stakeholder participation,
the strategic choices of the companies and their unions played a far
stronger role in determining the variation of outcomes (Turner 1991). 
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On the one hand, the BellSouth strategy emphasized joint partner-
ships to improve customer service, relatively high levels of employ-
ment stability (force reductions of roughly 20 percent), but low relative
wage and benefit increases.  The Communication Workers of America
(CWA, of which District 3 represents workers in the BellSouth region)
emphasized labor–management cooperation as the most effective way
to build union membership and power in the context of weak labor
laws.  Yet even here, it was difficult to sustain a cooperative approach
to implementing work reorganization in the face of anticipated local
deregulation.  On the other hand, the NYNEX strategy included no
union involvement in workplace innovations, high wage and benefit
increases, and high levels of workforce reductions (roughly 35–40 per-
cent).  The regional union at NYNEX (District 1 of the CWA) had the
most militant record of the seven regional districts and pursued the
most aggressively adversarial strategy against NYNEX in its six north-
eastern states.  In response, the company sued for labor peace begin-
ning in 1992, a shift in strategy that led to high employment security
for the survivor workforce through the most extensive retraining and




Even though BellSouth operates in a relatively weak regulatory
environment in right-to-work states, union membership traditionally
has been high (over 80 percent of union-eligible employees), and the
union and management had adopted a cooperative relationship.  This
cooperative approach dates to a particularly bitter strike in 1956, after
which the company accepted the union as a fact of life and began build-
ing a relationship of trust and mutual respect.  The union also made the
strategic decision to pursue cooperation to keep membership levels
high in this right-to-work environment, where workers could choose
whether or not to be members and feared management retaliation.
Regular interactions between union leadership and management fol-
lowed the negotiation of a “responsible relationship clause” between
AT&T and the CWA in 1966, while by 1971, a problem-solving
approach to grievances had reduced the number reaching the state
executive level by 50 percent.  In 1977 negotiations, the parties agreed




Experiments in “participatory management” began in the late
1970s (Crane 1990, pp. 34–46), and when AT&T and the national
CWA negotiated the joint QWL program in 1980, Southern Bell and
CWA District 3 actively implemented it at local worksites.  While
QWL efforts soon died out in most companies, at BellSouth they still
numbered over 600 in 1989 when they were merged into a TQM pro-
gram.  Workers generally viewed QWL programs as a benefit, an
example of management actually listening to their concerns.  Addition-
ally, the parties at BellSouth developed a joint QWL oversight structure
in which management at the district (local), state, and corporate levels
invited union leaders to attend regularly scheduled business meetings,
an important precedent for subsequent labor–management information
sharing and consultation.
In the early 1990s, the parties formalized union participation in
monthly business meetings and set up a three-tiered joint structure for
union–management collaboration in TQM.  The union backed the strat-
egy to improve competitiveness and save jobs.  Joint labor–manage-
ment training teams at the local, state, and corporate levels developed
curriculum and provided training to virtually all employees in the com-
pany over a two-year period.  The trainers also provided technical
assistance in problem solving, process improvement, and job redesign
efforts such as self-managed teams.  The parties also negotiated the
parameters for local experimentation in workplace innovations, includ-
ing telecommuting, self-managed teams, and bringing subcontracted
work back in-house.
Local experimentation with TQM and self-managed teams was
substantial, and by 1994 both management and the union considered
the efforts successful.  Twenty percent of workers in network and cus-
tomer services had participated in TQM problem-solving teams, and 5
percent were participating in self-managed teams.  Quantitative evalua-
tion comparing performance of self-managed and traditionally super-
vised work groups showed significant positive effects of teams for the
company, workers, and the union: performance of teams was signifi-
cantly higher, indirect labor costs fell, workers preferred the arrange-
ments, and nonmanagement jobs were saved at the expense of
management jobs (Batt 1999, 2001).  A 1996 customer service survey
by an independent consulting firm found that BellSouth had the top rat-
ings in customer service of any telephone company (J.D. Power and
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Associates 1996).  Furthermore, a 1994 survey found that 92 percent of
managers and 81 percent of local union presidents supported the
union’s participation in TQM.  Seventy-seven percent of managers and
77 percent of union presidents believed that union participation was
critical to the success of TQM.  Ninety-seven percent of local union
presidents were participating in monthly business meetings, and 32
percent were participating in weekly management staff meetings.  Sim-
ilarly, 90 percent of workers believed the union should participate in
TQM, and 60 percent believed union participation was critical to the
program’s success (Batt 2000b).  The union also supported the com-
pany in going before state PUCs to gain regulatory reforms that would
shift rate regulation from fixed to incentive-based systems, a shift that
allowed the company to keep some of its profits from efficiency gains.
The union’s participation in partnership strategies depended funda-
mentally on the company’s long-standing commitment to employment
and union institutional security and to the mature bargaining relation-
ship that the company and union had achieved.  At the time of divesti-
ture, for example, when BellSouth set up a separate subsidiary known
as Advanced Systems, Inc. (ASI), it negotiated a separate contract with
the CWA rather than operate ASI as a nonunion subsidiary (in contrast
to AT&T).  In the first round of bargaining after divestiture, BellSouth
was the only RBOC to agree to the union’s request for regionwide bar-
gaining (as opposed to the more decentralized approach of bargaining
with each telephone company in the region).  All postdivestiture con-
tracts were approved by the membership without strikes.  The company
and union also used memoranda of agreement extensively between
contracts to promote workplace change.  Other negotiated clauses off-
set the membership declines associated with attrition.  A 1989 joint
union–management task force studied the content of managerial jobs
and returned 550 jobs to the bargaining unit.  A 1995 joint study team
studied the costs of subcontracting work out and negotiated an agree-
ment to bring the work in-house.
Compared with AT&T and NYNEX, BellSouth has pursued a high
relative employment strategy with low relative wages.  This strategy
may reflect the market characteristics of the region, where (at the time)
the population was more rural, geographically dispersed, and growing.
Employment fell through attrition by roughly 10,000, or 12 percent of




were targeted to leave between 1994 and 1996, with roughly equal per-
centages of managers and workers affected, but many of these proved
unnecessary as market conditions improved.  Wage increases were rel-
atively low (averaging about 2–3 percent annually after divestiture).  
Cooperative labor relations were critical to the considerable exper-
imentation in work innovations at BellSouth.  Yet this cooperation was
based on the strategic choices of management and labor, rather than
through local mandates that would have institutionalized stakeholder
participation; and, this cooperative work reorganization occurred in a
context in which unilateral management rights threatened to reassert
themselves.  In fact, by the mid 1990s, BellSouth was adopting a strat-
egy of reengineering, reducing the emphasis on self-managed teams (in
spite of their success), and increasing its emphasis on downsizing.
This strategic withdrawal from cooperation strained union–manage-
ment relations, and in 1995 bargaining, the union and management
reduced their commitment to joint activities.  Management’s unilateral
decision to focus on reengineering and consolidation of work sites
illustrated the weak position of the union in sustaining a cooperative




In contrast to CWA District 3 at BellSouth, the official position of
the regional leadership of both the International Brotherhood of Elec-
trical Workers (IBEW) and the CWA District 1, which represent
NYNEX workers, was one of nonparticipation in joint quality and per-
formance-improvement teams.  Both unions had a militant history and
both continued a traditional approach of “effects bargaining” through-
out the 1990s.
 
8   
 
That is, management makes technology and opera-
tional decisions, and the union negotiates the effects of those decisions.
Both unions collaborated effectively in a successful three-month strike
in 1989 over maintaining health care benefits; they formed a consumer
coalition and successfully convinced the New York PUC to refuse the
company’s request for a rate increase during the strike, a decision that





unions’ militant strategy over the course of the 1980s and early 1990s
resulted in the highest wage and benefit increases in the industry.
NYNEX negotiated 3–4 percent annual wage increases in all four
rounds of bargaining since divestiture in 1984 (almost double those at
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BellSouth); it is the only company to continue to provide fully paid
health insurance without the requirement of shifting to health mainte-
nance organizations or copayments.
As a result of the 1989 strike, the company made the strategic deci-
sion to bring in a seasoned labor relations expert from AT&T (James
Dowdall), whose sole purpose was to develop a mature bargaining rela-
tionship with the two unions.  For 1992 bargaining, Dowdall hosted the
unions in a two-week joint training session in mutual gains techniques
and paved the way for labor peace.  In 1992 bargaining, the company
and unions established formal joint committees around technology and
workplace issues, but by management and union accounts alike, these
existed on paper only.  The bitterness evoked during the 1989 strike
continued for several years, undermining any real possibility for joint
labor–management efforts.  Because both unions give considerable
autonomy to locals, local union leaders have the choice of participating
in joint committees.  Only a handful did so, however; the overwhelm-
ing majority of local leaders consistently followed district policy,
refusing to participate in joint productivity-enhancing programs such
as the kind overwhelmingly supported by union leaders at BellSouth.
Meanwhile, work restructuring followed a path emphasizing reengi-
neering, the creation of customer service “megacenters,” and labor dis-
placement to obtain cost savings.  
In spite of their traditionally adversarial bargaining relationship, in
1994 the parties negotiated the most far-reaching employment and
union security clauses in the industry.  The NYNEX strategy was to
build a highly educated, flexible, and productive technical workforce
but without employee or union participation in work redesign.  In
addition to wage increases above the industry average, NYNEX
agreed to heavy investment in a two-year training program that created
a new multiskilled craft title of “Telecommunications Technical Asso-
ciate,” or “Super-Tech.”  In the first two years of the program, roughly
1,100 employees enrolled (Clifton 2000).  The new contract also
developed a force reduction plan with incentives aimed at voluntarily
eliminating 16,800 of 57,000 nonmanagement jobs at an estimated
cost of over $2 billion, or $77,000 per participating employee (many
of these proved unnecessary because market demand increased dra-
matically).  In addition, the contract enabled all NYNEX employees




a job bank and a new job-sharing provision; guaranteed union workers
access to all new NYNEX ventures; ensured that new subsidiaries
were required to offer union workers the opportunity to bid into the
new jobs; and further enhanced union institutional security through
card-check recognition, company neutrality, and access to NYNEX’s
nonunion workplaces.  These provisions helped the CWA win a
closely contested union election victory among 1,500 customer service
representatives in New England, a unit that had historically been anti-
union and had turned down representation in previous campaigns.
In sum, in exchange for high wages, retraining, union security, and
expansion into nonunion subsidiaries, the unions agreed to more sub-
stantial employment reductions than were taking place at other
regional companies, although in the end, these reductions were fewer
than expected and occurred through attrition and early retirement buy-
outs.  By 1993, NYNEX had eliminated 19,000 jobs, but only 6,000
were among union members, who accepted generous early retirement
offers.  The remaining 13,000 were among managers, who either
accepted generous settlements or forced layoffs.  Under the 1994 con-
tract, the 16,800 nonmanagement jobs targeted for elimination by 1996
would have amounted to an overall drop of at least 35 percent.  The
company strategy was to build a (smaller) highly skilled, flexible, and
productive workforce while maintaining unilateral management rights
with respect to operational decision making.  
The unions were able to make gains in employment and union
institutional security in part because they were able to leverage their
power with the state public utility commission.  That power was critical
to their winning the 1989 strike, which led management to sue for
labor peace in the early 1990s.  In the 1994 negotiations, management
agreed to give the union access to new lines of business in exchange for
the union’s agreement to support it before the state utility commission.
That support was crucial for the company in persuading regulators to
allow it to merge with other companies (Bell Atlantic and GTE).
Despite these more amicable labor relations, the union and company
never experimented with joint workplace innovations.  In fact, labor
relations deteriorated in the second half of the 1990s as the company
experienced unanticipated negative consequences as a result of its
downsizing and cost-cutting focus.  The demand for data and Internet
services and second lines to homes led to an explosion of demand in
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the latter half of the 1990s.  The company substantially underestimated
demand growth and overestimated the number of reductions that it
needed.  In the end, many more employees took the retirement buyouts
than the company would have preferred.  This change of events created
a large understaffing problem, and customer service suffered.  The
company responded by freezing mobility opportunities for frontline
workers and by requiring forced overtime, even for the largely female
office workforce that had never had this requirement.  These and other
conflicts led to a major strike during the 1998 contract negotiations.
Thus, the company and unions continue to have very traditional union
and management roles, with management retaining decision-making
authority and the union engaged in effects bargaining.  In contrast to
the AT&T case, however, the unions continue to be able to go before
state regulators on issues such as adequate staffing for customer service





The labor-mediated path to a deregulated telecommunications mar-
ket in Germany has differed substantially from the judicial drive to a
free market in the AT&T case as well as the consumer-driven path in
the case of the RBOCs.  Neocorporatist decision-making structures
have resulted in the use of legislation to promote the social market,
have created asymmetric structures of regulation which have benefited
Deutsche Telekom, and have minimized the negative effects of restruc-
turing on union and employee stakeholders.  Consistent with the pro-
motion of the social market, stakeholders (including the firm,
employees, unions, suppliers, and to some extent residential consum-
ers) have been full participants in restructuring at both the industry and
firm level, influencing the speed, form, and structure of the reregulated
product market, and developing new work practices, labor adjustment,
and corporate structures.  However, once European Union (EU) poli-
cies began to drive deregulation, they helped undermine the influence
of stakeholders and actually altered the nature of Germany’s semisov-




In perpetuating the social market, the participation of multiple
stakeholders in a quasi-corporatist policymaking process has resulted
in a path of restructuring that exhibits high levels of stability, limited
deregulation, and limited labor displacement.  In contrast to the United
States, a strategy of technological displacement of labor and cost mini-
mization has not dominated.  Of equal importance, however, the per-
formance of Telekom has continued to lag behind that of AT&T and the
RBOCs along several dimensions: slower restructuring to take advan-
tage of new technology, difficulty in reorienting Telekom from provid-
ing a basic social infrastructure to being a critical input into business
competitiveness, and fewer experiments or innovations in work organi-
zation.  The costs of restructuring also have been distributed signifi-
cantly differently among the stakeholders, with customers receiving
poorer service and higher costs.
In spite of being highly competent technologically and having the
largest cable TV and integrated services digital network (ISDN) in the
world, Deutsche Telekom has been slow to utilize the potential of new
technology.  By 1994, for example, only 30 percent of network switch-
ing and transmission was digital, compared with 100 percent in the
United States and Britain.  The availability of services from Telekom
has also been poor, and problems include underdevelopment of data
transmission, absence of itemized billing, high prices, long waiting
lists for installation and repair, and high fault rates (DTI 1994).  The
lack of integrated computer systems to provide enhanced customer ser-
vice has compounded these problems, while organizational and net-
work structures and operating procedures have been slow to adjust and
realize performance gains, even where new technology has been intro-
duced.  Furthermore, slow digitalization of the network and poor per-
formance occurred in spite of Telekom investing substantially more
than other telecommunications companies in the 1980s (Gerpott and
Pospischil 1993; Darbishire 1997a).
In parallel with the United States, the telecommunications market
in Germany historically was organized as a closely regulated monop-
oly.  However, it also operated under public ownership and, until 1989,
as part of the Deutsche Bundespost jointly with the postal and tele-
graph services.  As part of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunica-
tions, regulatory and operational decision making were not separated,
and Telekom was immediately subordinate to the federal minister.
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With an underlying mandate of public service comparable to that of
AT&T prior to divestiture, Telekom focused on its public service obli-
gations and underplayed commercial objectives.  Similarly, Telekom’s
universal focus meant that it was slow to respond to the capabilities of
new technologies and use them to develop differentiated market seg-
ments or meet the divergent demands of business and residential cus-
tomers.
Repeated attempts to reform the Deutsche Bundespost in the 1960s
and 1970s included proposals to create a management structure with
greater independence from political influence and to operate Telekom
on business principles.  Although reform proposals clearly accepted the
principle that public ownership, monopoly provision, universal service,
and social welfare obligations should be retained, these attempts failed,
largely because of union opposition (Duch 1991; Noam 1992).
In 1982 the Bundespost as a whole was responsible for 3.4 percent
of the German gross national product (GNP), contributed 10 percent of
its revenues to the government, employed 500,000 workers, and was by
far the most important purchaser of equipment from Siemens, one of
the world’s largest telecommunications equipment manufacturers
(Noam 1992).  However, this is insufficient to explain Deutsche Tele-
kom’s slow process of deregulation, because AT&T was in a similar
position as the world’s largest company, with over one million employ-
ees.  Rather, in contrast to the United States, German unions succeeded
in watering down policy initiatives during the 1980s.  German institu-
tional structures grant social partners, such as the unions, a substan-
tially greater institutionalized voice in the management of the
economy, and in the structure and timing of deregulation, than does the
United States.  This neocorporatist role of the social partners, a central
component of what Katzenstein (1987) characterizes as the “semisov-
ereign state,” substantially limits the extent of deregulation.  
The neocorporatist structures allowed the stakeholders (employees,
unions, and their work councils) within the Bundespost to form a pas-
sive coalition against any fundamental shift in the strategic orientation
(or organization) of the telecommunications industry, such as implied
by digitalization.  In contrast to the United States, no dominant reform-
ist business cohort could form in Germany to promote a significant
deregulation of the industry, in large part because of the institutional-




only employees, but also suppliers, who long operated an effective car-
tel in the equipment market, with prices substantially above world lev-
els (Darbishire 1997b).
The continued debate over the structure of the Deutsche Bundes-
post and, as importantly, over the inaction that resulted from each
reform attempt, was reflected in the influential 1987 report of the Witte
Commission.  This body was appointed by the government to examine
the future structure of the telecommunications industry.  The Commis-
sion reflected neocorporatism in Germany, as well as the institutional-
ization of stakeholders’ voice, and took one year to establish because
the panel needed to include not only all four major political parties but
also the unions, Bundespost officials, and business (though there were
no representatives of users on the Commission).  The inclusion of a
broad range of stakeholders ensured that a moderate compromise
resulted.
The report recommended separating the entrepreneurial functions
of telecommunications management from regulatory decisions;
increasing managerial independence; separating the three Bundespost
companies (post, bank, and telecommunications); bringing prices
increasingly in line with costs and focusing more on profits; and
increasing the flexibility of the companies in personnel policy (Witte
1987).  After a series of debates over the Witte recommendations, the
government implemented these changes under Post Reform I (July 1,
1989), and also introduced elements of competition into the terminal
equipment, value-added network services, and mobile telecommunica-
tions markets.  The Deutsche Postgewerkschaft (DPG) union consis-
tently opposed these changes, though the ability to block change is less
a feature of corporatism than the ability to significantly influence pol-
icy.  Thus, the compromise nature of Post Reform I ensured that Tele-
kom retained its critical monopoly over telephony services and the
network itself, which constituted 90 percent of its revenue.
The debates surrounding Post Reform I contrasted significantly
with those in the United States over deregulation.  In particular, the
structure of the reregulated product market was not determined by
“secondary” actors (such as the courts) but importantly by those stake-
holders most critically affected by deregulation, including employees,
unions, and the company itself.  The endogeneity of decision making
was characteristic of neocorporatism, a key feature of the German
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model, which applies particularly to corporate bodies such as the
Bundespost, which were founded under public law to carry out impor-
tant policy functions.  The unions were in a position to substantively
affect both the timing and extent of regulatory change.  Indeed, with
respect to telecommunications policy, “all the way up to the Federal
Chancellor there are people who want to avoid a conflict with the DPG
[Deutsche Postgewerkschaft],” given the strength of the union’s influ-
ence (Morgan and Webber 1986, p. 69).  The vigorous opposition of
the DPG to any change in the structure of the Bundespost, or to that of
the telecommunications market, reflected its concerns about the impact
of new technology.  In particular, the DPG was concerned that the new
technology would allow cost cutting through employment reductions.
The union also was concerned that liberalization threatened a signifi-
cant decline in its role, which had long been one of the strongest and
most influential in Germany.
Pressure to further restructure Telekom resurfaced far more rapidly
than had been anticipated after Post Reform I.  The privatization of
Telekom under Post Reform II was enacted in 1994 and driven by three
factors.  First, pressure from the EU played an increasing role in deter-
mining the pace of deregulation.  The European Commission issued a
series of directives under Article 90 of the Treaty of Rome, which suc-
cessfully forced the majority of EU countries, including Germany, to
agree to open their telephony services market by 1998.  Because the
effect of EU policies was to increasingly dictate the regulatory struc-
ture and enforce competition, the very nature of debates within Ger-
many was narrowed.  Consequently, Post Reform II did not even
address deregulation but rather confined itself to privatization.  The
central focus of Post Reform I debates, therefore, was removed from
the arena, and German stakeholders could have little influence on it.
Furthermore, EU directives on procurement policies undermined the
possibility of member states having national champion equipment sup-
pliers, and consequently meant that companies such as Siemens had
progressively less interest in maintaining the status quo.  
Second, and also of considerable importance, German unification
resulted in the need for Telekom to undertake a massive upgrading of
the east German network, with a projected cost of DM 60 billion
between 1990 and 1997.  Given increasing budgetary pressures, the




II to help fund unification.  Because Telekom itself had a deteriorating





management and political parties regarded privatization as a necessary
step to rectify this weakness.  Third, given the growing importance of
the international telecommunications market and an increasing empha-
sis on international joint ventures, Telekom management promoted
privatization to remove restrictions from Telekom’s global ambitions.
Furthermore, the inevitability of product market deregulation led Tele-
kom to argue that it needed to be released from the political control and
bureaucracy of the public sector (Darbishire 1995).  
In addition to generating greater stability in the telecommunica-
tions market in Germany, the integrated role of key stakeholders, par-
ticularly employees and unions, helped them protect their own
interests.  The DPG principally campaigned for employee and union









 and the DPG were concerned with how EU policies to liberalize
the product market would be enacted in Germany.  Stakeholders
ensured their influence on the structure of the product market through
the creation of a Regulatory Council under Post Reform II restructur-
ing.  Through this council, for example, they ensured the adoption of a
high standard of universal service (of general ISDN availability) by the
end of 1995.  By establishing the general availability of a high level of
service as a matter of public policy, stakeholders had substantially
greater input into the product market structure than in the United
States, while simultaneously constraining the strategic options avail-
able to Telekom.
During the political negotiations over Post Reform II, the DPG
secured the right to bargain with Telekom in all of its subsidiaries,
which were in turn bound to negotiate with the DPG.  Through this
mechanism, the DPG constrained Telekom from even considering a
nonunion employment strategy (Darbishire 1997a).  Employee repre-
sentation on the Supervisory Board was made uniquely strong, even in
a German context, while employee concerns about the postprivatiza-
tion structure of works councils led to additional alterations.  These
included the initial extension of the three-tier, public-sector works
council structure to the privatized Telekom, as well as a higher number
of works councilors (Darbishire 1995).  Furthermore, the DPG secured
the continuation of the contractual rights of all its employees, including
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their impressive employment security guarantees (which apply to civil
servants, who constitute half of Telekom’s workforce, as well as to all
workers aged 40, with 15 years of service).  These rights have, in turn,
constrained Telekom from adopting a technological displacement strat-
egy and substantially downsizing its workforce.
The institutional constraints on Telekom’s labor market approach
are illustrated by the relative employment stability within the company.
Between 1984 and 1994, Telekom employment in West Germany was
virtually unchanged, with a decrease of only 4,000 from 191,000.
Total employment, including the former East German telephone work-
ers, stood at 225,435.  It was only in March 1995 that Telekom offi-
cially doubled its goal of eliminating 30,000 jobs throughout East and
West Germany to 60,000 (26 percent of the workforce) by the year
2000. 
While the extent of potential technological displacement should
not be underestimated, Telekom’s underlying strategy has emphasized
a revenue-enhancing, up-market approach, with slow, heavily negoti-
ated change.  The emphasis on revenue generation rather than techno-
logical displacement, downsizing, or cost minimization is significant.
In contrast to the United States, where access lines per employee is the
standard performance measure, Telekom established a corporate objec-
tive of revenue per employee, set at DM 470,000.  This measure has
underlain Telekom’s strategy, substantially promoted by the DPG, of
seeking new employment opportunities rather than cutting costs.  By
mid 1995, the DPG presented Telekom with over 50 proposals of how
to generate new business to enhance employment security.  Telekom
took these proposals seriously, especially because of the downsizing
constraints it faced because the DPG had made employment security
its top priority.
The rights of the works councils—concerning the introduction of
new technology and restructuring of work, and the regrading of
employees, transfers, and appointments—required that Telekom work
cooperatively with the union.  For example, between June 1993 and
March 1994, the DPG negotiated a unique contract in response to the
proposed elimination of 11,000 posts under a restructuring program
known as Telekom Service 2000.  This contract guaranteed employ-
ment security to all workers affected by restructuring and specified




late 1994, the DPG extended this contract (in negotiations over a
broader reorganization plan) to all workers, thereby guaranteeing com-
prehensive employment security until the end of June 1996.  Moreover,
Telekom’s plan to downsize by 60,000 was premised on the use of
expensive voluntary redundancy and early retirement packages.
The positive impact of these industrial relations on Telekom’s busi-
ness strategy was facilitated by the favorable regulatory environment
that Telekom enjoyed and the absence of countervailing financial mar-
ket pressures.  Rather than being constrained by asymmetric regulatory
structures from entering closely aligned market segments (as, for
example, AT&T was in the local market and the RBOCs were in the
cable TV market), Telekom continued to operate the largest cable TV




monopoly and had 14.6 million
subscribers by the end of 1994.  Combined with the largest ISDN net-
work, these conditions provided Telekom with the potential for the
development of an integrated telecommunications services industry
and an up-market strategy generating new, high-quality businesses.
However, despite longer time horizons, a favorable regulatory cli-
mate, and the integration of DPG and works councils into decision
making, Telekom has continued to be slow in developing innovative
work practices or effective restructuring.  For example, management
viewed the lack of local autonomy as a principal deficit of its organiza-
tional structure and a division of the corporate structure needed to meet
differentiated customer demands.  Telekom initiated a project in 1993–
1994 to reorganize the company into three decentralized divisions
(serving business and residential customers, and managing the net-
work).  Although this model drew on successful U.S. and U.K. experi-
ence and involved substantial works council and union participation at
every stage, the reform proceeded in a slow, cautious, and centralized
manner.  This project included testing two competing models of corpo-
rate structure.  One, favored by Telekom management, was based prin-
cipally on market segments and another (favored by the DPG) on
geographic units (Darbishire 1997a).  The piloting of competing mod-
els indicates the strength of the union’s influence in seeking to mini-
mize the perceived negative effect of restructuring on union and worker
interests.
Unlike the slow pace of corporate restructuring, digitalization of
the network has led to substantial work reorganization and operational
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cost cutting.  As in the United States, this change involved a shift away
from functional organization, though significantly without any attempt
to increase the extent of Taylorism or machine pacing of work, as at
AT&T and the RBOCs.  Rather, digitalization occurred in the context
of intensive consultation and agreements with the central works coun-
cil, which utilized its codetermination rights to ensure that systems
capable of monitoring workers’ behavior have neither been used to do
that nor to intensify the pace of work.
In summary, rather than adopting a cost-minimization or labor-
intensification strategy, Telekom instead fully involved works councils
and the union in the process of restructuring.  As a result, it did not
experience the declines in morale or cooperative union–management
activity experienced in the United States.  Nevertheless, there have
been no decentralized workplace trials equivalent to those in the United
States.  Three factors contributed to this outcome.  First, Telekom was
slow to decentralize its operational structures, characteristic of its pub-
lic sector legacy.  This tardiness restricted its potential for workplace
innovation.  Second, the union and works councils were strongly
focused on the technological displacement and downsizing implica-
tions of restructuring.  Third, because employee representatives feared
that restructuring had the potential to undermine their position, they
attempted to minimize its downside by conducting highly detailed,
centralized negotiations about new work organization practices.
More generally, the restricted pattern of workplace innovation
reflects the radical nature of technological change in the telecommuni-
cations industry.  Although extensive worker and works council
involvement have promoted such innovation in industries experiencing
incremental changes in technology, in the telecommunications industry
the situation differs.  Workers perceive that technical changes will
undermine their existing skill sets as jobs become based more on
knowledge of software, clerical, and service skills.  Potential gains
from the transformation of work in the telecommunications industry
derive from new skill sets and cross-functional organizational integra-
tion as described in the AT&T and RBOC sections, not from building
on these workers’ existing craft skills (Darbishire 1997b; Lehrer and
Darbishire 1997).  The combination of strong worker rights, together




cautious restructuring of Telekom’s product market, although it gener-




What lessons for mutual learning can be gained from these com-
parisons?  Several are noteworthy.  At the most basic level, the ability
of stakeholders to influence or control the pace of change significantly
affects the outcomes.  The weak institutional position of unions in the
AT&T case prevented them from slowing the course of change.  The
unions in the regional Bell cases did not have more power but could
leverage concern for consumer welfare to slow the pace of change.  By
contrast, the institutional power of the German unions allowed them to
significantly slow the pace to explicitly address labor’s concerns.  
The slower pace of restructuring in both the regional Bell and Tele-
kom cases provided a longer time horizon to develop a range of labor
adjustment strategies to meet the needs of both management and labor.
At a minimum, these strategies included softening the negative effect
on the displaced workforce through the use of attrition, voluntary sev-
erance, and early retirement programs.  These strategies also had posi-
tive “spillover” effects on the morale of the survivor workforce.  For
management, this positive effect on morale increased the likelihood
that the survivor workforce would play a more cooperative role in
ongoing restructuring.  Additionally, the longer time horizon provided
the needed time for retraining and redeployment, strategies that bene-
fited not only the incumbent workforce but management as well by
building on the embedded skill base rather than losing that base to
competitors.
By contrast, the faster, unconstrained approach allowed companies
to take advantage of the full implications of new technology and mar-
ket flexibility, both in terms of process and product innovation.  In the
United States, the most significant outcome of this decade of market-
driven restructuring has been to alter the fundamental purpose of the
telecommunications industry.  Its mission has changed from providing
an integrated universal service to the public and maintaining national
security to supporting national economic competitiveness in a global
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economy.  In general, then, the U.S. telecommunications industry has
outperformed its German counterpart in terms of speed of delivery,
response time, product diversity, and price reductions—both as an
input into other industries and as a direct contributor to national eco-
nomic growth.  However, employees bore the major costs of restructur-
ing through displacement, decline in morale, and ongoing employment
insecurity.  Labor market segmentation increased.  Unions lost power
and members.    
In Germany, by contrast, the influence of government policymak-
ers, unions, and corporate stakeholders in slowing the pace of restruc-
turing prevented Telekom from taking advantage of the implications of
new technologies, limiting performance improvements for business
and residential consumers.  However, workers have not suffered the
kind of displacement, demoralization, or insecurity that U.S. workers
have faced.  Unions have retained membership levels as well as their
institutional power.  
These findings would argue for a classic story of the trade-offs
between consumer and worker welfare.  While in the short run, this
argument has some merit, the longer-term outcomes are far from cer-
tain.  First, to the extent that rapid, market-driven deregulation leads to
efficiency and innovation, corporate users and the national economy
more generally benefit.  Certainly, the United States continues to lead
the world in innovations in telecommunications technologies.  But it is
difficult to ascribe this positive outcome entirely to deregulation,
because the United States historically led the world in this field (Vietor
1989; Rosenberg 1994). 
Second, haste makes waste.  AT&T’s divestiture and deregulation
were premised on the assumption that new microwave technologies
would erode the natural monopoly argument in the telecommunica-
tions market.  However, the digitalization of network switching and
transmission systems substantially increased network economies of
scale and scope.  This has led some who are strongly pro-deregulation
to admit that technological efficiencies may lead to a recentralization
of the industry (Huber 1989).  The 1990s have confirmed some of these
worries, as merger activity has dominated the decade, exemplified by
the eight large local carriers at divestiture (the seven RBOCs and GTE)
that have merged into four.  In addition, some researchers have argued




this period of duplication and overcapacity.  Using three different mea-




 Keefe found that productiv-
ity growth in the 1984–1991 period (3.4 percent annually) was half that
of the 1974–1983 period (6.9 percent per year) and the 1951–1983
period (6 percent per year).  By the early 1990s, when AT&T served 60
percent of the long-distance market, MCI and Sprint together had the
capacity to meet the needs of the entire country (Keefe and Boroff
1994, pp. 321–322).  Moreover, while corporations benefited from
competition in the equipment industry, the U.S. economy suffered as
imports rose dramatically (from Canada’s Northern Telecom and Ger-
many’s Siemens).  U.S. manufacturers of telecommunications equip-
ment were decimated.  
Third, the distribution of benefits to consumers in the United States
has been highly unequal.  Large business users have benefited the most.
Small business and residential consumers have also benefited through
greater product diversity and reductions in the price of long distance,
which offset price increases in basic service.  Notably, however, resi-
dential consumers were protected because regulators slowed the pace
of deregulation in local service.  Otherwise, basic rates would have
skyrocketed in the 1980s.  Low-end consumers fared worse under
deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s because basic rates rose and they
could not afford to take advantage of long-distance price reductions.
While new FCC regulations seek to ensure universal service as well as
Internet access to low-income residents, the implementation of regula-
tions will determine longer-term outcomes.
It is not only pace of change that matters, however.  As we have
argued, more fundamentally, the outcomes depend on the relative
power and strategic choices of institutional actors and stakeholders in
shaping the trajectory of deregulation and restructuring.  In the AT&T
case, the courts and regulators deliberately chose to reduce the profit-
ability of AT&T, and the company, unions, and consumers were
excluded from the decision-making process.  In the case of the regional
Bells, political embeddedness gave the companies, unions, and resi-
dential consumers a position to win politically favorable legislation
that tempered a free-market approach.  In the German case, institu-
tional stakeholders deliberately chose an approach to reregulation that
privileges Telekom by retaining its monopoly in telephony and cable
TV.  This choice provided the opportunity for a carefully managed,
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integrated approach to restructuring and the provision of multimedia
services.  Although the EU may alter its adjustment path, Germany has
the potential to avoid duplicating its infrastructure as did the United
States, where the systemness of technology continues to favor econo-
mies of scale.  The German social market solution has the potential in
the long run to create mutual gains for firms, unions, employees, and
consumers.  Yet the promise is still to be fulfilled.
Finally, it is noteworthy that none of the approaches to reregulation
and restructuring has achieved a new system of “high-involvement”
work organization comparable to the innovative team-based or lean
production systems in manufacturing.  While more experimentation
has occurred in the United States, those experiments have been short-
lived, overcome by broad-scale cost-cutting initiatives.  Meanwhile,
Telekom and the German unions have positioned themselves for
greater labor–management cooperation in workplace innovations.
Rather than adopting a cost minimization or technological displace-
ment strategy, Telekom has focused on a revenue enhancement strat-
egy.  This has the potential to create a high-involvement approach to
work organization while limiting the ultimate costs and adjustment
burden borne by employees and the union.  Of key importance, how-
ever, is whether the cautious but sustained cooperative approach to
restructuring will produce performance gains in the long run.  The out-
come will itself be strongly influenced by the ability of stakeholders to
successfully implement changes to sustain the up-market strategy in
spite of ongoing downsizing and before new competitive entrants can




1. Until 1984, AT&T, or the “Bell system,” was a regulated monopoly composed of
Bell Labs (the research and development arm); Western Electric (the equipment-
producing arm); AT&T long lines (the long-distance arms), and 22 local Bell
companies (the local service providers).  In response to a lawsuit filed by MCI,
which sought entry into AT&T markets, the courts dismantled the monopoly.
AT&T retained ownership of the equipment and long-distance subsidiaries but not
local service.  The 22 local phone companies were reorganized into seven regional
Bell operating companies (RBOCs) with monopoly control of local service; they
also jointly owned Bell Labs until 1996.
2. Source: author’s interviews with Bell company representatives.
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3. NYNEX comprises the New York and New England telephone companies.  It
merged with Bell Atlantic, which subsequently merged with GTE to form Veri-
zon.  In this chapter, we refer to the company as NYNEX because the material is
specific to NYNEX before it merged with Bell Atlantic.
4. AT&T unsuccessfully led a coalition of consumers, unions, independent tele-





, after Frederick Taylor, refers to the practice of using time and motion
studies to separate thought from execution and break down complex jobs into nar-
row repetitive tasks to improve efficiency.
6. Source: author’s interviews with management and union officials.
7. Moreover, heightened transaction costs and consumer confusion, for example, are
a consequence of the package deals to consumers (such as MCI’s Friends and
Family and AT&T’s Reach Out and True Voice).  This trend is in sharp contrast to
current theories of quality in customer service that argue that customer loyalty and
longevity are the key to competitiveness (Schlesinger and Heskett 1991a, 1991b).
8. A 1996 union election replaced the long-standing CWA district leadership with a
leadership team more open to joint strategies, but the company was focused on
merger activity (with Bell Atlantic and GTE).  Contract negotiations in 1998 and
2001 were settled only after a strike.
9. For a fuller account of the unions’ use of the state utility commission to curb cor-
porate behavior, see Katz, Batt, and Keefe (2000).
10. Having amounted to 30 percent in 1990 and 25 percent in 1992, the reserve asset
ratio was projected to fall to 18 percent by 1994.
11. These measures are average annual increases in access lines per employee hour, in




Aronson, Jonathan, and Peter Cowhey.  1988.  
 
When Countries Talk: Interna-
tional Trade in Telecommunications Services
 
.  Lexington, Massachusetts:
American Enterprise Institute/Ballinger.
Batt, Rosemary.  1999.  “Work Organization, Technology, and Performance in
Customer Service and Sales.”  
 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review
 
52(4): 539–564.
______.  2000a.  “Strategic Segmentation and Frontline Services: Matching
Customers, Employees, and Human Resource Systems.”  
 
International
Journal of Human Resource Management
 
 11(3): 540–562.
______.  2000b.  “When Do Employees Benefit from Teams and Why?”
Unpublished manuscript.
______.  2001.  “The Economics of Teams among Technicians.”  
 
British Jour-




52 Batt and Darbishire
 
Batt, Rosemary, and Jeffrey Keefe.  1999.  “Human Resource and Employ-
ment Practices in Telecommunications Services.”  In 
 
Employment Prac-
tices and Business Strategy, 
 
Peter Cappelli, ed.  Oxford: Oxford University
Press, pp. 107–152.
Batt, Rosemary, and Michael Strausser.  1998.  “Labor Market Outcomes of
Deregulation in Telecommunications Services.”  
 
Proceedings of the 50th
Annual Meetings of the IRRA. 
 
 Madison, Wisconsin: IRRA Series
Clifton, Jean.  2000.  “Restructuring the Employment Relationship: Implica-
tions for Firms, Unions, and Employees.”  Ph.D. dissertation, School of
Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University.
Cohen, Jeffrey.  1992.  
 
The Politics of Telecommunications Regulation: The
States and the Divestiture of AT&T
 
.   Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe
Publishing.
Coll, Steve.  1986.   
 




Crane, Donald.  1990.  
 
Patterns of Industrial Peace: Case Studies of Coopera-
tive, Collective Bargaining Relationships
 
.  Research Monograph no. 102.
Atlanta: Georgia State University Business Press.
Darbishire, Owen.  1995.  “Switching Systems: Technological Change, Com-





______.  1997a.  “Germany.”  In 
 
Telecommunications: Restructuring Work
and Employment Relations Worldwide,
 
 Harry Katz, ed.  Ithaca, New York:
ILR Press, Cornell University.
______. 1997b.  “Radical versus Incremental Restructuring: Employment
Relations in the Telecommunications Industry.”  Working paper, Pembroke
College, University of Oxford.
______.  Forthcoming.  “Transforming Telecommunications: Institutional and
Stakeholder Impacts on Strategy, Work Restructuring and Employment
Relations.”  Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University.
DTI.  1994.  
 
Study of the International Competitiveness of the UK Telecommu-
nications Infrastructure
 
.  Robert Harrison, PA Consulting Group, Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry of the U.K.
Duch, Raymond M.  1991.  
 
Privatizing the Economy: Telecommunications
Policy in Comparative Perspective.
 
  Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press.
FCC.  1992/1993.  
 
Statistics of Communications Common Carriers.
 
  Federal
Communications Commission, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office.
Gerpott, Torsten J., and Rudolf Pospischil.  1993.  “Internationale Effizienz-
vergleiche der DBP Telekom: Ergebnisse eines Benchmarking-Projektes




Telekommunikationsunternehmen” (International Efficiency Comparisons
of the DBP Telekom: Results of a Benchmarking Project in Support of
Organizational Change in a National Telecommunications Enterprise).
 
Zeitschift für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung
 
 4: 366–389.
Huber, Peter.  1989.  “The Technological Imperative for Competition.”  In
 
Future Competition in Telecommunications
 
, Stephen Bradley and Jerry
Hausman, eds.  Boston: Harvard Business School Press, pp. 105–122.
J.D. Power and Associates.  1996. 
 
 Study of Residential Local Telephone Com-
panies.  
 
Photocopy, J.D. Power and Associates, Agoura Hills, California.
Katz, Harry, ed.  1997.  
 
Telecommunications: Restructuring Work and
Employment Relations Worldwide.
 
  Ithaca, New York: ILR Press, Cornell
University.
Katz, Harry, Rosemary Batt, and Jeffrey Keefe.  2000.  “The Strategic Initia-
tives of the CWA: Organizing, Politics, and Collective Bargaining.”
Unpublished manuscript.
Katzenstein, Peter J.  1987.  
 
Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth
of a Semisovereign State
 
.  Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Keefe, Jeffrey, and Rosemary Batt.  1997.  “United States.”  In 
 
Telecommuni-
cations: Restructuring Work and Employment Relations Worldwide
 
, Harry
Katz, ed.  Ithaca, New York: ILR Press, Cornell University, pp. 31–58. 
Keefe, Jeffrey, and Karen Boroff.  1994.  “Telecommunications Labor Man-
agement Relations after Divestiture.”  In 
 
Contemporary Collective Bar-
gaining in the Private Sector
 
, Paula Voos, ed.  Madison, Wisconsin:
Industrial Relations Research Association, pp. 303–372.
Landler, Mark.  1997.  “Big Restructuring of Phone Charges Approved by
F.C.C.”  
 
The New York Times
 
 (May 8), p. 1.
Lehrer, Mark, and Owen Darbishire.  1997.  “The Performance of Economic
Institutions in a Dynamic Environment: Air Transport and Telecommunica-
tions in Germany and Britain (summary in German).”  Working paper FS I
97-301, Wissenschaftzentrum, Berlin, Germany, pp. 97–301.
MacDuffie, John Paul, and Michael Maccoby.  1986.  “The Organizational
Implications of New Technologies: Remote Work Centers at AT&T Com-
munications.”  Discussion paper, JFK School of Government, Harvard Uni-
versity, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Morgan, Kevin, and Douglas Webber.  1986.  “Divergent Paths: Political Strat-
egies for Telecommunications in Britain, France and West Germany.”  In
 
The Politics of the Communications Revolution in Western Europe, 
 
Ken-
neth Dyson and Peter Humphreys, eds.  London: Frank Cass Publisher.




.  Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
 
54 Batt and Darbishire
 
Rosenberg, Nathan.  1994.  “Telecommunications: Complex, Uncertain, and
Path Dependent.”  In 
 
Exploring the Black Box: Technology, Economics,
and History
 
.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 203–231.
Schlesinger, Leonard, and James Heskett.  1991a.  “Breaking the Cycle of










Stone, Alan.  1989.  
 
Wrong Number: The Breakup of AT&T.
 
  New York: Basic
Books.
Temin, Peter.  1987.  
 
The Fall of the Bell System: A Study in Prices and Poli-
tics
 
.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Teske, Paul.  1990.  
 
After Divestiture: The Political Economy of State Tele-
communications Regulation
 
.  SUNY Series in Public Administration.
Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.
Turner, Lowell.  1991.  
 
Democracy at Work: Changing World Markets and the
Future of Labor Unions.
 
  Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
Vietor, Richard.  1989.  “AT&T and the Public Good: Regulation and Compe-
tition in Telecommunications, 1910–1987.”  In 
 
Future Competition in Tele-
communications
 
, Stephen P. Bradley and Jerry A. Hausman, eds.  Boston:
Harvard Business School Press, pp. 27–103.
Witte, Eberhard.  1987. 
 
Neuordnung der Telekommunikation: Bericht der
Regierungskommission Fernmeldewesen
 






Institutional Effects on Skill 
Creation and Management 











Political economists are devoting greater attention to issues of skill
development and corporate restructuring (Streeck 1989; Finegold and
Soskice 1988).  The shift from a focus on inflation and the welfare state
to education, training, and economic competitiveness reflects the pro-
found shifts that have taken place in the global economy in the last
decade.  The combination of the growing interdependence of national
economies, the emergence of new, low-cost but relatively high-quality
competitors, and rapid technological change has led many to conclude
that the only way for the advanced industrial countries to maintain or
improve their standard of living is to raise the skill levels of their citi-
zens (Reich 1991).  Likewise, education and training are seen as one of
the main solutions to the growth in wage inequality that characterized
many of the developed economies in the 1980s and early 1990s (OECD
1994).
Most of the comparative work by new institutionalists on skill
issues has focused on the relative success of different national or
regional vocational education and training systems in producing craft
and technical skills (e.g., Ryan 1991; Finegold and Mason 1996).
These intermediate skills are seen as an essential component for intro-
ducing flexible production regimes (e.g., Streeck 1989; Finegold and
Wagner 1997).  Interestingly, there has been relatively little compara-
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tive institutional research on the skills of the individuals responsible for
designing and implementing workplace restructuring, i.e., company
managers.  This chapter is an attempt to start filling that gap, focusing
on how national institutional structures shape different models of man-
agement development in the United States and Germany.  It compares
and contrasts the roles of the state, intermediary institutions, the mar-
ket, and firms in each setting in developing managerial skills.









 we mean any individual who oversees other





 includes activities beyond formal education and training,
such as planned job rotation.  Our focus is thus broader than most pre-
vious comparative studies of management development, which have
tended to confine themselves to top managers and the university pro-
grams they attend (e.g., Commonwealth of Australia 1982; Handy
1987).  For example, we include the major contribution that two-year
colleges and firm-based training make to management development in
our analysis.
We conducted semistructured interviews with the main providers
of management development in each nation: education and training
institutions (both public and private) and companies.  For the compa-
nies in each country, we identified a sample that met the following cri-
teria: 1) participates in the global economy (including through exports
or servicing international customers; 2) is a mixture of large and small
(fewer than 100 employees) operations; 3) represents best practices in
management development (as identified by peers or our review of the
management literature); 4) represents one of three manufacturing (food
processing, precision engineering, and electronics) or three service
(hotels, banks, and business services) sector enterprises.  We also inter-
viewed relevant professional organizations, policymakers, and experts
in management development.  
Within each organization, we tried to interview more than one indi-
vidual to get different perspectives (i.e., human resource and produc-
tion managers, professors, and deans) on the issues of management
development.   In all, we conducted 50 interviews in the United States
(29 with education providers and 21 with company managers) and 39
interviews in Germany (21 with education providers and management
experts and 18 with firm managers).  We supplemented the interviews
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with reviews of the relevant literature and the national and international
data available on management development.
Our interviews confirmed that major changes under way in the
world economy—increased competition, globalization, pressures for
customization and enhanced quality, technological change, and shifts
toward flatter, more team-based organizations—are forcing institutions
involved in management development in both countries to develop a
broad range of new capabilities for their management workforce (e.g.,
Lawler 1996).  At the same time, however, managers continue to need
strong technical and interpersonal skills to help them act as organiza-
tional leaders.  Chief among the new demands is the need to combine
analytic and interpersonal skills earlier in a manager’s career.   With
firms reducing management layers and relying more on teams to cus-
tomize output, a growing number of managers need both “hard” and
“soft” skills right from the outset if they are to function effectively.
Among these soft skills, firms in both countries are placing a growing
emphasis on interpersonal management skills, such as the ability to
facilitate group work.  
A second new skill demand is the capacity of managers to become
effective lifelong learners.  As companies remove layers from manage-
rial hierarchies, more managers face career paths that are horizontal
across a number of different functions in the organization or across
several companies, rather than a more vertical (“stovepiped”) progres-
sion within a single field of expertise (Kiechel 1994).  To cope with this
uncertain environment, managers need both a broad initial education
and continuing opportunities to update or alter their skills. As one
American woman who had successfully progressed from a clerical
worker to a middle manager while acquiring two degrees part time put
it: “What you really need is your own personal career counselor.  But
since the company isn’t going to provide that, you need to take owner-
ship over your own career development.”  In addition, managers need
to develop the capabilities to learn from different experiences, a set of
attributes that recent research has shown to be a strong predictor of
successful international executives (Spreitzer, McCall, and Mahoney
1997).
A third related emerging skill need is that of developing global
capabilities.  With the continued internationalization of all aspects of
the world economy (goods and services, information, capital and
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labor), both organizations and individuals need to enhance their ability
to operate effectively across national, institutional, and cultural bound-
aries (Finegold 1997).  Firms need managers who can coordinate
design and production on a worldwide basis (Sabbagh 1996) as well as
establish new markets in other nations and lead or participate effec-
tively in transnational teams (Snow, Snell, and Davison 1996).
Our study focused on the different institutional arrangements for
management development in the United States and Germany and how
well they are coping with these new demands.  To summarize our main
findings, the strengths and weaknesses of the two countries’ systems in
preparing managers for both traditional and emerging skill needs are
essentially mirror images of each other.  Germany’s strong employer
organizations and quasi-public institutions have contributed to broad
initial skill development and strong technical skills, but the overregula-
tion and heavy dependence of universities on state funding has discour-
aged the innovation in management education needed to keep apace of
the international shifts in the global economy.  The organization of skill
development within firms, moreover, has made it difficult to develop
many managers’ cross-functional skills.  In contrast, intense competi-
tion among public and private business schools in the United States has
produced global leadership in graduate management education and
research.  Also, the flexible internal structures of leading U.S. corpora-
tions have enabled them to adapt training programs to more decentral-
ized, leaner organizations by promoting cross-functional skills among
all managers.  The reliance on the market, however, has led to greater
variation in the quality and quantity of technical and organizational
training for supervisors and managers in small firms.  Some states are
experimenting with creative new institutional arrangements for devel-
oping the capabilities of individuals and smaller firms that otherwise




Four main types of institutional arrangements govern economic
activity generally and the development of managerial skills in particu-
lar: the market, internal firm hierarchies, intermediate organizations
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(such as employer associations) and the state (see Hollingsworth,
Schmitter, and Streeck 1994; Crouch, Finegold, and Sako, 1999).  All
countries will have a mix of these different institutional mechanisms,
or what we call “models of management development.”  How effective
each combination of models is in the United States and Germany
depends, to a large extent, on the fit between the kinds of skills
required and the type of model being used to develop them.
Human capital theory suggests that the market should produce an
optimum level of skill investment.  The theory has traditionally distin-
guished between two types of skills, general and firm-specific (Becker
1975).  General skills, which can be transferred easily from one firm to
another, will (according to the theory) be financed by individuals who
can then recoup the investment through higher wages.  Many manage-
rial competencies fall into this category, for example, good communi-
cation skills, problem-solving abilities, and leadership.  Because there
is a high private rate of return to those who possess these competencies
(Finegold and Brewer 1996), individuals should be willing to under-
take and finance education or training experiences that help develop
these skills.
Firms will, along with their employees, cover the costs of develop-
ing skills that are specific to their enterprise, such as an understanding
of a particular corporate culture or mastery of a set of internal practices
required for the organization to operate effectively.  Unlike the predic-
tions of human capital theory, however, which treat the firm as a black
box, institutional and management research shows that there are signif-
icant differences in the structure of firms among countries, and these
differences in turn have a major impact on the skill requirements and
development of managers.  Large Japanese firms, for example, with
strong internal labor markets and consequently low turnover rates, use
systematic job rotation and ongoing training programs to invest in
developing a set of general managerial competencies, an undertaking
that most U.S. companies would not be willing to support (Dore and
Sako 1988).  
Stevens (1996) has shown that there is a large intermediate cate-
gory of “transferable skills,” like the understanding of a new computer
technology or of a retail distribution system, that are best created pri-
marily under one employer but are potentially useful to a group of
companies within a sector.  She also showed that market failures for
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transferable skills can easily arise because firms are unwilling to invest
in these skills for fear their employees will be “poached” by competi-
tors.  Stevens’ third observation is that individuals may be unable to
make this investment because of capital constraints, the risks associ-
ated with an investment in sector-specific skills that they may lose if
they lose their job, and the need to have the cooperation of their firms.
Where such market failures exist, one possible solution is for interme-
diate institutions, such as employer organizations, to bring private sec-
tor actors together to form a “club” (in the economist’s sense of the




 is a voluntary association of actors (in this case, firms)
who develop a means of restricting access to an otherwise public good,
such as a professional association that holds meetings and provides ser-
vices only to its members.  While in free labor markets it is not possible
for some firms to restrict the access of others to their employees skills,
Olson (1971) has shown how clubs can potentially overcome this bar-
rier to collective action by generating secondary benefits—linked to the
provision of transferable skills—that are consumable individually and
on a basis of some exclusion, thus giving them some leverage over
members (see Crouch, Finegold, and Sako 1999 for a fuller discussion
of club theory applied to skill creation).  Thus, for example, German
chambers of commerce exercise both formal and informal pressure on
member firms that are not perceived to be providing their share of
places in the apprenticeship system (Streeck 1987; Soskice 1991).
Such intermediate institutions are given added legitimacy, and thus
hold a greater attraction for potential members, where they are
included in corporatist policymaking and given public resources to
help attain policy objectives (e.g., Hall 1986).
The alternative solution to market failure problems is for the state
to play a role in the development of managers.  The state has several
theoretical justifications for supporting the development of general
managerial skills (particularly in areas where there is a strong public
good component to the skills): to ensure individuals have equal access
to this important determinant of future life success, to increase the
societal stock of knowledge and skills in order to foster economic
growth, and to promote a more enlightened citizenry.  In reality, how-
ever, in both countries the state has taken a major role in the education
and training of managers more from historical accident than any strong
case of market failure or public good.  Publicly funded colleges and
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universities are the principal providers of higher education in these
countries, like the rest of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD).  As the demand for management education
from individuals and companies grew following World War II, public
colleges and universities responded by developing a variety of courses
ranging from undergraduate diplomas and degrees to executive MBAs
and short, noncredit modules tailored to specific skill needs.
Given this large existing state role, one of our study’s most striking
findings was the near universal opposition to any direct state role in
management development.  While this opposition might have been
expected from company managers and individuals in the United States
(where government has traditionally been distant from the private sec-
tor), more surprising was the equally strong hostility to state interven-
tion in Germany, where over 90 percent of respondents to our
interviews did not see a role for the state in the initial or further training
of managers.  The most frequently cited reasons for why the state is not
the most effective provider of management development were 1) public
institutions are slow to adapt; 2) companies are in the best position to
determine new managerial demands and train for them; 3) managers
learn best in “real world” situations; and 4) the returns to management
development accrue to the firm and the individual, and therefore it
should be financed by them, not the taxpayer.  Some respondents went
further, arguing that government involvement in management develop-
ment could actually be counterproductive, because subsidies for public
institutions could discourage the development of private providers,
while individuals who do not have to pay for management education
(as is the case in many publicly funded higher education systems) may
not treat it as an investment nor be sufficiently motivated.
Beneath the broad antagonism to direct government involvement in
management development, however, was a recognition by interviewees
that there are a number of indirect, yet important, ways in which the
state contributes to the education and training of managers.  Most nota-
ble is providing individuals who may eventually become managers
with a solid educational foundation on which to build more specific
and ever-changing skills.  Nearly every respondent indicated that,
given limited resources, government’s first priority should be ensuring
a high-quality basic education for all citizens.
 










(technical colleges) act as the main training ground for future German
managers (Table 1).  The educational task facing these institutions is
simplified by the high-quality general education and demanding
entrance exams that all individuals qualifying for higher education
must pass so that they can receive a state-funded place that covers
tuition and living expenses.  
With their extensive and academically oriented coursework, the
universities are the traditional pillars of the German higher education
system.  Courses at the university can theoretically be completed in
four to five years, but overcrowding in these institutions has made this
difficult in practice.  Overcrowding has been caused by a substantial
increase in the number of young people qualifying for places over the
last two decades (with approximately 30 percent of each cohort now
going on to higher education) without a substantial increase in the
physical capacity of universities.  The result has been an oversubscrip-
tion of many courses and a lengthening of the average time to gradua-
tion to 6.5 years.
 







Language, cultural studies, sport 13.2 1.0 14.2
Law, economics, and social sciences 22.7 26.5 49.2
Mathematics and natural sciences 17.2 2.9 20.1
Engineering 11.8 24.5 36.3
Medicine 11.8 — 11.8
Agricultural 2.5 2.2 4.7
Arts 3.7 1.8 5.5
Total 83.0 58.9 141.9
SOURCE: Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft, Grund- und Struktur
Daten, 1993–1994.
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The active role that the German government plays in regulating
higher education was cited by many respondents as the major weak-
ness in the German system of management development.  Said one
interviewee, “The system [of higher education] puts professors first,
students a distant second, and ignores the needs of industry altogether.
It needs to be changed to put students in the role of consumers of pro-
fessional skills and professors in the position of providing a service.”
Three factors were cited as helping to create a “bureaucratic mentality”
and inhibiting innovation among providers of higher education.  The
first is the way in which curricula are determined.  Reorganizing an
existing course or introducing a new course at either type of public
institution requires several levels of deliberation and consultation, both
inside the institution itself and with local educational authorities.  The
effect is to discourage new ideas.  The second factor cited as inhibiting
innovation is the professors’ status as civil servants with lifetime
appointments, which effectively insulates them from having to respond
to those who demand marketable skills, e.g., students and firms.  A
final factor cited as discouraging innovation is disincentives to be
active in the area of further training and customized courses in man-
agement.  Money earned from offering further training courses goes




 itself, but rather straight to the state.  By removing the
financial incentives for involvement in further training, the state has
stemmed the flow of ideas between industry and higher education
which normally arise from this activity.  The result has been to discour-






 were established in the 1960s to accommo-
date the growing numbers of students going on to higher education and
to provide a more relevant course for managers entering industry.  As




 are shorter and more vocationally oriented.  Course-
work is normally completed in three to four years of full-time study,
and the average graduation age is a correspondingly younger 24–25.
Nearly three-quarters of the students graduate in engineering or busi-
ness administration, showing the heavily professional orientation of
these technical colleges.
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, but only one-third of those studying at a university,




Company-based internships are, moreover, an integral element of the
educational experience, with one or more internships of several months
required during the period of study.  A balance between theory and
practice is also institutionalized in instruction.  Professors as a rule
have several years of hands-on experience in either industry or law, and
recruiting visiting professors and guest lecturers from firms is common
practice.





the majority of management positions at all levels, but with clear varia-





number their university counterparts in the lower levels of manage-
ment, accounting for 31 percent (compared with 21 percent) of depart-
ment heads, they are relatively underrepresented in the ranks of top
management.  More than half of managing director positions are held
by university graduates, with only 20 percent of these positions falling










firms favor graduates with technical as opposed to liberal arts educa-
tion.  Graduates in engineering, economics, and business administra-
tion are among the most highly recruited groups.  Those students who
combine university and traditional apprenticeship are highly sought
after by companies for their mix of theoretical and practical training





, reflected in differences in pay and career prospects for
the faculty and graduates of these institutions.  This gap may be nar-
rowing, however, as there is a broadly held perception among both pol-
icymakers and business people, exemplified by several managers we
interviewed, that “university instruction is too long and theoretical and





 with their short, industry-oriented courses,
in an increasingly favorable light.  The trend in educational policies of




, with the goal of changing the student ratio from
70:30 in favor of the universities to 50:50 by the year 2000.
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Table 2 Educational Qualifications of German Managers, 1990 (%)
Table 3 Academic Disciplines of Employed University 
and Polytechnic Graduates (%)
 
The importance of educational attainment for a management career
varies considerably according to firm size and among economic sec-
tors.  Among the largest and most internationally active German com-
panies, there is great respect for academic attainment.  Over half of the
managing directors of the largest 100 German firms possess a doctorate
in engineering, science, or law.  Recruits from universities are also




 graduates to find their way into large











































































 graduates are, on the other hand, coveted by firms




, the small- and medium-sized manufactur-
ing enterprises that have accounted for much of the nation’s export suc-
cess.  Typically operating on a tight budget, these firms do not have the
time nor the internal resources to bring the “high-potential” university




-trained engineers or econ-
omists are attractive to small- or medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
because their more practical education allows them to dive right into
work.
An equally pronounced split in patterns of management, recruiting,
and promotion is found between firms in the manufacturing and service
sectors and those in the services.  Whereas in the traditional strong-
holds of German industry (e.g., chemicals, auto) reaching top manage-
ment is very difficult without a university degree (and in some cases a
doctorate) in services, only a few sectors, such as large consulting
firms, recruit managers and professionals exclusively from the ranks of









 (advanced and vocational certificates,
respectively) as their highest level of educational attainment in the
ranks of top management is quite normal.  The large banks are the ser-
vice sector firms most thoroughly infiltrated by university graduates
and yet only 25 percent of the managerial workforce and 50 percent of
top managers are graduates, although they are now recruiting more uni-
versity graduates as the number of young people participating in higher
education has increased.  In the hotel and retail sectors, the number of
graduates in the ranks of management is considerably smaller (e.g.,




In contrast to the situation in Germany, the U.S. federal govern-
ment has been a relatively minor player in education generally and
management development in particular, with the primary responsibility
resting with state and local governments and private actors (individuals
and firms).  The federal government accounts for under 8 percent of
total spending on compulsory education, and, unlike most other




Federal funding for higher education has been more substantial and
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helped the United States construct the world’s first mass higher educa-
tion system.  A combination of means-tested federal grants and loans to
individuals, private scholarships, and funding for large public universi-
ties has helped make some form of higher education an affordable
option for the majority of Americans.  But in contrast to Germany, this
funding comes with relatively minimal regulation of institutions or
qualifications, allowing universities virtually complete freedom to
design courses and compete for students in the higher education mar-
ketplace.
The result of this decentralized system has been that the quantity of
education in the United States is impressive, even if the quality of some
educational programs (notably the high school diploma) is highly vari-
able compared with that of other nations (Handy 1987).  International
comparisons of educational attainment of both high school students
and adults in the workplace find that mean U.S. scores rank in the mid-
dle of the pack, but the United States has the widest dispersion of any
of the advanced industrial countries, with some of the best and worst
performing individuals (Colvin and Shorgren 1997; OECD 1996).
More than 80 percent of the adult population aged 25–64 has a high
school diploma or equivalent certificate, and nearly two-thirds of
young adults aged 20–24 in the United States enroll in a community
college, college, or university (International Institute for Management
Development 1993).  The high levels of education of the U.S. popula-
tion compared with those of other industrialized countries are pre-
sented in Table 4.
Eighty-five percent of all U.S. employees have at least a high
school diploma, and among the ranks of persons who classify them-
selves as managers and professionals, 96 percent have high school
diplomas and 47 percent have at least undergraduate degrees (data
from U.S. Current Population Survey 1990).  Table 5 presents the per-
centages of managers, professionals, and general employees who have
achieved the highest levels of education across all industries.  There is
wide variation among business sectors.  For example, in financial ser-
vices, 52 percent of managers have college degrees, whereas in the
construction sector, only 26 percent of managers have degrees.  Among
U.S. college students, business administration remains the most popu-
lar subject concentration; nearly one quarter of all students major in
business, an option which grew in popularity throughout the 1980s
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(National Center for Education Statistics 1995).  U.S. young people,
who have to self-finance a larger portion of their higher education than
do their European counterparts, place an emphasis on acquiring practi-
cal, marketable skills while in college.  As one career placement officer
explained, “The kids now are already thinking about finding jobs when
they graduate.  If it isn’t going to help them get and keep a good job,
they don’t want to bother, and they switch or leave.”
Outside of formal education, the state has not historically sup-
ported professional development within U.S. firms, other than allowing
companies to deduct training costs from operating expenses before
taxes.  The Clinton administration launched a network of Manufactur-
ing Technology and Extension Centers, similar to the Rationalization
Committee of German Industry (RKW) though more limited in scope,
which help small firms improve their product and process technology
 
Table 4 Population Percentage Completing 
Different Levels of Education (%)
Table 5 Percentage of All U.S. Workers and Managers Completing 
Various Levels of Education (%)
 
United States OECD average
Early childhood (K–8)  17  45
Upper secondary (9–12; high school)  47  36
















Managerial/professional  4 26 23 30 17 100
All others 17 47 22 10 4 100
Total workforce 15 44 22 13  6 100




Managers and professionals represent 17 percent of the total working population.
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(Finegold et al. 1994).  Much of the service these centers provide is
essentially management development for SMEs, enabling them to
redesign their organizations and upskill their workforces.
State governments have played a more direct role in management
development and worker training.  The level and type of government
support varies widely across the 50 states (Batt and Osterman 1993).
The growth in state-subsidized customized training is part of a general
trend toward integration of education and training and economic devel-
opment at the state level.  North and South Carolina, for example, have
used training packages provided by their technical colleges to become
leaders in attracting new businesses.  Iowa and Oklahoma have pro-
grams that allow eligible firms to fund their training expenses through
the issuance of bonds that are underwritten by the state.  The funds can
be used to train new workers or retrain existing workers, with commu-
nity colleges and private consultants usually providing the training.  If,
after the training, the firm shows an increase in profits, some or all of
the interest and principal payments are forgiven by the state.  The rea-
soning is that effective training should have a positive effect on the bot-
tom-line financial results of the company, and if this happens, the firm
is contributing more in state taxes, which thus allows the training to
effectively pay for itself.
Likewise, Arizona recently enacted state support for professional
development as an incentive for companies to create new jobs.  A fund
of $3 million is set aside each year which corporations can apply for if
they are expanding their Arizona operation or relocating to the state.  In
either case, they must be adding new jobs.  Twenty percent of the pool
has been set aside each year to assist small companies (less than 100
total employees).  A common aspect to all the programs described is
that although the government provides funding and clear guidelines for
eligibility and repayment, it does not directly provide the retraining.
Firms are free to contract with education providers, both public and
private, to design and build the courses they deem the most worth-
while.  These state and federal initiatives, while growing, are still rela-
tively minor in the context of overall U.S. management development.
 








 graduates account for the
majority of German managers, there is a sizable minority who have not
been through higher education.  A look back at Table 2 shows nongrad-
uates to be well represented at all levels of management, accounting for
half of the department heads, over 40 percent of the division heads, and
some 30 percent of the managing directors.  For the nongraduates,
entry into management is normally contingent upon achieving a second
level of vocational qualification.  These qualifications build on the
completion of an apprenticeship and a minimum of 3–5 years of work
experience, and, like apprenticeships, this route into management is
made possible by strong employer organizations (such as the 83 cham-
bers of commerce and industry which all German employers are
required to join).  The chambers oversee these courses and administer
the final certifying exam, ensuring the relevance of course content to
employer needs and a consistent quality standard across the country.





ented further training), this second level of vocational qualification is




 (master craftsman or supervisor) certificate








 certificates in services.












 courses and the associated exams in a broad range of
disciplines across all industrial and commercial sectors (see Table 4).
For each type of further training, classroom instruction is offered in the
evenings or on weekends and is meant to accompany continued work,
with the goal of achieving a tight integration of theory and practice.
The courses involve between 500–900 hours of classroom-based
instruction, spread out over a two- to three-year period, and costs range
from DM 2500–6000 ($1,500–3,500), which in some cases are paid by
the employing firm.
Despite these similarities, each course plays a different role in Ger-









 certificate is designed to deepen the skills and





 is often considered a prerequisite for those with-
out a university degree to move into management, especially in larger
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viduals typically take over responsibility for a small business unit
within a larger commercial firm, e.g., a bank’s branch office or the pur-
chasing group within a department store.  Later, opportunities for





including top management, are also abundant.









designed to prepare the skilled manufacturing worker to take over a
leadership position in production.  Just over half of instruction is
devoted to deepening technical knowledge and understanding of manu-
facturing processes.  Technical training is complemented with courses
in business administration, along with instruction in pedagogical and




 certificate holders not only supervise
other employees and organize production but also play a critical role in
continuous skill formation on the shop floor.  It is these individuals
who oversee the training of apprentices. 
With the move toward flatter, more team-based organizations, the
traditional role of the supervisor—to maintain control over produc-
tion—declines in importance (Mason 1996), but this has not decreased










 qualification as the demand increases for persons
doing more long-range technical and organizational planning activities:
design and monitoring of quality control systems (e.g., obtaining and
requalifying for ISO 9001); leading continuous improvement efforts;
acting as a representative of manufacturing on integrated product teams
(IPTs); serving as programmers; or working as a technical expert




holders for the new work
environment, the standards and curriculum for their courses have been
reformed with further emphasis on communication, cooperation, plan-
ning, technical, and coaching skills (Scholz 1996).





opportunities for upward mobility are considerably more limited than




holders have traditionally been unable to rise above the level of super-
visor.  However, while in the relatively flat employment hierarchy of




 is on the same level of the
employment hierarchy as the managers of other functional departments
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who remain are often the only management layer between the
plant manager and the shopfloor.
In addition to the role that chambers of commerce play in support-
ing further training, there is another quasi-public organization active in
the field of management development—the Rationalization Committee
of German Industry (RKW)—from which German SMEs also derive
considerable benefits.  Since its founding in 1923, the RKW has
focused on assisting economic rationalization and structural adjust-
ment in the German economy, with particular attention to the needs of
small- and medium-sized manufacturing firms.  Through its central
office in Frankfurt and regional offices in each of the federal states, the
RKW offers a range of services oriented toward supporting innovative




.  One service is delivering
ongoing training courses in management education.  A second is on-
site consulting in organization flexibility, implementing new technol-
ogy, and controlling budgets.  In 1992, the RKW logged some 43,500
days of consulting work in just over 6,000 different firms (RKW 1992).
A final service offered by the RKW is the publication of books and
expert reports on themes related to innovation management.  Drawing
on the expertise of business practitioners, university professors, and
other management experts, the RKW produces 25–30 publications
each year covering innovations in technology, organization, and per-
sonnel development.
The benefits of the chambers’ and the RKW’s activities to the
SMEs are twofold.  The most obvious is the increased availability of
management training and consulting.  Because of public subsidies to
both types of organizations, these services can be obtained by the SME
at a price as much as one-third below market value.  Less obvious, but
perhaps more important, is the role both organizations play in diffusing
innovative management techniques (Wever 1995).  For the RKW,
extensive involvement with small business enterprises permits a steady
accumulation of knowledge about evolving management practices,
knowledge which in turn can be diffused through consulting and pub-





 leads to extensive interaction with both large and small firms, con-
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tact which allows for the accumulation of expertise that again can be
diffused.
Employers’ organizations also play a role in supporting the man-
agement development efforts of SMEs through networks of private
training providers.  These providers are of two sorts.  One called the
Training Center of German Industry resembles the RKW in organiza-
tional form.  It operates through regional administrative bodies in each
of the federal states.  The second type of private provider with strong
links to employers’ organizations is professional associations.  These
are organized on an industry basis and include the Association for Pro-
fessional Education in Banking, the Institute for Professional Educa-




The United States has numerous employer and professional organi-
zations, but in comparison with Germany’s, these intermediate institu-
tions are relatively weak.  They lack the compulsory membership or
regulatory supports that allow their German counterparts to act as stra-
tegic players in the corporatist policy formulation, which helps over-
come public goods problems (see Crouch, Finegold, and Sako 1999);
instead, they typically play two roles: providing services, such as man-
agement development in competition with other providers in the mar-
ketplace, and lobbying for their members in policy debates.
The American Management Association (AMA) provides an
example of a large U.S. labor market intermediary.  It is the largest and
one of the oldest private providers of management seminars in the
world.  Founded in 1923, the AMA has over 70,000 members, includ-
ing many in Europe, most of whom are business managers.  The AMA
offers two types of short seminars, three- to five-day courses for mid-
level managers and one- to two-day courses for office administrators
and supervisors.  The AMA contracts with independent consultants to
teach the courses.  The breadth of subjects offered in AMA seminars
covers every area of management, both general and industry-specific,
as well as technical and “soft” subjects.  Among the most popular cur-
rent offerings are courses on implementing information technology,
ISO 9000 quality standards, workforce diversity, power speaking,
inventory management, and increasing customer satisfaction.
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Although the AMA fulfills a role similar to that of the RKW, it is a
nonprofit educational institution that funds itself strictly through course
fees and sales of journals and books it publishes.  The president of the
AMA states the reasons for this: “We not only don’t seek government
assistance, we don’t accept it when offered.  If we can’t run our own
business successfully, how can we expect to help our members and cli-
ents run theirs?”  Reflecting this private-sector orientation, there
appears to be a strong preference in AMA courses for business practi-
tioners rather than academics to serve as faculty.
 
THE GERMAN MARKET FOR 
MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT
 
The strong role of the state and employer organizations in Ger-
many has had many beneficial effects, most notably ensuring that indi-
viduals and firms, regardless of their financial resources, have access to
management development.  As noted, however, the entrenched higher
education bureaucracy lacks market-like mechanisms that can stimu-
late innovation and responsiveness to customer demands in the public
sector.  A good example of the negative impact that the state has had on
the potential market for management development is the Master of
Business Administration (MBA).  Despite significant demand, an MBA
was still not an officially recognized educational degree in the Federal
Republic at the end of the 1980s, and thus no German educational
institution offered the degree.  In the 1990s, however, public and pri-
vate universities found ways around this lack of recognition, awarding
MBAs in conjunction with a sister school abroad or by renaming
MBA-style courses (i.e., those with case studies, team projects, and
company internships) with such titles as Master in International Busi-
ness.  There are now close to 15 German institutions offering one- to
two-year MBA-style programs, and between 600–800 German stu-
dents take the MBA degree each year, with approximately half of those
degrees earned abroad (Haller 1993).  The international orientation of
the degree is a key to explaining the rapid growth in interest in the
MBA (Schneider 1993).  International management topics and oppor-
tunities to study at sister schools abroad form core elements of most
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German MBA programs and set the MBA apart from the normal busi-






A few select, private universities are most highly regarded for their
instruction in this area.  The Koblenz School of Corporate Manage-
ment, the European School of Management in Berlin, and the Euro-
pean Business School in Oestrich-Winkel are similar to their public
counterparts in offering a number of different final degrees in the area
of business administration.  Their business administration courses are
developed in the context of international business, with topics like
international marketing, finance, and personnel management making
up the core elements of instruction.  Coursework on international busi-
ness themes is also complemented with periods spent studying and
completing company-based internships abroad.
There are a few other private management training providers in
Germany, but those with close ties to employers’ associations are cer-
tainly the most important.  One factor that has stifled the creation of a
more active market for management development is the lack of
demand from firms.  Small firms, as noted above, rely heavily on quasi-
public institutions and the chambers for assistance, while large firms
typically outsource far less management development than their U.S.
counterparts; large German companies keep 90 percent of ongoing
training internal, using external providers for specialty classes, particu-
larly in the area of information technology.  In contrast, large U.S.
companies typically spend more than 60 percent of their development
expenditure on outside experts (Weiss 1994; Bassi and Cheney 1996).
 
THE U.S. MARKET FOR MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT
 
Unlike Germany, the United States has a thriving market for fur-
ther management development, epitomized by its business schools that
attract students from all over the world to obtain the highly prized
MBA (Finegold and Brewer 1996).  In U.S. business, demonstrated
ability counts for more than academic credentials, but increasingly,
U.S. managers believe the two are connected.  Thus, almost all U.S.
managers in large organizations now start their careers with a degree
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(usually business or technical) that they later augment with further
management study and/or an MBA.  Of the six sectors studied, only
hotel managers did not think a university degree was an important
entry characteristic or a prerequisite for promotion beyond a certain
level.  The other exception to the rule of degreed managers is at start-up
firms, where entrepreneurs often see little or no payoff from formal
higher education.
While only 10–12 percent of all managers in business have MBAs,
35 percent of chief executives of America’s largest 500 companies pos-
sess them.  The MBA originated in the United States in the late nine-
teenth century (Porter and McKibbon 1985).  Until the Wharton School
of Business was founded at the University of Pennsylvania in 1881,
business education in the United States had been the province of tech-
nical schools and commercial colleges.  The MBA gained in prestige in
the early twentieth century as world-renowned institutions such as Har-
vard and Stanford added graduate business schools.  By the mid twenti-
eth century, the classic MBA—with its full-time, two-year curriculum
of management, accounting, finance, and operations, and an emphasis
on quantitative analysis—was well established.  The average student
worked 2–3 years before seeking an MBA, and the goal of the MBA
was to produce a new breed of general manager, educated to a graduate
level in all aspects of running a business.  Still, MBAs were relatively
rare, with only 4,500 awarded in 1956 and just nine schools accounting
for more than half of all the degrees awarded.  The growth in the popu-
larity of MBAs since then has been explosive, particularly throughout
the 1970s and 1980s.  In 1991, over 78,000 MBAs were awarded by
over 700 American business schools.
The recession of the early 1990s slowed the growth in MBAs for
the first time, with the number of persons taking the Graduate Manage-
ment Admissions Test (GMAT), which is the standard entrance exam
for MBA applicants, declining from 1990–1993.  Much of the decline
was cyclical, reflecting the substantial downsizing of many large U.S.
corporations, including the reduction in layers of management (Lawler,
Mohrman, and Ledford 1995), but complaints from companies about
the usefulness of MBAs were also increasing.  Until fairly recently,
“classic” American business education emphasized analytics and
finance and was U.S.-centric in its focus.  This traditional education
has been criticized as being shortsighted and inadequate to meet the
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increased pressures on businesses today.  A new set of business compe-
tencies is augmenting (but not replacing) the old: foreign language
skills, familiarity with other cultures, Internet literacy, and firm-based
team projects, for example.  These important additions to business
school curricula are a reaction to critics who charged that business
schools were not adapting quickly enough to changes in the duties and
career structures of managers (Haynes 1991).
A sign of the market responsiveness of U.S. business schools was
that as soon as demand for their educational products began to slacken,
institutions adopted major reforms.  Most of the top-tier MBA pro-
grams have reengineered themselves in the last 5–10 years.  While
many of these reforms are still in their early phases, the more promi-
nent changes include a greater emphasis on teamwork and firm-based
learning, greater international experience, and use of new technologies.
The contrast between the elements of the traditional MBA model and
the new model, which the top-tier business schools are adopting, is
shown in Table 6 (see Finegold et al. 1994 for fuller discussion).  The
reforms, along with the turnaround of the U.S. economy, have helped
produce a resurgence in demand for MBAs, with applications and start-
ing salaries at record levels (Lord 1997).
Another factor driving changes in MBA programs has been the
shifting demographics of the customer base.  The average starting age
 
Table 6 Changes under Way in U.S. MBA Programs
 
Traditional model New model
Few courses Diversify provision
Classroom-based Apprenticeship
Theoretical Real-world cases
Finance, quantitative focus Analytic and soft (“people”) skills
Functional separation Cross-functional
Faculty focus on research Balance research & teaching emphasis
U.S.-centric International
Individualistic/competitive Group/cooperative
Male-dominated student body Diverse (women, minorities) student body
Early in career Lifelong learning
Traditional lectures Use of new technologies
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for full-time MBA students was 24–25 ten years ago; now it is 27.
Business school officials and firms we interviewed agreed that more
work experience (and greater maturity) make the MBA a more valu-
able academic experience.  Most business schools have developed new
course options—part-time MBAs, FMBA (fully employed MBA), and
EMBA (executive MBA)—to cater to students who are already in the
workplace.  These programs offer similar coursework to the full-time
programs but are structured to accommodate students’ work schedules.
Students meet nights and weekends for their classes while working
during the week.  Unlike full-time MBAs, firms, rather than the indi-
viduals themselves, often pay the tuition and related costs.
Another sign of the ways in which business schools and other U.S.
providers of management development have responded to changes in
demand is the dramatic growth in customized training.  This firm-spe-
cific training uses the business problems faced by the company as
course material and incorporates the firm’s business requirements and
strategy, rather than focusing on the general development of the indi-
vidual.  The growth in customized training occurred when companies
began to question the economic returns to the company from costly
executive education or other general-audience short courses.  While it
“may pay off for the individual participant, there is little evidence of
how such education has increased the value of the business corpora-
tions,” according to Finegold et al. (1994).  “Companies are using
executive education,” they continue, “to meet specific strategic goals or
transform corporate culture; organizational transformation is replacing
a focus on personal development.” 
In custom courses, the education provider—usually business
school executive education departments, community college profes-
sional development centers, or private providers—tailors coursework
to the business needs of individual companies and teaches only
selected managers and professionals from that company, often onsite.
The courses may be only a few days or part of an ongoing partnership
between the provider and the firm.  The educator may access propri-
etary information that requires confidentiality agreements or similar
guarantees.  In the past, leading business schools have resisted custom-
izing courses, but that now appears to be changing.  At many schools,
customized courses have increased from 10 to 40 percent of the execu-
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tive education department’s revenues over the past three years and
demand is still growing.  
Smaller companies and companies seeking to retrain large seg-
ments of their workforce are more likely to seek their customized train-
ing from more affordable and accessible community colleges, which
provide a state-subsidized service somewhat similar to the RKW in
Germany.  One of the community colleges in our sample had a profes-
sional development center that had trained individuals in hundreds of
SMEs.  Most of the training is customized total quality management
(TQM) and statistical process control (SPC) courses, which the college
provided on the firm’s premises after performing an analysis of the
company’s specific business needs.  The companies often use the train-
ing to initiate an effort to transform the business processes and culture
of their organizations.  Participants in the initial training cohort are pur-
posely selected to represent a cross-section of all the major business
functions and levels within the organization; for example, trainees may
include the head of accounting, a mid-level operations professional,
and someone from marketing.  When the class is over, the skills
acquired can be utilized on the job and shared with other co-workers,
who may become part of a later training cohort.
Private providers, such as the AMA and Globecon, have also added
or increased the customized component of their training.  At the AMA,
the newest division, AMA On-Site, is the fastest growing.  AMA On-
Site provides week-long courses at the customer’s own facility that are
tailored versions of AMA’s general seminars.  Globecon has carved a
successful niche by combining consulting and education services to
“solve a bank’s overall business problems, rather than just their train-
ing needs,” according to its president.  While this plethora of U.S. pro-
viders creates a wide array of options for individuals and firms who
want to purchase management development in the marketplace, it can
also create problems.  The lack of standards and rapid rate of change
led many of the managers we interviewed to complain about the diffi-
culty of determining the quality and relevance of the many courses that
are offered.
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GERMAN FIRMS
Compared with the system of initial management education, firm-
based management development in Germany can only be described as
weak.  German firms rely on hiring already qualified individuals from
universities and Aufstiegsweiterbildung courses and then do relatively
little to train them further.  As one management recruiter said, “We
expect [applicants] to bring their certificates with them . . . [and] pos-
session of these certificates attained through a long course of training
will allow them to get on with the job.”
What this means for the great majority of German managers is that
further development efforts are minimal.  One survey of over 800
large- and medium-sized firms estimated that German managers spend
three to five days per year on further training in courses mainly devoted
to “soft” management themes like motivation and communication
(Gaugler and Witz 1993).  The survey of European Union (EU) mem-
ber states also found that German enterprises were the least likely in
the EU to use systematic job rotation or periods spent abroad as tools
of management development.  A mere 7 percent of German firms used
employment abroad as part of their personnel development, putting
German industry last in the EU and considerably below the EU average
of 17 percent.  Only 12 percent of German firm respondents had job
rotation programs, again a figure well below the EU average of 25 per-
cent.
Alongside the lack of investment in ongoing management develop-
ment are structural features of German firms that may hinder their tran-
sition to more team-oriented forms of work and the accompanying
development of new managerial capabilities (Wever 1995; Herrigel
1996).  There are two reasons for expecting difficulties.  The first is the
residual hierarchy of German industry.  This manifests itself in a preoc-
cupation with certifying and ranking skill levels, e.g., the university
over the Fachhochschule, and the Meister certificate over the skilled
worker.  It also appears in the emphasis German managers at all levels
place on technical expertise as the basis for their authority.  These ways
of ranking skill levels make the transition to fluid organizational struc-
tures difficult to implement.  A second barrier to creating teams is the
minimal use of job rotation by German firms for the purposes of per-
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sonnel development.  Because most managers, unlike apprentices, do
not have opportunities to cultivate their skills in different functional
areas, they may be less adequately prepared to organize and lead teams
of functional experts.
The comparative neglect of management development by German
industry is confirmed by other studies (Wever 1995).  One survey of
German and British middle managers showed a strong pattern of func-
tional management in German firms.  Of the 30 German managers sur-
veyed, all but one had stayed in the same functional area during the
entire period with his present employer.  Twenty of these managers had
been in the same position for more than 5 years, and 12 of them more
than 10 years.  Another comparison of the career patterns of German
and Japanese managers suggested that 10 times as many Japanese man-
agers had made rotations through Germany as German managers
through Japan.3
Opportunities for sustained investment in management develop-
ment are, in fact, open to only a small and elite group of the managerial
workforce in large German firms.  These programs identify “high-
potential” management candidates and intensively cultivate the next
generation of top managers.  As one executive stated, “It is these indi-
viduals who will make the organization prosper, and so cultivating
their leadership and business skills is the highest priority.”  High-poten-
tial programs typically consist of two elements.  The first is job rotation
through different functional departments, product divisions, and inter-
national operations.  Switching employment positions relatively fre-
quently (e.g., two- to five-year rotations) allows the “top manager in
training” not only to develop a sense for the company’s overall busi-
ness but also to demonstrate a high level of initiative and commitment
to the firm.  Among the managers we interviewed, periods spent work-
ing abroad were considered particularly critical to developing the skills
and flexibility needed for leadership positions.
Further training complements job rotation for this elite group.
“The purpose of further training,” said one developer, “is to take the
normal manager and turn him into an entrepreneur and business
leader.”  It is typically only the high-potential candidates who attend
training seminars in subjects like entrepreneurship and strategic man-
agement, as well as international marketing and personnel manage-
ment, at such notable providers as the German Universitätsseminar der
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Wirtschaft (USW).  Europe’s top-rated business school, the European
Institute of Business Administration (INSEAD) at Fontainebleau, and
the Harvard Business School also play a role in further training top
managers.  For some firms, the external seminars are considered very
important; they are expected to stimulate creativity by giving top man-
agers distance from the organization and putting them in contact with
other business leaders.  Most organizations, however, consider external
seminars too highly priced to be cost-effective and, as noted earlier,
German companies typically outsource far less management develop-
ment than their U.S. counterparts.
In size and degree of formalization, the high-potential programs
vary somewhat from industry to industry.  We found that the largest
number of managers designated as “high potential” worked in large
banks and high-technology manufacturing.  They represented close to
10 percent of all managers.  These firms also had a relatively high
degree of structure in their further training, with clearly laid-out train-
ing programs accompanying upward mobility.  Among hotels and
lower-tech manufacturers (e.g., food processing), the development pro-
grams were less formal and smaller, including only 1–3 percent of the
management workforce.
U.S. FIRMS
In-company training, both formal and especially informal, is the
most common mode of management development in the United States.
It is also considered most practical because new competencies can be
developed as necessary.  U.S. employers spend over $40 billion each
year on additional training, with a high percentage spent on manage-
ment training in particular (Fuchsberg 1993).  Lillard and Tan (1986)
showed that the likelihood of getting formal on-the-job training and the
amount of that training rise with the level of schooling.
Formal training is most common at the onset of employment in a
large firm.  At this time, a high-potential new recruit is likely to enter a
management development program that includes some classwork and
systematic job rotations.  After formal initiation, which lasts anywhere
from six months to two years, in-company training becomes less pro-
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grammatic and more individualized.  Large companies increasingly
include in their annual personnel performance assessments a section
where the individual and his or her supervisors can decide what skills
the employee needs to develop and how best to develop them.  The
individual development plan resulting from this process may include
specific new responsibilities, course attendance, and rotations in differ-
ent departments or divisions.  Also, the provision of certain seminars or
courses is often standard when a manager reaches certain levels or is
assigned to certain departments.
A growing number of large U.S. firms have formalized in-company
training and extended it to all the employees of the firm and its suppli-
ers by establishing corporate universities.  Firms such as Motorola,
General Electric, and Xerox have developed autonomous business
units whose primary function is to meet their company’s ambitious
continuous education requirements.  These corporate universities com-
bine the use of education to meet specific strategic goals or achieve
organizational transformation with a strong, ongoing commitment to
professional development.  Because of the level of resources required
to set up these universities, they tend to be limited to very large compa-
nies.
Motorola University (MU), arguably the most well-known com-
pany university, is more of a planner and contractor than a training pro-
vider.  The mission of MU is to provide the means by which Motorola’s
120,000 employees, worldwide, can continuously upgrade their skills.
To accomplish this mission, MU has units at the main Motorola facili-
ties, including in China, sometimes forming partnerships with local
colleges to deliver courses.  For example, classes at MU’s western divi-
sion are administered by Mesa Community College, which screens and
hires course instructors, provides classrooms and support services, and
administers course registration.  By charter, MU only develops its own
courses if the subject is not obtainable through a local college or pri-
vate provider or if it requires discussion of proprietary information.
Motorola finds that the benefits provided by MU far outweigh its
costs, despite spending over $100 million annually on training in 1992.
First, MU courses provide the opportunity continually to restate strate-
gic objectives such as quality improvement, cycle time reduction, and
technology leadership, aimed at achieving total customer satisfaction.
Second, MU can respond to changing objectives much more quickly
84 Finegold and Keltner
and cohesively than outside educational providers.  Arnie Sabel, man-
ager of MU West, estimates that about 70 percent of the courses
changed in the program’s first eight years.  The slower pace at which
many universities worldwide have responded to the changing business
environment is thus notably absent in corporate universities such as
MU.
However, for Americans who are not working in the relatively
small group of large companies that are leading providers of manage-
ment development, the United States does not have a highly structured
system of training for entry-level managers equivalent to the German
Aufstiegsweiterbildung.  The quantity and quality of management
development for this group is thus far more variable, with some indi-
viduals receiving no formal management development, while others
undertake extensive, ongoing training.  The most common approach to
further training for supervisors is informal on-the-job training supple-
mented by short, externally provided courses that individuals or firms
purchase in the training marketplace when they have a perceived skill
need (Mason and Finegold 1997; Mason 1996).  Each course usually
focuses on a particular issue or skill set.  Some may be industry-spe-
cific, such as short courses for bankers on subjects such as credit analy-
sis and securities-backed financing.  Other courses, such as those in
presentation skills and quality assurance, may be applicable across
industries.
Courses last anywhere from a day to two weeks, with costs ranging
from $100 for a day-long community college seminar to $15,000 for an
executive seminar offered through a business school.  To help individu-
als who take these courses in their own time, a large number of U.S.
employers, including many small firms, now offer some form of tuition
reimbursement to their employees (Finegold and Mason 1996).  In the
public transportation industry, for example, 61 percent of all agencies
offer tuition reimbursement to supervisors and 55 percent offer it to
mechanics (Finegold et al. 1996).
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CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Our comparison of management development in the United States
and Germany reveals a number of conclusions about the role of
national institutional structures in the skill-creation process.  First, it
confirms the findings of earlier international comparisons focused on
lower-level skills by showing the important role that different institu-
tional arrangements play in determining the level, type, and effective-
ness of skill investment in different countries.  Americans and Germans
generally learn the skills they need to manage in quite distinct ways,
and the choices they and their firms make about what skills to develop
and how to develop them are shaped by the incentives, information,
and developmental routes created by the national institutional environ-
ment.  
Second, our research suggests that for a complex set of competen-
cies like those required by modern-day managers, it is wrong to think
of a country as having a single or dominant institutional model of skill
development, such as the dual system for apprentices or state-based
compulsory education.  Rather, managers in both countries acquire
their skills through a combination of four different institutional
arrangements: the state, the market, internal firm hierarchies, and
employer or professional organizations.  Third, the particular mix of
institutional arrangements for management development found in each
country is not the result of a market generating the theoretically opti-
mum skill outcome.  Neither is it a carefully crafted solution by public
policymakers to the challenges facing managers entering the twenty-
first century.  Instead, the current institutional arrangements demon-
strate the strong influence of history or the path-dependent nature of
institutional development.  Most notably, the large role that the state
plays in initial management development, particularly in Germany, is a
by-product of the evolution of a government-dominated higher educa-
tion system.
Finally, it is the fit between the historical mix of institutional
arrangements in each country and the types of skills required in the
workplace that appears to explain the relative effectiveness of the
United States and German systems.  Several features of managerial
competencies suggest that a combination of individuals investing in
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their own skills in the marketplace and internal firm development pro-
vides the most efficient means of managerial development.  The char-
acteristics that appear to favor market-based institutional arrangements
over state-led managerial skills development include increasingly
dynamic global competition, technological change, and the high rate of
private return to market-based skill investment.  The returns are also
greater if skills development and the timing of the training are closely
linked to the managerial requirements of the organization in which the
skills will be used.  There are, however, a number of reasons why the
market alone will fail to provide a sufficient level of investment in
transferable managerial skills: imperfect information, capital con-
straints on individuals or small firms, a lack of internal firm capacity
for effective management development, and the free-rider problem.
To remedy such deficiencies, it is useful to have strong employer or
professional organizations capable of collective action.  These organi-
zations can act as an effective conduit for state support for management
development, overcoming market failures while at the same ensuring
the relevance of the skills created to their members.  The respective
strengths and weaknesses of the German and U.S. institutional arrange-
ments for management development are summarized below.
Germany 
The hallmark of the German management model is a commitment
to professional preparation.  Through a combination of theoretical and
practical training provided by the state and strong intermediate institu-
tions, the vast majority of managers can develop a very deep and rich
understanding of their intended area of professional expertise.  For stu-
dents at the Fachhochschulen, as well as those at private universities,
the combination of theory and practice is a standard part of the curricu-
lum.  For university graduates, completion of an apprenticeship and/or
a management training program is increasingly used to complement
their stricter theoretical training with hands-on experience.  The Meis-
ter, Fachwirt, and Fachkaufleute courses ensure, moreover, that it is not
just top managers, but also those at lower and middle levels of corpora-
tions who are comprehensively prepared for their jobs.  The courses
round out practical work experience with a more theoretical treatment
of subjects related to supervision and management.
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The emphasis on thorough initial training, a historical strength of
the German system, may now be becoming a weakness.  It has encour-
aged German firms to rely heavily on external mechanisms for man-
agement skill development and to concentrate their own development
efforts on a select group of high-potential recruits.  In the process, the
functional or “single-career” management model became the accepted
paradigm.  Rapid economic and technological change mean, however,
that the single-career model has become outdated as firms place greater
emphasis on the need for functional breadth and continuous learning.
In the emerging world economy, therefore, the high-quality initial
management training received by most German managers will be a
strength only if this acquired skill set can be continually expanded and
upgraded.
The German case also suggests the advantages of public support
for private initiative and the dangers of public regulation in the area of
management development.  Employer-dominated institutions such as
the chambers of commerce and the RKW enable firms to act coopera-
tively to drive change using public policy in a supporting role.  Further
training courses are developed informally in conjunction with private
industry.  Consulting and other advising activities are likewise oriented
toward meeting market demand.  Public policy relies on employer
organizations and other intermediate institutions to encourage and has-
ten the diffusion of innovation.  Government support gives these orga-
nizations a degree of independence from the vagaries of the market,
allowing them to continue their activities through recessions.  By low-
ering the costs of training and consulting activities, government subsi-
dies also allow these nonprofit organizations to reach a larger number
of firms, including those that would not otherwise invest in manage-
ment development.  
In contrast to its positive role in supporting firm-based manage-
ment development, the state bureaucracy appears to have hindered
innovation in initial and graduate management education.  Among the
regulations that stifle competition are a cumbersome government
approval process that limits the ability of institutions to respond to
changing demands by developing new courses; a centralized admis-
sions process that prevents universities from competing for the most
able students; and civil service rules governing faculty salaries that
limit the incentives for professors to work closely with industry.  The
88 Finegold and Keltner
large public sector has also crowded out, or at least significantly
reduced, the development of a thriving private sector in management
development.  Not surprisingly, most innovations have come from out-
side the public educational system in the form of private university
education and MBA programs.  Management developers and university
professors alike agreed that the present system of management educa-
tion could be improved by higher levels of competition between pro-
viders.
The United States 
The U.S. case illustrates both the strengths and weaknesses of a
more market-driven approach to management development.  Individu-
als, firms, and educators are the primary actors in this system; the gov-
ernment does not play a significant role.  Individuals and firms are the
initiators of, payers for, and beneficiaries of management education;
they are also the source of demand in the system.  Colleges and private
training institutions supply management education in response to the
changing business environment.  Firms are becoming increasingly
dominant players in the professional development marketplace.
Because they are the largest source of funding for postemployment
training, firms exercise great power in determining course offerings.  In
recent years, businesses have been demanding more customized train-
ing (or otherwise requiring that training be more firm-specific) in order
to receive a greater return on their professional development invest-
ment.
The government does play a minor role in the management educa-
tion marketplace, especially where public investment in training is
viewed as a means of retaining or attracting business.  The federal role
is largely confined to student loans for low-income groups.  States sub-
sidize education and training while allowing firms and individuals to
make the actual decisions about which schools to choose, how courses
should be offered, and who should receive training.  Where states have
launched training programs, they have attempted to increase the return
on this investment by tying the funding to demonstrated results.  This
approach fosters competition among trainers, flexibility of provision,
and less bureaucracy while avoiding the crowding out of private train-
ers and slow rates of response to changing demands.  But, in the
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absence of regulation and national skill standards, it is often difficult
for individuals or firms to ascertain the quality or impact of the many
courses offered in the marketplace.  Likewise, reliance on the market
can exclude those actors—whether economically disadvantaged stu-
dents or some small firms—that do not have the resources to invest in
management development.
Notes
1. Most Fachhochschule students take an apprenticeship instead of staying on in
school to complete the Abitur, the academic upper secondary qualification,
although a growing percentage now do both.
2. Under the Clinton administration, however, national standards for education in the
United States are being seriously debated for the first time.
3. In a presentation to the Deutsch-Japanischer Wirtschaftskreis in Dusseldorf in
May 1995, a Japanese manager put the comparative figures at 40,000 and 4,000.
An official of the Wirtschaftskreis said that “exact figures cannot be verified, but
that there were certainly many more Japanese managers coming to Germany than
the reverse.”
References
Bassi, L., and S. Cheney.  1996.  Restructuring: Results from the 1996 Bench-
marking Forum.  Alexandria, Virginia: American Society for Training and
Development. 
Batt, R., and P. Osterman.  1993.  A National Policy for Workplace Training.
Washington, D.C.: Economic Policy Institute.
Becker, G.  1975.  Human Capital.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft.  1993–1994.  Grund- und
Strukturdaten.  Bonn, Germany.
Colvin, R., and L. Shorgren.  1997.  “U.S. 4th Graders Score Strongly in Sci-
ence and Math.”  Los Angeles Times (June 11), Sec. A1.
Commonwealth of Australia.  1982.  Inquiry into Management Education:
Report.  Canberra, Australia, April.
Crouch, C., D. Finegold, and M. Sako.  1999.  Are Skills the Answer?  The
Political Economy of Skill Creation in the Advanced Industrial Economies.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
90 Finegold and Keltner
Dore, R. and M. Sako.  1988.  Vocational Education and Training in Japan.
London: Routledge Press.
Finegold, D.  1997.  “Developing Global Capabilities.”  Paper presented at the
Center for Effective Organizations Developing Global Capabilities seminar
held in Los Angeles, California, April 1.
Finegold, D., and D. Brewer.  1996.  “Does Business School Quality Make a
Difference?  The Impact of Institutional Selectivity on MBAs’ Starting Sal-
aries.”  Working paper, Center for Effective Organizations, University of
Southern California.
Finegold, D., and G. Mason.  1996.  “National Training Systems and Indus-
trial Performance: U.S.-European Matched-Plant Comparisons.”  Paper
presented at the ILR-Cornell Institute for Labor Market Policies confer-
ence “New Empirical Research on Employer Training” held in Ithaca, New
York, November 15–17.
Finegold, D., and D. Soskice.  1988.  “The Failure of Training in Britain: Anal-
ysis and Prescription.”  Oxford Review of Economic Policy 2(2): 22–51.
Finegold, D., and K. Wagner.  1997.  “The Search for Flexibility: Workplace
Innovation in the German Pump Industry.”  The British Journal of Indus-
trial Relations 36(3): 469–487.
Finegold, D., M. Robbins, L. Galway, C. Stasz, and T. Kaganoff.  1996.  Clos-
ing the Knowledge Gap for Transit Maintenance Employees.  Report for
the Transportation Cooperative Research Program, RAND, Santa Monica,
California.
Finegold, David, Susan Schechter, Jeff Luck, Elan Melamid, Heide Phillips-
Shockley, Brent Keltner, Brent Boultinghouse, Frank O’Carroll, Steen
Scheuer, and Anne Kathrine Mandrup.  1994.  International Models of
Management Development: Lessons for Australia.  RAND, MR-481-IET,
Santa Monica, California.
Fuchsberg, Gilbert.  1993.  “Harvard Weighs One-Year Version of M.B.A.
Program.”  Wall Street Journal (October 29), pp. B1, B6.
Gaugler, Eduard, and Stefan Witz.  1993.  Personalwesen im Europaischen
Vergleich: the Price Waterhouse Cranfield Project on International Strate-
gic Human Resource Management. Universität Mannheim-Lehrstuhl für
ABWL, Personalwesen und Arbeitswissenschaft, Mannheim, Germany.
Hall, P.  1986.  Governing the Economy.  Oxford, England: Polity Press.
Haller, Sabine.  1993.  “Marktanalyse: MBA-Programme in der Bundesrepub-
lik.”  Working paper, Fachhochschule für Wirtschaft, Berlin, Germany.
Handy, Charles.  1987.  The Making of Managers: A Report on Management
Education, Training and Development in the USA, West Germany, France,
Japan, and the UK.  National Economic Development Office, London,
England.
Skill Creation and Management Development 91
Haynes, P.  1991.  “A Survey of Management Education.”  The Economist
318: S1–S14 (March 2).
Herrigel, G.  1996.  “Crisis in German Decentralized Production.”  European
Urban and Regional Studies 3(1): 33–52.
Hollingsworth, J.R., P. Schmitter, and W. Streeck.  1994.  Governing Capital-
ist Economics.  New York: Oxford University Press.
International Institute for Management Development.  1993.  World Competi-
tiveness Report.  Lausanne, Switzerland.
Kiechel, W.  1994.  “A Manager’s Career in the New Economy.”  Fortune
(April 4): 68–71.
Lawler, E.  1996.  From the Ground Up: Six Principles for Building the New
Logic Corporation.  San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Lawler, E., S. Mohrman, and G. Ledford.  1995.  Creating High Performance
Organizations.  San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Lillard, Lee A., and H.W. Tan.  1986.  Private Sector Training: Who Gets It
and What Are Its Effects?  RAND, R-3331-DOL/RC, Santa Monica, Cali-
fornia.
Lord, M.  1997.  “After a Slowdown in the Early ’90s, Demand for MBAs is
Soaring.”  U.S. News & World Report (March 10): 80–81.
Mason, G.  1996.  Shopfloor Management Skills in Manufacturing: The For-
mation of Supervisors in the U.S., Germany and Britain.  Report to the U.S.
Department of Labor, Washington, D.C.
Mason, G., and D. Finegold.  1997.  “Productivity, Machinery and Skills in the
U.S. and Western Europe.”  National Institute Economic Review 162(Octo-
ber): 85–97.
National Center for Educational Statistics.  1995.  Vocational Education in the
U.S.: The Early 1990s.  NCES 95-024, U.S. Department of Education,
Washington, D.C.
OECD.  1993.  Education at a Glance.  Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development.
______.  1994.  The Jobs Study.  Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development.
______.  1996.  Education at a Glance.  Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development.
Olson, M.  1971.  The Logic of Collective Action.  Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Porter, L., and L. McKibbon.  1985.  Management Education and Develop-
ment.  New York: McGraw Hill. 
Reich, R.  1991.  “The Real Economy.”  Atlantic Monthly (February): 35–52.
RKW.  1992.  Jahresbericht.  Rationalizierungskommitte der deutschen
Wirtschaft, Frankfurt. 
92 Finegold and Keltner
Ryan, P., ed.  1991.  International Comparisons of Vocational Education and
Training for Intermediate Skills.  London: Falmer Press.
Sabbagh, Karl.  1996.  21st Century Jet: The Making and Marketing of the
Boeing 777.  New York: Scribner.
Schneider, Ralf.  1993.  “Umfrage zum Stand des MBA in Deutschland”
(Parts 1–6).  In the Handelsblatt Career section, every Friday between
October 22/23 and December 24/25, Frankfort.
Scholz, D.  1996.  “Neuprofilierung der Weiterbildung zum Industriemeister
als Anwort auf neue betriebliche Anforderungen.”  Berufsbildung in Wis-
senschaft und Praxis, 5.
Snow, Charles C., Scott A. Snell, and Sue Canney Davison.  1996.  “Use Trans-
national Teams to Globalize Your Company.”  Organizational Dynamics
24(Spring): 50–67.
Soskice, D.  1991.  “Reconciling Markets and Institutions: An Interpretation
of the German Apprenticeship System.”  Working paper, Wissenschaftszen-
trum Social Science Research Center, Berlin.
Spreitzer, G., M. McCall, and J. Mahoney.  1997.  “The Early Identification of
International Executive Potential.”  Journal of Applied Psychology 82(1):
6–29.
Stevens, M.  1996.  “Transferable Training and Poaching Externalities.”  In
Acquiring Skills, A. Booth and D. Snower, eds.  Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Streeck, W.  1987.  The Role of the Social Partners in Vocational Training in
the Federal Republic of Germany.  Berlin: European Centre for the Devel-
opment of Professional Training.
______.  1989.  “Skills and the Limits of Neo-Liberalism.”  Work, Employ-
ment and Society 3: 90–104.
Weiss, R.  1994.  Die 26-Mrd.-Investition—Kosten und Strukturen betriebli-
cher Weiterbildung.  Cologne, Germany: Deutscher Institut Verlag.
Wever, K.  1995.  Negotiating Competitiveness: Employment Relations and







Frameworks and Innovative 
Industrial Organization
 
Supplier Relationships in the 






This chapter examines how the relationship between the broad
institutional configurations of the German and U.S. political economies
affects the adaptation, among their firms, of innovative patterns of eco-
nomic organization.  In particular, it examines the transfer of a critical
new organizational practice, “just-in-time” (JIT) delivery, from Japan
to the U.S. and German economies.  Car producers and other large
companies have begun outsourcing the production of many sophisti-
cated subassemblies to suppliers under JIT.  Despite international mar-
kets for capital and goods and services, important differences still exist
in institutional frameworks—specifically, in corporate law and indus-
trial relations systems, the two areas most strongly influencing the
introduction of JIT delivery strategies.  This chapter argues that
although JIT delivery has been successfully diffused from Japan to
Germany and the United States, differences in national institutional
structures have created important differences in the ways that firms in
each country support the new system.  Furthermore, examining the
processes by which JIT delivery has been transferred to the United
States and Germany lends insights into the governance of innovation in
the two countries.
Innovative forms of economic organization like JIT delivery must
be supported by laws and by informal rules negotiated between firms.




bility and dynamism created by the new arrangements.  At the same
time, this organization creates ways to distribute important legal and
market risks.  JIT delivery is an especially problematic relationship to
organize.  The delivery of parts directly to final assembly lines that
have neither quality-control checks nor large inventories of replace-
ment parts leads to a number of well-known problems.  Some defects,
particularly nonrandom defects, can halt production and, if not
detected before use in assembly, can damage expensive capital equip-
ment or create extensive reworking costs.  Because the costs of break-
downs are often large, firms must create both legal entitlements
distributing these risks and rules establishing the technical division of
labor between companies, in particular, quality-control procedures.
Institutional frameworks influence how companies create the gov-
ernance structures needed to regulate their relationships.  Virtually all
studies of the Japanese production system emphasize that JIT delivery
emerged as the solution to a unique set of problems and opportunities
posed by the structure of Japanese markets and the institutional organi-
zation of the Japanese economy (Cusumano 1985).  Supplier relation-
ships in the United States and Germany were until recently based on
arms-length relationships between large, vertically integrated final
assemblers and thousands of small parts suppliers.  In Japan, however,





 system of cross-ownership within industry groups
engendered long-term relationships with key suppliers.  Because these





final assemblers and suppliers have an incentive to share the legal and
market risks entailed in JIT production.  As a result, Japanese car man-
ufacturers developed highly collaborative manufacturing relationships
with their suppliers.  Most of the technical governance problems
caused by JIT, such as developing robust quality-control management
procedures at supplier companies, were solved through these informal
relationships (Sabel 1993).
At least in the short term, institutional frameworks often prevent
firms from engaging in innovative forms of organization.  How and
when can such institutional obstacles be overcome, or, more usefully,
reconfigured to help firms introduce modern industrial practices?   One
solution is convergence.  This means that in order for innovative busi-
ness practices to be transferred across systems, either the relevant mar-
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ket-regulating institutions will have to be changed, or firms wishing to
implement new practices will have to opt out of national models and
create their own, largely private arrangements.  Indeed, some firms in
both the United States and Germany have adopted private contracting
arrangements between suppliers and final assemblers that mimic key
aspects of the Japanese solution, but most have not.  Instead, most U.S.
and German companies have found alternative governance structures
supporting JIT delivery that are compatible with their own institutional
environments, which differ substantially from those used by the Japa-
nese.  Furthermore, in the German case, the alternatives have been
accompanied by a substantial reconfiguration of contracting laws used
to demarcate both the legal and technical division of labor between
companies in the supplier network.  These changes represent a partial
reconfiguration (as opposed to a wholesale change) of the German
model.
The United States, unlike Germany, has a highly decentralized or
“uncoordinated” political economy (Soskice 1999).  In general, neither
business nor labor has the organizational capacity to develop or enforce
collective agreements across labor and/or business organizations.   As a
result, both the legal system and work organization framework are
decentralized and oriented toward private contracting between autono-
mous agents, in contrast to Germany’s “coordinated” business system.
In addition to the apprenticeship program and other well-known fea-
tures of the German industrial relations system, strong business coordi-
nation allows the Germans to create a qualitatively different system of
legal rules.  Under government supervision, important parts of legal
frameworks are negotiated between different business associations that
represent different corporate interests (manufacturing firms, banks,
insurers).  This system develops policy instruments that the govern-
ment can use to regulate how firms distribute legal risks among them-
selves when setting up supplier network contracts.
More specifically, this chapter makes the following arguments
about the transfer of JIT delivery to the United States and Germany.
Despite significant problems caused by prevailing supplier relation-
ships in the United States up until the late 1980s, institutional frame-
works do not create fundamental hurdles to JIT delivery.  While the
legal system does not actively promote or transfer the type of arrange-




tude in designing their own agreements, which in many cases are
successful.   In the area of quality control, patterns of work organiza-
tion in U.S. plants were actually conducive to developing a new breed
of sophisticated quality management systems that facilitate JIT.  Inno-
vation, then, stems from organizations rather than institutions.
In Germany, despite a history of longer-term supplier relationships
and, through the apprenticeship system, the existence of skilled work-
ers in most factories, institutional rigidities hinder the introduction of
JIT production, at least in the short term.  German legal frameworks
actively inhibit the development of the contracts needed to manage the
risks created by JIT.  Traditional patterns of work organization are not
conducive to the introduction of quality management systems.  Fur-
thermore, gaps in the law have obfuscated what are usually very strict
legal regulations that detail how contracting risks are to be spread
among firms.  This legal uncertainty has prompted a power struggle
between final assemblers and suppliers.  Most final assemblers have
pushed responsibility for a number of new legal risks onto suppliers,
exacerbating an already difficult transition to JIT delivery.  In these
ways, Germany differs strongly from the United States case.
However, in the long term, the German institutional system has a
reconfigurative capacity that is lacking in the United States.  Elements
of business coordination, exemplified by firms bargaining within trade
associations and guided by strong government regulatory oversight,
have led to the modification of existing legal frameworks and created
new agreements to solve some of the obstacles to JIT delivery.  These
agreements have recently been packaged into a new trade association
legal framework that is being widely diffused across German industry.
In short, these legal frameworks serve as “blueprints” that firms can
use to develop complex industrial organization.  Here again, the Ger-
man case is quite unlike that in the United States.
The remainder of the chapter elaborates these arguments in detail.
The next section examines JIT delivery in the United States.  This is
followed by a section examining the problems created by the German
legal framework in adopting JIT delivery and the initial attempts by
companies to overcome them.   Then comes an analysis of the broader
processes within the German political economy that have reconfigured
legal frameworks regulating JIT delivery.   In the conclusion, I summa-
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rize the argument and restate the implications of introducing foreign
innovations in the two countries.
 
JIT DELIVERY IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
For decades, U.S. car manufacturers maintained a highly profitable
production system, and for this reason, they were slow to see the need
for change in automotive technologies during the 1950s and 1960s
when manufacturers in Japan and Germany were making advances.  An
oligopolistic domestic market structure, combined with a lack of seri-
ous international competition, allowed final producers to develop very
long (five- or six-year) product cycles of basic models and to compete
only on the basis of essentially cosmetic annual design changes.
Because of the huge size of the U.S. market, large economies of scale
could be introduced through mass production with specialized factory
equipment.  Under these conditions, it made sense for final assemblers
to become highly integrated, performing any part of the production
process where scale economies could be obtained, which meant that
most value-added work took place in-house (Piore and Sabel 1984).  
Final assemblers used thousands of suppliers, who produced very
simple parts with very little value added.  Because these parts were
simple to produce, final assemblers routinely kept large inventories of
spare parts.  Thus, quality was supplied by in-house value-added work,
and the price of parts was the main focus of competition among suppli-
ers.  Final assemblers typically signed one-year contracts with suppli-
ers.  Assemblers usually relied on a number of subcontractors for each
outsourced part to ensure fierce competition for contracts.  Kenney and
Florida (1993, p. 130) quoted a manager of a U.S. supplier company
who characterized the traditional system as follows: “The strategy was
line ’em up and beat ’em up until you get ’em to a point where they
can’t make money anymore.  Then you’ve got the best price.”
Today, to keep competitive, all car producers in the U.S. market-
place must introduce much shorter (three-year) product cycles, as well
as a wealth of new subassemblies based on quickly changing electron-
ics and chemical technologies.  Under the old system, U.S. producers




produce no more than 20–30 percent, outsourcing the rest to suppliers
who design their own parts and use JIT delivery systems.   A number of
commentators have pointed out that the traditional U.S. supplier sys-
tem presented a substantial obstacle to implementing a modern produc-
tion system (Helper 1991; Womack, Jones, and Roos 1990; Kenney
and Florida 1993).  
However, recent studies have conclusively shown that a tremen-
dous shift in the organization of U.S. supplier relationships has taken
place.  Studies conducted between 1992 and 1995 show that the United
States has caught up with Japan both in the standard length of contracts
offered to suppliers and in the percentage of suppliers using JIT deliv-
ery systems (Helper and Sako 1994), and that the United States is actu-
ally ahead of Japan in collaborating with suppliers in product
development (Ellison, Clark, and Fujimoto 1995; Liker et al. 1996).
These results are especially persuasive because similar studies con-
ducted in the late 1980s, often by the same researchers, showed sizable
deficits in each of these areas (Helper 1991; Clark and Fujimoto 1991;
Womack, Jones, and Roos 1990).
To explain how this transformation was possible, it is necessary
first to analyze the traditional system and then investigate the problems
that had to be overcome.  The old system had two major obstacles to
modernizing supplier relationships.  First, existing supplier firms were
largely unsophisticated, simple parts producers.  In the late 1980s,
because of the brutality of price competition under the old system,
these firms had few resources to invest in the advanced production
technology, design capacity, or quality-control procedures needed for
more sophisticated production.  The first problem in transforming the
system was to find sophisticated suppliers or companies capable of
becoming “full service.”  The second problem concerned obstacles to
creating effective governance structures to support JIT delivery, as well
as obstacles to other parts of new, decentralized supplier networks such
as joint product development and long-term price contracts.  This prob-
lem was exacerbated by the prevailing atmosphere of distrust between
suppliers and final assemblers, given decades of ruthless supplier poli-
tics.  Difficulties in creating effective governance structures were also
rooted in the institutional organization of the American political econ-
omy.
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As to the first obstacle, increased technological sophistication has
made it possible for suppliers to produce higher-value-added auto
parts.  This has spurred a huge entry of sophisticated manufacturing




   These new suppliers have the
resources to establish wholly dedicated production sites to meet the JIT
delivery needs of particular final assemblers.  Their individual plants
are usually very small.  The newest seat production plants of both
Johnson Controls and Lear Seating, the largest American JIT seat pro-
ducers, employ fewer than 45 production workers per shift; but these
small production sites are backed up by tremendous corporate
resources, including research and development facilities, quality-con-
trol and production engineering departments, large financial reserves,
and highly trained management teams dedicated to large purchasing,
engineering, and sales departments.  The nature of the supplier industry
has been qualitatively transformed since the late 1980s.  The huge size
of the U.S. market and direct investment by large foreign suppliers
facilitated this transformation.  Furthermore, as we will see in more
detail, U.S. final assemblers faced virtually no legal obligations to the





Understanding the second major obstacle—creating effective gov-
ernance structures needed to support JIT delivery—is more complex.
This requires a systematic examination of the incentives and con-
straints presented by the broad institutional configuration of the U.S.
political economy.
 
Laws Regulating Interfirm Relationships
 
In the United States, most sophisticated firms either have their own
legal departments or long-standing relationships with large private
legal practices.  Trade associations play an insignificant role in regulat-
ing the contractual dealings of companies.  Unlike in Germany, they
are for the most part uninvolved in formulating standardized contracts
or mediating disputes between companies.  While laws and court pre-
cedent influence the variety and magnitude of various risks (as in prod-
uct liability law), they generally do not provide firms with governance
structures to regulate their dealings.  Legal resources are decentralized
among companies and private law firms.  As a result of this decentrali-




innovative, but only in providing incentives for firms to create new
legal structures facilitating new governance arrangements between
companies.  There exists no public legal infrastructure to transform
innovative private legal arrangements into industry frameworks that
can be transferred from firm to firm.  Furthermore, the U.S. court sys-
tem is limited in the type of contracts it can adjudicate because it has
no access to private information generated within complex contracting
relationships. 
U.S. contract law is constructed around classical principles.  It
assumes that all parties are sophisticated agents; through the enforce-
ment of formal written agreements, it protects their freedom to contract
(Macneil 1978).  Calls for court reinterpretation of contracts when cir-
cumstances have changed, or when the bargaining power between




  In adjudicating most breach of contract
disputes between firms, U.S. courts usually insist on the fulfillment of
even flawed written contracts (Schwartz 1992).  Though tort law, espe-
cially in the products liability field, provides for large, often punitive
sanctions against those responsible for injuring third parties (Priest
1985), contract law does not regulate how contracting parties distribute
such liability risks.  Parties may contract them out as they see fit.  This
means that in JIT delivery and other supplier contracts, neither the final
assembler nor the supplier has preexisting legal protection against vari-
ous liability claims.
 JIT contracting does not present any fundamentally new legal
challenges for U.S. firms.  The content of the legally binding part of
JIT contracts is settled entirely by the relative bargaining power of the
parties involved, on a case-by-case basis.   Because final assemblers
continue to have tremendous bargaining power over most supplier
companies, the legal risks created by JIT are usually borne by suppli-
ers.  While JIT delivery creates a dramatic increase in risk exposure to
suppliers, from a legal perspective it does not create a dramatically new
state of affairs (Bennett 1985); suppliers always have been responsible
for damages caused by their defective products.  If a defective part is
not spotted until after use in assembly, the supplier pays supplementary
“rework” costs.  If a defective part damages the final assembler’s
machine tools, the supplier is liable for these damages as well.  JIT
delivery just increases these risks.  It also creates an incentive for sup-
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pliers to create and for final assemblers to monitor high-quality control
systems.
 
The Introduction of ISO 9000 Technical Norms 
 
Even with these clear-cut legal rules, there are some risks that can-
not be contracted out.  Most important are damages to the final assem-
bler’s reputation created when defective products reach consumers.   It
is also difficult to recover all costs from production shutdowns that
often occur under JIT delivery when systematic defects are found in
outsourced parts.  Final assemblers must add informal rules and proce-
dures to the formal contract to manage these extra risks.  When large
volumes of usually very simple standardized parts were delivered to
final assemblers, most defects could be easily spotted by workers and
simply replaced through large inventories.  Increasingly, defects cannot
be easily spotted because they are contained in more complicated com-
ponents such as brake systems, seats, or preassembled instrument pan-
els assembled by system suppliers with technical know-how that the
final assembler does not possess.  Furthermore, JIT delivery often
makes inspections impossible, either because no spare parts exist or
because parts are customized according to flexible logistical systems
with very short procurement times (often less than four hours).
Only suppliers’ direct monitoring of quality-control procedures
can solve these problems.  Final assemblers across Japan, Europe, and
North America have thus formed relationships with suppliers to moni-
tor their quality control.  These agreements vary tremendously, both in
style and legal consequences.  Japanese-owned manufacturers, both in
Japan and in U.S. transplants, rely on informal “hands-on” or collabo-
rative relationships between large quality-management staffs of the
final assembler and suppliers (Kenney and Florida 1993).   Quality
management personnel develop customized quality-control goals with
each supplier.  They routinely conduct informal audits of each supplier,
leading to suggestions for improvements.  Repeated visits by assem-
blers’ quality-control staffs, along with the threat that the contract
could be terminated, ensure that problems are solved by suppliers (see
Sabel 1993 for a more detailed description of this system).
The Japanese transplant producers have successfully introduced




Japanese and U.S.-owned supplier companies (Kenney and Florida
1993, pp. 130–145).  However, these firms have three advantages.
First, they access management know-how from Japan.  Second, they do
not suffer from negative reputations caused by the mismanagement of
supplier relationships that tar American-owned car assemblers.
Finally, most Japanese transplant suppliers had preexisting long-term
relationships and, in many cases, financial and/or ownership ties with
their major customers (Kenney and Florida 1993; Abo 1994).  These
relationships allowed the Japanese transplants to re-create collabora-
tive quality-control relationships in the United States.  When dealing
with American-owned suppliers, the Japanese companies have trans-
ferred to the United States some of the private institutional arrange-
ments that in Japan facilitate trustful supplier relationships.  Toyota, for
example, quickly organized supplier associations in an effort to social-
ize their American-owned suppliers into the Japanese system of orga-
nizing supplier relationships (Kenney and Florida 1993, p. 151).  
U.S.-owned car manufacturers faced a very different situation.
After decades of adversarial “hands-off” relationships, final assemblers
lacked both organizational competency (i.e., large quality-control staffs
in the purchasing department) and experience in this area.  Further-
more, informal quality-control relationships are risky to suppliers.
Even though U.S.-owned manufacturers have systematically begun to
offer four- to five-year contracts to sophisticated suppliers using JIT
delivery, price clauses are still renegotiated yearly.  Detailed inspec-
tions of the manufacturing process by quality-control experts from the
assembler could lead to improved quality control but also expose inside
information concerning the company’s operating costs.  Given a his-
tory of opportunistic price politics, suppliers have reason to be risk
averse when contemplating collaborative quality-control relationships.
Over time, the big three U.S. car manufacturers might have been
able to develop both the organizational competencies and cooperative
supplier relationships needed to pursue collaborative quality-control
projects.  However, they have pursued a different and very interesting
course.  Sophisticated companies moving into the automobile parts
business usually already have quality management systems because
they have long been exposed to full legal liability for most damages
caused by their products.  New companies, or those upgrading from
simple parts production to full-service suppliers, have every incentive
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to introduce such systems.  However, from the final assembler’s point
of view, if JIT delivery is to be used, it is necessary to verify that an air-
tight quality-control regime exists.  In a rare example of extensive
cooperation, GM, Ford, and Chrysler jointly developed an ingenious
industry framework that not only allows monitoring of each supplier’s
quality management system without detailed audits by the final assem-
bler, but also provides a blueprint suppliers can use to upgrade or intro-
duce a quality management system.  This system was later adopted by
the International Standards Organization and became the ISO 9000 set
of technical norms.
From a comparative institutional perspective, the development of
the ISO 9000 system is extremely interesting, because aspects of U.S.
work organization, which in other contexts have proven to be deficient,
have actually facilitated the development and diffusion of ISO 9000
norms throughout U.S. manufacturing.  Most blue-collar workers in the
United States have not been formally trained in industrial skills
through an apprenticeship program; instead, they learn on the job.
American industrial relations scholars have concluded that a primary
reason why a German-style vocational training system has not devel-
oped in the United States is the lack of strong employer associations or
other coordinating institutions that could jointly develop a curriculum
or, more importantly, prevent “free riders” from poaching employees
trained by other companies (Soskice 1999; Wever 1995).
When institutional or other constraints hinder the development of
one set of competencies within one part of an organization, these com-
petencies must be developed elsewhere if the organization is to survive
in a competitive market setting.  Most U.S. manufacturing firms have
no highly trained workers educated to organize their own work and
perform machine maintenance and quality-control duties.  As a result,
work organization has long been controlled by large middle manage-
ment staffs of industrial engineers, human resource specialists, techni-
cians, and quality-control experts.   Even though many U.S.-owned car
manufacturing plants now use extensive job rotation within work
groups and train workers in basic machine maintenance and set-up
tasks, there is still a broad consensus that the separation of execution
and conception that has long characterized American manufacturing
plants still exists (Turner 1991).  A similar division of work between




exists in most sophisticated supplier firms.   Hence, most suppliers pos-
sess quality-control and other managerial experts who can be used to
implement sophisticated quality management schemes.  
It is not surprising that broad “scientific management” principles
were invented and widely diffused in U.S. firms, because large U.S.
corporations were heavily reliant on large middle management staffs to
organize all aspects of work (Guillen 1994).  These large staffs still
exist today and are ideally placed to implement ISO 9000 quality-con-
trol norms.  Though now diffused worldwide, U.S. car manufacturers
were among the first large companies to introduce this system commer-
cially to help alleviate quality-control problems caused by JIT produc-
tion.
The prototype for the ISO 9000 system was first developed by the
U.S. Department of Defense in the 1970s to aid its procurement deci-
sions with commercial contractors.  General Motors (GM), as a sup-
plier of jeeps and other military vehicles, had been forced to comply
with the military version of the ISO 9000 norm (Casper and Hancké
1999, pp. 964–965).  GM worked with Ford and Chrysler to reconfig-
ure the military version of the system into a quality management sys-
tem suitable for commercial use.  By the mid 1980s, the Japanese
producers had taken over more than one-third of the U.S. domestic
market.  GM, Chrysler, and Ford were each attempting to improve
quality control at its suppliers in order to introduce both the system
supplier strategy and JIT procurement.  Facing a common threat and
using many of the same local suppliers, the big three could lose little
and gain much by cooperating on designing a common quality man-
agement system for suppliers.
As this common system now stands, companies meeting different
versions of the ISO 9000 norms must incorporate modern quality-con-
trol techniques into their assembly operations.  The ISO 9000 technical
norms are not tailored to particular industries or technologies.  Rather,
they broadly cover the organization of quality management processes,
including design, manufacturing, and packaging and distribution.  Pro-
cedures examined include statistical process controls, the introduction
of quality-control inspections and record keeping within all aspects
production, machine maintenance and setup, and the introduction of
systematic quality-control meetings and suggestion programs that
include production workers, management, and design staff (Paradis
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and Small 1996).  There are different levels of certification, depending
on both the type of activities engaged in by the firm and the number of
norms actually met (Casper and Hancké  1999).
Widespread use of the ISO 9000 system has prompted the develop-
ment of certification agencies qualified to conduct ISO 9000–based
audits as well as consultants trained to help firms reorganize their qual-
ity-control system to meet the norms.     
ISO 9000 certification signifies nothing about the excellence or
performance of the products of the company being evaluated.  These
qualities are inherent in the broader design of the product, of which
ISO 9000 norms say nothing.  But, the norms do ensure that a large
number of critical process controls are implemented, which minimizes
the probability that defective products will be produced and shipped to
the customer.  It is particularly important for JIT production that the
systematic introduction of statistical process controls virtually elimi-
nates serial defects, which can quickly halt production at the final
assembler.
It is not surprising that ISO 9000 norms work well in the context of
the U.S. work organization.   Workers do not need to be well trained to
participate in the system, because in U.S. firms most sophisticated pro-
cess checks, such as statistical process controls, are performed by spe-
cialists.  The introduction of documented process checks into most
routine work processes also complements job mobility within the firm
by increasing job standardization.
The overall result has been a tremendous success.  The ISO 9000
norms have helped to rapidly introduce JIT delivery techniques into the
U.S. car industry without the accompanying informal quality-control
relationships used by the Japanese.  In 1991, GM, Ford, and Chrysler
again cooperated to modernize the norm series, adding supplementary
norms specialized to mass production processes particularly prevalent
in the automobile industry.
In sum, incentives provided by the institutional organization of the
U.S. political economy combine with the often ingenious strategies of
firms to produce a viable new set of supplier network relationships.
Facing strong Japanese competition, U.S.-owned car manufacturers
rapidly reorganized the composition of their supplier chains and devel-
oped and quickly adopted the ISO 9000 technical norms to monitor the




oped by companies, the institutional organization of the political econ-
omy facilitated the transformation.  The legal system’s free-contracting
principles acclimated companies to the harsh liability regime intro-
duced by JIT and created few legal obstacles to the rapid change in the
supplier base serving final assemblers.  The ISO 9000 system allowed
the hands-off monitoring needed to overcome a legacy of distrust
between U.S. final assemblers and their suppliers.  Somewhat paradox-
ically, ISO 9000 technical norms work so well in the U.S. industrial
context because they take advantage of large technical management
staffs that are commonly created in U.S. companies because of inade-
quacies in the vocational training system.
The next section examines the parallel introduction of JIT delivery
in Germany.  Though the problems facing companies are similar, dif-
ferences in both the legal and industrial relations systems have necessi-
tated very different strategies by large companies.
 
JIT DELIVERY IN GERMANY
 
A large literature describes how “business coordination” facilitates
collective solutions within many important domains of German eco-
nomic life, such as collective wage bargaining, training, and finance
(Thelen 1991; Streeck 1984; Wever 1995).  Other scholars have
pointed out how these frameworks often serve as “para-public institu-
tions” (Katzenstein 1989) linking private economic governance with
public regulatory oversight and support of training, research and devel-
opment, and many other areas of the business system.  While there is a
large literature connecting the organization of Germany’s political
economy to its unique patterns of industrial relations, comparatively
little analysis has been given to the German legal system.  While pat-
terns of work organization are important in Germany, the legal system
has been the primary institutional framework influencing the develop-
ment of governance structures for JIT delivery.  
Compared with U.S. law, German law provides a fundamentally
different legal context within which firms in supplier relationships
must regulate their dealings.  In the U.S. case, the legal system was
largely benign, neither promoting nor hindering the development of
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contracting structures suitable for JIT delivery.  German companies, on
the other hand, faced important legal obstacles when first organizing
JIT delivery relationships in the mid 1980s.  These obstacles made it
difficult for firms to create the necessary legal structures to manage
risks.  They also combined with incentives produced by the German
industrial relations system to hinder the development of adequate qual-
ity-control arrangements within supplier firms. 
Recently, some German firms have engaged trade associations and
other para-public institutions to reconfigure some parts of this legal
framework, an ability of the German political economy lacking in the
United States.  The ultimate aim of this section of the chapter is to
explain how and when these agreements emerged.  First, however, the
section examines the broad character of German legal frameworks reg-
ulating supplier networks, how these laws affect companies trying to
organize governance structures needed for JIT delivery, and finally, the
private, short-term strategies that companies have developed to solve
these problems. 
 
Legal Problems Caused by JIT Delivery
 
Germany’s coordinated system of economic governance facilitates
the creation of a qualitatively different type of legal environment than
exists in the United States.  While “good faith” principles have long
dominated German commercial law, the broad reorganization of the
German economy along “social market” principles after World War II
solidified its protective nature.   While German law allows large com-
panies extensive freedom to design contracts with other large compa-
nies, it strongly regulates contracts between large and small
companies.  The 1976 passage of the law regulating standardized con-
tracts (AGB-Gesetz) created a broad tool that courts have used to
police contracts between large and small companies.  Before imple-
mentation of the AGB-Gesetz, powerful firms could redesign standard
legal entitlements to their advantage and force smaller firms to accept
their terms.  The AGB-Gesetz provides a legal instrument courts use to
control the types of contractual burdens placed on users of preformu-
lated contracts.  The general principle of the AGB-Gesetz is that a pre-
formulated clause violates Article 9 of the law when, for economic




writing the contract by inappropriately modifying contract laws set out
in standard German civil and commercial law.  The most sophisticated
supplier chains in the automobile industry still involve dozens, if not
hundreds, of firms.  As a result, even very complicated long-term con-
tracts regulating relationships with JIT suppliers are often preformu-
lated by the final producer and therefore fall under the scrutiny of the
AGB-Gesetz (Grünewald 1995). 
Though the technical organization of JIT delivery in Germany is
similar to that in the United States, differences in the legal context
mean that the same JIT delivery relationships that cause no legal prob-
lems in the United States create substantial difficulties in Germany.
Articles 377 and 378 of the German commercial code (HGB) contain a
nearly 100-year-old law requiring that the (final assembler) undertake a
“speedy and thorough” examination of all goods upon delivery.  This
law limits suppliers’ liability when inspections do not take place.  In
such cases, the final assembler loses all warranty rights and must





liability cases routinely end in multimillion–deutsche Mark settle-
ments, these legal entitlements are important to the firms involved.  
The problem is that the essence of JIT logistical systems is delivery
directly to the assembly line for immediate use.  Final assemblers
argue that the technical organization of JIT precludes them from per-
forming their duties under Articles 377–378 HGB.  However, because
the “entry inspections” carry with them critical legal entitlements,
eliminating them creates a conflict of interest between final assemblers
and suppliers concerning the distribution of liability risks associated
with defects. 
From the final assembler’s perspective, if contracts shift the legal
responsibility for Article 377–378 HGB inspections to suppliers, sub-
stantial liability burdens are also shifted onto suppliers.  Final assem-
blers could demand compensation for both parts and wages incurred in
the assembly and the repair of products found faulty due to defects in
parts supplied via JIT delivery.  Under the old system these defects
would be spotted by entry inspections, and legal liability would lie with
the assembler.  Suppliers would find themselves liable for damages in
product liability cases where random defects in parts slip through the
production process unnoticed and later cause harm to customers (Grof
von Westphalen 1990).  Supplier firms turn this logic around.  They see
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no reason why liability risks should be shifted towards them because





Patterns of work organization in small German firms compound
the legal problems.  Most German workers are highly trained and
spend their entire career with one firm.  Quality control at most Ger-
man manufacturing firms is good, but idiosyncratic.  Instead of system-
atized routines developed and implemented by management
specialists, skilled workers in German firms usually developed their
own quality-control procedures (Schmidt-Salzer 1996; see also Thelen
1991 and Turner 1991 for more on German work organization).  Qual-
ity-control routines were rarely systematized into formal procedures or
supplemented by detailed record keeping.  Because the same work
groups often survived for decades, informal routines were enough: new
recruits could easily learn such procedures from the existing cadre of
workers, usually during their three-year apprenticeship.  Over the long
term, supplier firms could not rely on the strong legal protection from
liability damages provided by Articles 377–378 HGB, because their
customers could always stop doing business with them if they had con-
tinuous quality-control problems; but when introducing new products
or work procedures, the law provided short-term protection from qual-
ity-control problems.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the German auto parts industry was similar
to that in the United States.  Most supplier plants produced large quan-
tities of standardized parts.  As a result, the work process was fairly
simple.  Workers were highly skilled, responsible for setting up and
maintaining their machines, setting cycle times, and performing quality
control according to very effective but often highly idiosyncratic sys-
tems.  However, in the 1980s and 1990s, as part of the broad switch to
the JIT supplier strategy, many supplier firms in the German automo-
bile industry attempted to upgrade their manufacturing processes to
win more lucrative contracts for more complicated components or, in
some cases, complete subassemblies.  For most suppliers, this involved
a major redesign of the work process.  The new procedures contained
more steps.  Furthermore, many suppliers had to create flexible manu-
facturing processes that met different product specifications.  This
change in processes was an essential part of the JIT strategy.  
Because the old informal quality-control procedures often cannot




now more likely to suffer quality-control problems, with their inherent
liability problems.  But at the same time, most suppliers have been
asked to sign a new breed of contract that cedes their traditional Article
377–378 HGB protection against important liability risks.  
 
The Creation of “Quality-Control Agreements” 
by German Final Assemblers
 
In the short term, the uncertainty of existing laws has created a
void that firms must fill with their own contractual structures.  To a cer-
tain extent, this creates a bargaining game not unlike that in the United
States.  Strengthened by their bargaining power over suppliers, final
assemblers in the German car industry can create new contracting
structures as they see fit.  However, they must remain mindful of the
likely legal validity of their interpretations should they come under
judicial review.  Most of these firms use standardized contracting struc-
tures, which fall under the purview of the AGB-Gesetz.      
When developing JIT delivery contracts, most of the German car
manufacturers combined legal clauses with technical agreements regu-
lating quality control.  German business practice is for the most part
similar to that in the United States in that technical aspects of supplier
relationships (such as product specifications or quality-control stan-
dards) are normally separated from the formal contract that distributes
different legal and market risks.  However, faced with the combined
problems of developing a more complicated division of technical labor
with suppliers and solving the legal uncertainties caused by JIT deliv-
ery, the legal departments of most German final assemblers have joined







These agreements usually contain formal abrogations of Article
377–378 HGB inspections, other legal or quasi-legal rules covering
warranties and product liability responsibilities, and provisions for set-
tling various problems, such as delay in delivery due to traffic and
rework costs.  In addition to product specifications, technical provi-
sions contain numerical goals of acceptable error rates and outline the
type of quality-control system to be maintained by the supplier.  From
the late 1980s onwards, most final assemblers adopted the same ISO
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9000 norms used in the United States (Casper and Hancké 1999).  The
final assembler takes responsibility for monitoring whether or not these
goals are being met and helps deficient suppliers upgrade their quality-
control systems.
While most of the German car producers have set up QCAs con-
taining abrogations of Article 377–378 HGB inspections, important
details in their implementation dramatically influence their actual con-
sequences (see Casper 1996 for case studies).  The high-end specialist
producer BMW, for example, organizes collaborative quality-control
relationships that are similar to those of Japanese-owned producers.
BMW sends its own auditors to perform supplier certifications, which
are supplemented by product technology checks that differ substan-
tially across different types of producers (e.g., textile versus metal-
working or electronic technology).  Most of the other German car pro-
ducers pursue more formal quality-control arrangements that look
more like those in the United States.  Suppliers sign legally binding
contracts abrogating Article 377–378 HGB rights allowing “zero
defects.”  They are then supposed to introduce a quality management
system specified by the final assembler to achieve these goals.  Because
the ISO 9000 system is ideal for monitoring quality control across a
diverse array of firms, this is the system used by all final assemblers.
German final assemblers have a strong incentive to designate as
many firms as possible JIT suppliers and ask them to sign QCAs
because it substantially shifts legal risk from their responsibilities.
Volkswagen, for example, has recently designated all suppliers making
a customized part for VW as JIT.  When setting up a new production
facility in East Germany, VW explicitly organized its new production
site along decentralized production principles.  Volkswagen has four
JIT suppliers in the area.  Deliveries occur several times a day with
substantial variation in product specifications.  Nine other suppliers
deliver complicated but standardized subassemblies on a daily basis.
Then there are more than two dozen other local suppliers, most of
which make simple stamped parts that are delivered anywhere from
daily to weekly.  All these firms are officially JIT suppliers that must
face the full gauntlet of new legal risks (see Casper 1997 for more on
this case).
Because they are an entirely new breed of contract, QCAs have




the Article 377–378 HGB abrogations contained in these documents
violate the AGB-Gesetz.  Lawyers working for final assemblers argue
that they are in effect carrying out Article 377–378 HGB obligations
through both stipulating desired quality-control targets and practices to
be carried out by suppliers and then monitoring their enactment.
Because QCAs substantially improve quality control within supplier
firms (to the high levels sufficient for JIT delivery), final assemblers
suggest that QCAs make entry inspections superfluous.
Though a number of related court cases point to the interpretation
that some QCAs violate the AGB-Gesetz, there has as yet been no spe-
cific individual precedent (Casper 1996).  This is in part because Ger-
man parts producers value their long-term supplier relationships more
than the possible short-term gains that might be won in a court deci-
sion.  However, coordinated German supplier companies have other
policy instruments at their disposal that American companies lack.
Important parts of the industry frameworks governing JIT delivery are
being reconfigured to solve some of these problems.
 
Reconfiguring German Industry Frameworks 
 
“Private lawmaking” has long formed a central part of German
associational law.   A key difference in the German (relative to Anglo-
American) legal system is that in German law, voluntary associations,
such as trade associations, have also been allowed to partake in a cor-
porate character and develop strong legal roles and responsibilities
(Hueck 1991).  Although trade associations in both the United States
and Germany have legal departments, those in Germany are much
larger and more specialized than those in the United States.  In addition
to providing services for individual member firms and lobbying the
government, trade association lawyers have developed model firm-
level contractual agreements.  Industry frameworks serve as legal tool
kits, helping companies develop the contracting structures needed to
set up innovative business dealings.  Until recently, these contractual





) that small member firms without legal
resources could use to set up legally secure business deals.  But as the
proportion of firms setting up more complicated business ventures has
increased, trade association lawyers have attempted to develop more
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complex model contractual agreements.  Though many of these ven-
tures have failed due to lack of consensus among member firms, there
have been some successful agreements. 
The German Cartel Office is charged with reviewing all proposed
industry agreements to assure that agreements break none of Ger-
many’s cartel laws.  Because of the tightening of German cartel law
after World War II, these reviews are very strict.  Any trade association
agreement whose implementation can foreseeably restrict future com-
petition within a market can be struck down.  The principle of volunta-
rism is at the center of this review, because any model contractual
agreement in which participation is binding will be voided.  As a result,
bargaining within trade associations is usually based on consensus.
Where conflicts of interests prevail within a trade association, negotia-
tions will often fail.  
The institutional capacity to develop collective solutions to some
of the problems posed by JIT delivery is fragile.  Even though quality
control agreements were first widely used in the German auto industry,
conflicts of interest between final assemblers and suppliers have pre-
vented new industry standards from emerging in this sector.  Most Ger-
man car producers oppose the development of a standardized QCA
within the Verband deutsche Automobilindustrie (VDA).  The hierar-
chical industrial organization of the automobile sector explains why
final assemblers can so easily develop standardized QCA agreements
and then present them to suppliers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.  
Instead, an important industry agreement has emerged elsewhere.
Though QCAs were initially used most intensely within the auto indus-
try, they have also been employed by companies in other industries
with complex supplier relationships.  This is particularly true in other
advanced technology sectors, such as the machine tool and electronics
industries.   The trade association representing the electronics industry
(ZVEI) has recently developed an important QCA framework that is
changing the contours of the JIT delivery debate throughout Germany
industry.
Patterns of business coordination are more vibrant in the electron-
ics sector because of its organizational features and the technologies
involved.  First, most firms are small or medium in size.  Relationships
with suppliers are typically more balanced because of this greater




preferred contractual solution on their supplier partners.  Furthermore,
the largest two firms in the sector, Bosch and Siemens, are both suppli-
ers and final producers.  Their dual role has tempered their willingness
to write overtly opportunistic QCAs.  Lawyers from Siemens actually
played a key role in developing the ZVEI framework.  
Technological factors have also played a role.  Articles 377–378
HGB only mandate a “feasible” inspection for “visible” damages.
Because most electronic parts are microscopic, this limits a feasible-
entry inspection.  Most firms agree that they should include inspections
for obvious physical damages and assurances that products are prop-
erly labeled.  But because more detailed inspections cannot take place,
the supplier must assume liability for other defects.  Because of this
naturally clear-cut distribution of liability risks and inspection duties,
conflict over Article 377–378 HGB inspections is not as great in the
electronics sector.
The ZVEI agreement obliges final assemblers to conduct simple
Article 377–378 HGB entry inspections, which creates a clear bound-
ary to the risks that must be accepted by suppliers.  Entry inspections
include checks for transport damages and limited examinations of
products to check for visible defects. This modified version of Article
377–378 HGB entry inspection is based on a legal interpretation by
ZVEI lawyers, supported by German High Court cases, that final
assemblers cannot be expected make entry inspections that demand the
development of special expertise or resources (Grünewald 1995).  In
the electronics industry, the vast majority of errors can only be found
through detailed testing of integrated circuits contained in electronic
devices.  For this technological reason, most supplier firms have
adopted detailed quality-control checks into their production pro-
cesses.  Simple spot checks by final assemblers are all that is required
to fulfill Article 377–378 HGB obligations.  These nominal entry
inspections prevent final assemblers from labeling supplier relation-
ships as “just-in-time” purely to serve opportunistic legal strategies that
would limit liability through Article 377–378 HGB abrogations.
The agreement also contains supplemental provisions pertaining to
the supplier’s quality-control system.  Like all QCAs, the ZVEI agree-
ment obliges supplier firms to set up a quality management system.
However, the precise specifications of this system are determined by
the parties to the agreement themselves.  ZVEI representatives suggest
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that most firms will simply use the ISO 9000 norm series most suitable
to the technical specification of the supplier’s production process, but
firms have the option of setting very detailed customized agreements to
provide for unique cases.
Overall, the most important attribute of this industry framework is
that it creates a reasonable solution to risk distribution issues, through
modified exit inspections.  Companies using it can direct their energies
towards developing the customized supplemental agreements, without
fear that these informal parts of their QCA will radically reshuffle con-
tracting risks or break important legal codes.  This elasticity shows that
it is not only possible to develop complex contracting structures within
Germany’s associative governance system, but also to structure these
agreements so as to place broad limits around the risk distribution
issues that often undermine complex contracting relationships.  
Furthermore, the ZVEI agreement contains a workable blend of
standardized contract terms and supplemental agreement provisions
that allow for relationship-specific concerns.  The standardized legal
terms maintain standard legal entitlements.  This brackets off negotia-
tion over many contentious risk distribution issues and assures integra-
tion of the agreement with broader German legal codes.  Supple-
mentary agreements negotiated by the parties themselves allow some
of the relational contracting flexibility that can customize innovative
and complex economic relationships.
The ZVEI agreement is one of the most promising examples to
date of developing a complex contracting structure within the German
associational governance system.  Though its review by other trade
associations and by the Cartel Office was only completed in January
1995, early signs indicate that it may become widely used within Ger-
man industry.  In the first part of 1995 alone, the ZVEI received over
10,000 requests for copies of the agreement from companies, trade
associations, and others.  Though there are as yet no statistics on actual
usage, interviews suggests that knowledge of the agreement within
firms is high, even in non-electronics-related sectors (Casper 1996).
For example, the lawyer specializing in contract law within the
VDMA, the influential trade association representing the machine tool
sector, noted in an interview that the agreement will become a model
solution to the Article 377–378 dilemma within German law, stating




If the ZVEI agreement is broadly used in the electronics and
machine tool industry, it might soon spread to the auto industry as well.
This will first happen when powerful suppliers with monopolies on
important technologies begin to insist that the ZVEI agreement, or
QCAs closely modeled after it, be used in their contract relationships.
In the longer term, however, court precedents will play a major role.  If,
as many German legal scholars predict, the standardized QCA agree-
ments used by most final assemblers are found to violate the AGB-
Gesetz, then the ZVEI agreement will begin to look like an increas-




Innovative organizational practices can be transferred among
nations with varying national institutional frameworks.   The JIT deliv-
ery case shows that, in the face of intense international competition
from Japan, companies can engage company organizational structures
as well as broader institutional resources existing within their political
economies to create new solutions.   Companies in Germany and the
United States have created viable governance for JIT delivery, but the
organization of these governance structures and the way they are regu-
lated within national legal systems differ.
In the United States, the legal system played a passive role and the
system of industrial relations, in a somewhat perverse way (because
inadequacies of the United States vocational training system were a
facilitating factor), provided an ideal setting for the transfer of ISO
9000 quality-control norms from the military procurement system into
private industry.  In Germany, the highly regulative legal system cre-
ated important institutional constraints.  These constraints were first
overcome by the development of quasi-legal quality-control agree-
ments in the auto industry.  While the end result in many cases looks
similar to the arrangements used in the United States, in Germany
these agreements are embedded within an entirely different legal con-
text.  In Germany, quality-control norms were formally merged with
legal clauses to allow final assemblers to transfer important liability
risks to supplier firms.   This was facilitated by gaps in the law and by
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the asymmetrical distribution of bargaining power between final
assemblers and suppliers.  Industry frameworks are now being devel-
oped within trade associations to reregulate JIT delivery within tradi-
tional contract law restrictions concerning the distribution of liability
risks.  
The distinction between “coordinated” and “uncoordinated” politi-
cal economies allows us to understand key aspects of the these differ-
ences.   In the United States, the lack of coordinating mechanisms
means that industries cannot quickly adapt regulations supporting
innovative business organization (for example, trade associations are
not in a position to incorporate innovative changes into industry frame-
works).  Part of the reason why JIT spread quickly in the United States,
even without this advantage, was the lack of highly regulative laws.
Furthermore, companies had developed considerable private technical
and legal resources that allowed them to compete on the basis of inno-
vative governance structures.  In this context, it is no surprise that the
ISO 9000 norms were reorganized for commercial use in the United
States.  The drawback is that firms must create their own legal frame-
works and cannot gain transaction cost advantages by cooperating
within powerful trade associations.  Because firms must create their
own system of property rights, at least in terms of how contracting
risks are managed, the contracting process is often contentious. 
The German system allows key aspects of the governance struc-
tures used for new patterns of industry organization to become incorpo-
rated into public legal frameworks.  We have seen how this mitigates
some of the risk distribution issues that firms face.  Commentators have
long noted the importance of the small firm sector in Germany (Acs
and Audretsch 1993; Vitols 1995).  Germany’s regulative system of
contract law helps shield small companies from important market and
legal risks.  This is an important institutional factor influencing patterns
of industrial adjustment.
However, highly regulative legal systems are likely to unravel
quickly in the face of innovative forms of business organization.  This
is precisely what happened in the JIT delivery case.  In this context, the
“reconfigurative capacity” made possible through the system of busi-
ness coordination becomes a driving feature of the German political
economy.  Courts and other state actors cannot predict the forms of




nance structures they might need to manage complex relationships.
However, we have also seen that when the Article 377–378 HGB liabil-
ity law is applied to JIT delivery contracts, the same large companies
lose important legal rights.   A fascinating aspect of the German law-
making process is that the large companies that are disadvantaged by
contract law are simultaneously the pivotal actors in creating and legal-
izing new frameworks.  
Large German companies create industry frameworks because the
governance structures they contain in their organization help socialize
the cost of competing internationally and at the same time limit domes-
tic competition over governance structure innovation.  Instead of com-
peting privately to create new legal and technical arrangements, many
large companies engage trade associations to collectively develop and
legalize new legal and technical arrangements for them through the
associations’ links with the state.   So long as the gains from these
activities outweigh the costs, large German companies will continue to
engage trade associations.  However, we have seen that in the auto
industry, distributional issues have caused a breakdown in trade associ-
ation bargaining.  Only in the electronics sector, where differences in
industrial organization and technology have created a more favorable




1. These include large American technology companies such as TRW, which has
become one of the largest suppliers of instrument panels; Japanese transplant sup-
pliers servicing both Japanese and U.S. final assemblers; former parts divisions
from the big three producers, which have been spun off into private companies;
and many traditional suppliers that have managed to upgrade their competencies.
2. Though there unfortunately exist no studies of this trend, it seems likely that many
of the old parts suppliers were consolidated through mergers and acquisitions into
larger firms able to meet the new market conditions.
3. This has led to a major debate within the legal studies field, spurred by the most
recent version of the Uniform Commercial Code, which makes “good faith” a
central tenet and thus gives ample legal precedent for courts to take a more activist
stance if they so choose (Schwartz 1992; Dawson 1983).  The most persuasive
analyses locate this reluctance to reinterpret the law squarely in the broader frag-
mented organization of the U.S. business system.
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4. The law states that if the purchaser had properly performed its duties under Arti-
cles 377–378 HGB, visible defects would have been found and the future dam-
ages avoided (Grünewald 1995).
5. Some legal experts argue that through the incorporation of statistical process con-
trols into inspection systems, final assemblers can still perform entry inspections
that satisfy Articles 377–378 HGB while maintaining JIT delivery (Grünewald
1995).  Though such checks might decrease the overall efficiency of a firm’s JIT
logistical system, they would satisfy legal requirements and maintain a traditional
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The German economy today finds itself in a crisis of the “high
road”; by contrast, the U.S. economy is experiencing a parallel crisis of
the “low road.”  Although neither of these crises is depression-sized or
system-threatening, each is domestically perceived as a serious set of
problems that policymakers have yet to solve.  Solutions to each set of
problems will be guided by understandings of and decisions about the
viability of, first, alternative institutional frameworks and, second, dif-
ferent forms of production in the contemporary world economy.
The German high-road crisis is characterized by high unemploy-
ment, continuing painful and uneven development in eastern Germany
(including east–west conflict within Germany), and new strains
between unions and employers and between different employer groups
in a formerly stable social partnership.  Important actors in both the
public and private sector are calling for greatly expanded deregulation
and a dismantling of the old social partnership, although employers
remain divided on these issues.  This crisis has been intensified by
international and European competition, internal economic and organi-
zational rigidities, overregulation, high taxes, and certain employers’
enchantment with the siren songs of deregulation and the low road to
economic growth.
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The U.S. crisis is characterized by growing income inequality, a
shrinking safety net, and the decline of worker representation.  Like the
German crisis, it is caused in part by intensified global competition.
Unlike in Germany, problems in the United States have also been exac-
erbated by deregulation, short-term horizons (e.g., quarterly reports to
shareholders), and the decline of the labor movement.
Both Germany and the United States, however, have substantial
political, economic, and social resources to use in solving their prob-
lems.  The contemporary crises do not appear for either of these coun-
tries to foreshadow a major collapse like that of the Great Depression.
We are confident that actors in Germany and the United States can and
will pursue reforms, including policy innovations and negotiation.  In
so doing, we suggest that these societies—the two strongest western
economies—have a great deal to learn from each other and from their
common experience in the global economy.  They do not need, and are
unlikely to get, convergence.  Yet, each could benefit significantly by
adopting elements and aspects of the other’s institutions, practices, and
policies.
In this chapter, the focus is on employment relations, which we
believe are central to the broader economic and social problems in each
society.  We consider the following two interrelated questions.  First,
exactly how do the internal and external pressures on employment rela-
tions emerge in each country?  Second, in what tangible forms do these
pressures appear “on the ground,” where labor and business (and, more
indirectly, other political, social, and economic actors) interact to per-
petuate, alter, or scrap certain modes of production, including service
delivery, work organization, and negotiation?
At the national level of comparison, the strengths and weaknesses
of the German and U.S. models of employment relations are reversed.
On the one hand, labor and business in Germany are good at negotiat-
ing adjustments to external and internal pressures at the regional,
industry, and national levels through extensive and highly articulated
institutions of employment relations.  On the other hand, with some
notable exceptions, the U.S. legal and political system is relatively ill-
equipped to coordinate employers and unions in reaching consensual
and encompassing strategies for dealing with the economic and associ-




At the micro- and meso-levels of analysis, comparative strengths
and weaknesses are reversed as well.  On one hand, U.S. companies
and unions have developed deep and far-reaching innovations in orga-
nizational structures and processes for labor participation in manage-
ment and industrial relations more generally (Applebaum and Batt
1994; Rubinstein 1996).  Many of these innovations have been dubbed
international “best practice” and are even the envy of German employ-
ers (Gesamtmetall 1989).  On the other hand, at the organizational
level, German employers are hampered in developing such innovations
by two key factors: first, the functional rigidity and specialization
(including management and skill hierarchies) built into most medium-
sized and large companies (Finegold and Keltner, in this volume, p. 55)
and second, the highly mediated and legally focused function of many
(but not all) works councils in codetermination at the workplace
(Wever 1995b).
The general challenges facing the two countries parallel this mir-
rored comparison.  Germany’s main challenges in the coming years
reflect the costs of having taken the high road to competitiveness by
preserving high wages and skills, high levels of social security, and rel-
ative peace among labor and employer groups while emphasizing
diversified quality production (Sorge and Streeck 1988), especially in
its powerful export sectors.  But the current high unemployment shows
that the economic costs of this socially palatable, but in some ways
decreasingly competitive, national strategy for growth and social peace
have grown substantially, and they are compounded by the continuing
high costs of unification.  Thus, many German observers, in fact, speak
of a crisis of the German model (Streeck 1997a,b).  
The chief problems facing the United States, by contrast, arise
from the prevalence of companies adopting the low road to competi-
tiveness, with its focus on the reduction of labor costs (whether by
downsizing, deunionizing, moving facilities to domestic or foreign
nonunion areas, or outsourcing production to nonunion operations).  In
the advanced capitalist countries, along with low wages come low skill
levels, which in turn are increasingly associated with low quality and
low productivity.  The social inequities that inevitably accompany such
a strategy (poverty, wide income disparities) have to date seemed
acceptable, at least to the individual companies choosing to take the
low road.  These growing social problems have, however, become
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increasingly salient in national and state-level political debates and in
the lives of millions of U.S. workers and families.
In the remainder of this chapter, we will briefly compare the basic
institutions and practices of employment relations in the two countries,
illustrating how in each case these are tightly embedded in broader
political economic structures, such as financial systems, the organiza-
tion (or disorganization) of the employer community, labor law, and the
nature of government intervention in employment relations.  This is
followed by a comparison of the past strengths and emerging weak-
nesses of the high- and low-road approaches and a discussion of how
the problems associated with each path are exacerbated by and
reflected in the structures and strategies of employment and industrial
relations.  We then illustrate this argument in concrete empirical terms
by considering how unions, works councils, companies, employer
associations, and governments at various levels are in fact dealing with
their respective challenges.  Here, we clarify the extent to which varia-
tion in actor strategies can be found even within the two countries.
Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the implications of our find-
ings and an argument for what German and U.S. business, labor, and
government actors and policymakers can learn from each other as they





The key strength of German employment relations is their inclu-
siveness, which manifests itself in a bias toward negotiating change
between multiple interested stakeholders (Turner 1998; Soskice 1990;
Thelen 1991; Wever and Allen 1993; Keim and Unger 1986).  Govern-
ment and the labor and employer communities can all be credited with





   The government provides a strong and





) within which business and labor have found incentives to




level (Allen 1989).  The business community takes full advantage of
the stability offered by a partnership-oriented labor movement and the
supportive framework offered by the social market economy, promi-
nently including a highly skilled workforce.  Sure and steady manage-
ment practices harness worker and manager skills that are based on
functional specialties and that favor concrete technical skills over gen-
eral managerial qualifications (Berg 1993). The unions actively try to
influence technological change by promoting high levels of productiv-
ity and skill development (Turner 1991).  German unions, for their part,
have been prepared to modify their wage demands when the overall
economic good seems to call for such a position.  They have allowed
the works councils (which are formally independent, enterprise-based,
and legally mandated) to negotiate the terms of changes in human
resource policies to fit the needs of specific companies (Wever 1994).
This dynamic remained essentially in place in unified Germany in the
1990s (Turner 1998).
More specifically, employment relations in Germany involve sev-
eral interconnected levels of negotiation.  Collective bargaining con-
tracts are bargained at the level of the region and industry (e.g.,
between the North Rhine–Westphalian branches of the chemicals
industry union, Industriegewerkschaft Chemie [IG Chemie], and the
industry’s employer association).  In most sectors, patterns are estab-





), which are then adopted in other regions.  In some cases, indi-
vidual company agreements set patterns as well: for instance, Volks-
wagen negotiates directly with the metalworkers union IG Metall.
These bargains cover employers in a range of companies.  As such, the
agreements are perforce highly general, laying out wage, hour, and
working condition minima.  
These minima are the legal contractual bases used as starting
points for further negotiations at individual companies, typically
between a personnel or human resource department and the works
council.  However, even within companies, different interpretations
and permutations of the collective bargaining agreement may be nego-
tiated: the company works council may reach one set of broad agree-
ments, while works councils at various production or service delivery
locations may have more refined agreements as well.  In many cases,
the individual works councils may agree on wages that exceed the min-
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ima established by the collective bargaining agreements.  In short, the
works councils effectively translate loose-framework collective bar-
gaining agreements into company- or workplace-specific practices of
labor–management relations.  
Formally independent of the unions, the councils represent about
two-thirds to three-quarters of German workers and are most prevalent
in larger companies.  These work councils are in constant contact with
representatives of personnel or human resources departments, jointly
implement the collective bargaining agreement, and participate closely
in most basic personnel decisions.  The councils have veto power over
hiring, firing, transfers, and overtime decisions, among others, and
must be consulted regarding most other personnel-related matters.
German managers credit the existence of the councils—that is, man-
agement’s ability to negotiate directly with a company- or workplace-
specific body of worker representation—for much of the country’s
vaunted postwar labor peace (Wever 1995b).
On the subject of labor peace, it is important to note that different
unions approach negotiations with employer associations differently
(Markovits 1986).  In general, the unions representing metalworkers,
public employees and employees in the media sector have been
regarded as fairly forceful and confrontational.  However, these
unions—particularly the huge IG Metall—have made the most
progress in addressing workers’ interests, for instance, on the issue of a
shortened work week.  IG Metall has also been the most strategically
adept and forward thinking of the German unions, in part because of its
tremendous resources.  The union normally associated with the most





  Because of the unions’ close relationships with the works
councils, a given union’s approach to management usually, but not
always, reflects that of the works councils within that union’s industry.
Thus, for example, works councils in the chemicals sector tend to be
fairly quiescent and seldom take the initiative to make organizational
change within the firm.  By contrast, councils in the metalworking
industry are frequently involved in, and sometimes the initiators of,
significant work reorganization.
The overall labor–management relationship in Germany is a con-
structive and cooperative one.  In addition to the reasons suggested in




that significant dispute resolution procedures take place outside the
workplace.  Disputes are adjudicated by a separate system of labor
courts, peopled by representatives of labor, business, and government,
which is widely regarded as fair and effective.
Suddenly, however, beginning with the breathtaking events that
started with the symbolic fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and resulted in
German unification less than a year later, a great deal of uncertainty, a
host of unfamiliar challenges, a vast economic burden, and an entirely
new political landscape have been inserted into German employment
relations, and politics more generally.  Germans must now deal simul-
taneously with the new terms of economic and political competition
that have been introduced by unification; the supplanting of traditional
forms of production organization; the high cost of German labor; the
weak international position of the German high-technology sector; and
the pressures for Germany to conform to the less “social” market stan-
dards of other European Union (EU) countries and of the rest of the
world (Streeck 1997b; Streeck and Vitols 1994).  The German
employer community—increasingly focused on labor costs—has
asserted growing unease about the continued viability of further invest-





 (Germany as a production site) debate.
In short, the stability, labor peace, “export miracle,” and other char-
acteristics of the postwar German political economy have been under-
mined by the pressures of foreign competition, the high cost of
unification, and the need to cut social spending to meet EU standards
for Economic and Monetary Union.  Under these circumstances, in the
eyes of employers and of the current Schröder government, the negoti-
ated high-road (high wages, high skill development, high social stan-
dards) strategy has become too costly.  One important manifestation of
German employers’ dissatisfaction with the status quo is their falling
rate of membership in sectoral employer associations, which negotiate
collective bargains with industry unions.  Nonmembership in an
employer association means a company is not bound to the terms of the
industry bargain, allowing the company to lower its labor costs.
Because the centralized foundation of German employment relations
has long been considered a key to its postwar socioeconomic success,
the weakening of these institutions is clearly cause for concern to labor
(Silvia 1997).
 
130 Turner, Wever, and Fichter
 
Two other significant challenges threaten traditional German
employment relations.  First, institutional, organizational, and strategic
rigidities limit the substance of what can be negotiated among the
major actors, especially in comparison to “best practice” cases in the
United States.  German managers have been deeply but, in comparative
terms, narrowly trained for functionally specialized deployment (Lane
1989; Maurice, Sellier, and Silvestre 1986).  Thus, German manage-
ment faces peculiar problems in developing the cross-functionality and
flexible new forms of organization that are necessary to compete in the
contemporary international marketplace (see also Finegold and Keltner
in this volume, p. 55).  
The second challenge in adopting less rigid forms of work and pro-
duction organization lies in the structure and functions of the works
councils as laid out by the Works Constitution Act of 1952 (as
amended).  The councils exist as a buffer between workers and person-
nel or human resource management departments.  They seldom con-
duct substantive negotiations with operations managers or workplace-
level supervisors; needless to say, in most cases, neither do frontline
workers.  Most of the councils’ functions concern managing human





The key strength of U.S. employment relations is the relative
weakness of institutional constraints on the parties involved.  This free-
dom makes possible world-class innovations in work and production
organization, training initiatives, service delivery mechanisms, team-
work, and cross-functional collaboration, as well as a capacity for
organizational innovation of all kinds.
As in Germany, the government has created an institutional frame-
work to govern employment relations.  That framework consists of two
main pieces: first, the National Labor Relations Act (commonly known
as the Wagner Act), the Railway Labor Act, and parallel public sector
legislation, which govern union–management relations and union
structure in the unionized sector of the economy; and second, the pro-
liferation of laws governing individual employee rights (regarding, for




action).  These rights are cumbersome for the employer because they
can end in lawsuits and significant financial penalties and because they
can be filed by either individual employees or groups of employees.
Nevertheless, most medium-sized and large companies are benignly
inclined toward EEO and affirmative action.  In contrast, U.S. employ-
ers have historically objected ardently to collective employee and
union rights as codified in the Wagner Act and other legislation.
Today, the rules of union organizing, union recognition, collective
bargaining, contract administration (grievance procedures), strikes, and
lockouts—which were established by the New Deal framework (cen-
tering on the Wagner Act)—are hotly contested by many employers
(Babson 1995).  Many, perhaps most, U.S. firms are run by managers
who believe that unionization necessarily entails significant increases
in labor costs without any balancing improvements in company com-
petitiveness such as the higher levels of productivity and quality that
have been shown in Germany (Milkman 1997).  Moreover, like much
of the public at large, many managers associate U.S. unions with con-
tentious and combative labor relations, long and bitter strikes, and a
hostile work climate.  Unions’ legislative efforts to make it illegal for
companies to hire permanent replacement workers in case of a strike
have been bitterly and successfully fought by the employer community
and their conservative (Democratic as well as Republican) allies in
Congress.  Indeed, even the extremely mild labor law reform that was
introduced in 1978 under the Democratic Administration of Jimmy
Carter, to ease the rules connected with organizing new workers, failed
to pass into law.
Outside the legislative arena, companies have used multiple legal
and illegal means to prevent their employees from unionizing.  Many
companies with some union operations have shifted production toward
nonunion operations, often in more conservative regions of the country,
where states’ right-to-work laws constrain union rights.  Union decerti-
fication campaigns have grown in number and have been increasingly
successful since the early 1980s.  Partly as a result, union density (the
percentage of the workforce that is unionized) has dropped from
almost 25 percent in the late 1970s to less than 14 percent currently.
This drop has occurred despite continuing relative union gains in the
public sector.  Private sector unionism has dropped to less than 10 per-
cent.
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The U.S. union movement has been under constant and effective
attack by these forces for more than two decades, which is one impor-
tant reason why unions are often unwilling to engage in cooperative
endeavors with employers.  The overall weakness of organized labor in
the United States is not the only impediment to joint labor–manage-
ment innovations.  Another important factor is the law itself.  The Wag-
ner Act lays out in detailed terms precisely how unions can organize,
what issues they may bargain over, and what sorts of structures must
attach to any joint labor–management efforts.  Thus, for example,
many impressive examples of union initiatives in organizing and labor–





Unlike in Germany, collective bargaining in the United States is
conducted for the most part at the company level (often supplemented
by plant-level agreements).  Variation across union contracts is great,
and contracts are in general lengthy, highly specific, and arduous to
negotiate.  Although some of the more powerful unions in some ways
resemble German-style industry unions, there are many examples of





 Given the diversity of U.S. negotiation strategies, the exist-
ence of over a hundred different unions (craft and industrial unions as
well as some hybrids), and the lack of coordination among employers
in standardizing employment relations (bargaining minima or max-
ima), the United States cannot benefit from the channels of communi-
cation and bargaining alternatives that are available to German unions,
works councils, and employers.
Having no “second channel” of worker representation (such as the
works council), unions in the United States typically have no influence
over the kinds of human resource management decisions that require
the input of works councils in Germany and most other advanced
industrial countries.  In most cases, therefore, the adage that “manage-
ment acts, the union reacts” continues to hold true.  In addition to stra-
tegic considerations based on widespread management hostility toward
unions, this lack of a second channel is another way in which U.S.
unions are discouraged from taking an active role in labor–manage-
ment or organizational innovations.  Moreover, lacking a separate
forum for dispute resolution (such as the German Labor Courts), the




in which contracts are negotiated and administered.  This combination
introduces a potentially hostile mood and distributive considerations
into the very forum in which joint labor–management endeavors could
hypothetically be developed.  Given this combative institutional and
cultural landscape, it is no wonder that strike rates are much higher in
the United States than in Germany.
Under these circumstances, it is noteworthy—if not astonishing—
that in some cases that are discussed in the following section, unions,
workers, and managers have jointly developed highly refined methods
for changing the nature of labor–management relations and the organi-
zation of work and production.  In part, their ability to buck the trend
rests on the fact that while the government’s intervention in labor rela-
tions is detailed and intensive on paper, it is relatively minimal in fact.
Examples of labor–management participation and cooperation leading
to significant organizational and relational innovations have seldom
been challenged legally.
Successful U.S. cases of the transformation of traditional labor–
management relations (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986) can partly
be attributed to the lack of organizational and strategic rigidities that in
Germany limit the substance of what can be negotiated.  Even the Ger-
man-based operations of many U.S.-owned companies appear to be
characterized by the kinds of cross-functional, flexible new forms of
employment relations and work and production organization that are
necessary to competitiveness in the contemporary international market-
place but so difficult to engender in the German context (Wever
1995a).  
Finally, U.S. innovations are in some ways aided by the lack of
German-style works councils: where joint innovations are negotiated
and implemented, unions and workers typically negotiate intensively
and regularly with operations managers and production supervisors,
rather than being limited to formal relations with the personnel or
human resources function.  Rather than acting as a buffer between
workers and management in these cases, unions act as facilitators in
ongoing negotiations with management about how work is best accom-
plished.
In short, the employment relations systems and environments of
the United States and Germany are strikingly different, each with its
peculiar strengths and weaknesses.  The strengths of the U.S. system,
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at the level of organizational innovation, are mirrored in reverse by the
weaknesses of the German system, while German strengths in institu-
tional supports for extensive dialogue and negotiations between labor
and management are the reverse image of the great tensions between




How can these problems in U.S. and German employment rela-
tions systems be categorized, and what are the implications of the com-
parison?  After several decades of pursuing the unilateral managerial
(United States) and negotiated (German) paths, each country now faces
a path-specific set of problems. 
The German high road entails what Streeck (1992) has dubbed a
“virtuous circle,” in which the production of high labor-value-added,
high-quality goods, requiring a skilled and cooperative core workforce,
promotes exports.  These qualities in turn have reinforced the “diversi-
fied quality production mode,” relying on broad, long-term consensus
among the social partners.  This is the sort of consensus that has histor-
ically led German unions to forfeit wage gains in times of recession, in
the knowledge that they would be recouped in boom times.  
The U.S. low road, by contrast, entails efforts to substitute technol-
ogy for labor, to cut labor costs where possible, with the inevitable
resistance and—given employers’ power in the United States—even-
tual weakening of organized labor.  Another low-road strategy is to
move operations to geographical locations (foreign or domestic) where
labor costs are lower by virtue of the weakness of or lack of unions or
low prevailing wages.  Relatively high labor costs and the need to pro-
duce high labor-value-added goods and services persist in many indus-
tries (e.g., high-tech services, some areas of high-tech manufacturing,
and most business services).  But in the United States, even in indus-
tries in which a high road is possible (e.g., in telecommunications,
where service quality is critical to productivity and profits), we see
firms not only pursuing the high road (e.g., BellSouth, at least until




labor participation in management and with less concern for skill




In Germany, as suggested in the previous section, institutions and
the traditions they have spawned are necessarily associated with slow,
thorough, widely negotiated, and usually more or less consensual
change.  The notoriously slow pace of organizational decision making
is lamented by German managers, as are Germany’s high labor costs.
The problem is that to speed change would require the relaxation of
regulations, which in turn would require significant adjustments to the
current institutional framework of employment relations.  Such adjust-
ments would lead (indeed, have led) to noticeable increases in social
unrest.  Public sector strikes in the 1990s in Germany surrounding the
government’s efforts to cut the social wage attest to this.  For employ-
ers, simply to move in the direction of the low road, even with the tacit
support of powerful forces in the federal government, would be to
court levels of social strife (e.g., conflicts, strikes, slowdowns, or sick-
outs) which might require the sacrifice of both labor peace and the high
level of overall skills.
Germany’s endangered position on the high road both influences
and is influenced by German employment relations.  The effect on
labor relations is perhaps more obvious.  Employers and their associa-
tions have been calling for lower labor costs for at least 20 years.  To
the extent that employers choose not to join or to drop out of employer
associations, it is usually because they wish to avoid the terms and con-
ditions of sectoral contracts.  
But the structure of employment relations also contributes to the
problem.  To the extent that unions are unwilling to allow more sub-
stantive issues to be negotiated at the local level between individual
companies and works councils, employers will continue to find at least
some public and political support for their efforts to lessen the influ-
ence of the collective representatives of employees. 
It should be noted that IG Metall and IG Chemie, as well as several
other unions, are on the record as being willing to renegotiate the struc-
ture of collective bargaining and the relationship between industry-
wide and company-specific issues and dynamics.  Indeed, IG Metall
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publicized proposals on this topic as early as 1990 (IG Metall 1990).
Nevertheless, the positions of the unions and the employer associations
remain distant from each other, especially in the pattern-setting metal
industries.  In part, this is because the unions are, not surprisingly, loath
to give up too much centralized control over the terms and conditions
of employment.  The rift between labor and management can also be
attributed in part to some employers’ near-total embrace of the United
States’ more unilateral approach to labor–management relations,
which reduces labor’s participatory powers far more than the unions,
most works councils, or German society as a whole accept.
Many employers try to create worker participation and worker–
management cooperation programs that bypass the councils and the
unions, with mixed success.  Again, this tactic resembles the more uni-
lateral managerial approach associated with employment relations in
the United States.  In this regard, given the need for strong labor repre-
sentatives in order to preserve the noted benefits of the German system,
such methods exemplify how the structure of employment relations not





In the United States too, the employment relations system—along
with other features of the institutional landscape, such as employer
organization (Casper, in this volume, p. 93)—helps create the problem
as well as being directly affected by it.  The contentious nature of
union–management relations in most of the unionized sectors makes it
reasonable for many employers to try to weaken unions or seek non-
union settings in which to produce their goods and services.  The so-
called “union wage premium”—the wage benefit enjoyed by union
workers as compared with workers in similar jobs who are not union-
ized (currently between 25 and 30 percent of wages)—is also part of




   Union work rules his-
torically have hampered employers in their efforts to deploy workers
efficiently.  For instance, craft workers maintain narrow jurisdictional
lines, meaning that a plumber on site may be prohibited by the labor




pied or not available.  This is another reason why many employers
dread unions.
The U.S. employment relations system also lacks institutional
structures that offer employees pride in their negotiation skills and in
implementing workplace transformation initiatives.  Ever since the rise
of the industrial unions in the 1930s, the emphasis of many unions has
been more on the organization of existing workforces, skilled and
unskilled.  The skills of those workers and the improvement of their
skills have seemed less important to the unions than simply consolidat-
ing the labor movement sufficiently to gain significant bargaining
power vis-à-vis individual employers.  To the extent that skill develop-
ment has played an important role, programs have been fostered and
often delivered primarily by craft unions, which have strong interests in
preserving their jurisdictional lines (in competition with other unions)
and maintaining control over the content of skills (e.g., hampering
efforts to broaden skills in line with more flexible work practices).
There is much to applaud in the revitalization of the labor movement
that followed the 1995 election of a dynamic labor leader, John
Sweeney, to the presidency of the American Federation of Labor–Con-
gress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO).  Sweeney has reorga-
nized the federation and hired an intelligent, young, and dynamic new
top staff.  Nevertheless, the main priorities of the new AFL-CIO are
similar to those of the industrial unions in the 1930s, which focused
more on organizing new members than on improving and protecting
skills.  Moreover, union density declined again in the year 2000, and
organizing efforts are waning in many unions.
Employment relations also takes its toll on the U.S. institutional
landscape.  Most obviously, employers’ sustained attack on the labor
movement (including decertifications and the legal and widespread
practice of firing pro-union employees) has created a climate in which
any union cooperation with management is by itself a remarkable
accomplishment.  Moreover, because a union can be decertified or a
plant’s operations moved to a nonunion setting or even abroad, most




 at the sufferance of
management.  There are in fact numerous cases in which employers
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Another important way in which the U.S. institutional framework
contributes to the low-road problem stems from the pressures created
by its financial system.  Most U.S. companies view stockholders as
their primary stakeholders.  Stockholders and lenders require quarterly
statements of profits and losses.  Many managers’ salaries are tied to
financial performance on a quarterly basis.  This system creates a host
of incentives to develop short-term business strategies.  However,
investments in human capital, to say nothing of investments in efforts
to transform the labor–management relationship, offer only long-term
returns.  Moreover, since they are in many regards qualitative, these
“returns” are hard to measure.  In many cases, it cannot be shown
quantitatively that productivity or quality improvements follow from
these kinds of investments.  Many managers could argue, in fact, that
such improvements would have occurred even in the absence of train-
ing or labor–management participation programs.
What, then, would indicate that significant inroads into solving the
low-road crisis were being made?  We argue that at the very least, sig-
nificant changes to current U.S. labor law would be needed.  In addi-
tion, changes to the financial system and to other features of the
institutional landscape (such as antitrust laws, which limit extensive
employer coordination of the sort that is possible in Germany) could
improve the situation.
The high- and low-road crises of Germany and the United States
can be understood in terms of the mirrored reversals that we explained
earlier: the U.S. context is better suited to promoting organizational
innovation and change (albeit usually without the involvement of col-
lective worker representation), while the German context better coordi-
nates the main actors, such that change is negotiated and consensual
(albeit slow).  
 
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR REFORM
 
In this section, we examine the main priorities and current action
plans of the parties on the ground in both countries, focusing on how





Germany: Renegotiating the Negotiated System
 
In contrast to that in the United States, employment in Germany is
characterized by high and relatively egalitarian average wages and
partnership relations in firms and workplaces that largely reflect a high-
road philosophy (Streeck 1997b).   The question of how to create alter-
native strategies for reform from those available to labor and manage-
ment is central to the future of the Germany’s well-structured,
integrated, and interdependent socioeconomic system.  The debate over
which strategies to use raises the question of whether all or at least
some basic elements of the system should be reformed or whether sin-
gle, company-oriented proposals should be advanced.  Discussions
among the various sectors of the economy and within unions and
employer organizations have produced conflicting opinions on how to
best solve these problems.
The two key problems concern the instrument of comprehensive
sectoral collective agreements and the role of works councils and co-
determination.  Sectoral collective agreements set wage minima and
define the spectrum of company-level bargaining over work organiza-
tion.  Critics regard this system as too inflexible and cumbersome to
function effectively.  Indeed, the highly structured character of the Ger-
man system and the overall strength of the unions and the employer
associations have been maintained despite membership losses on both
sides and numerous steps toward decentralization.  Many negotiated
agreements are moving toward more decentralization, including, for
instance, recommendations by the sectoral bargaining agents for com-
pany-level negotiations on a variety of topics (Bahnmüller and
Bispinck 1995, p. 157).  The breadth of topics that can be negotiated at
the company level has grown, especially in regard to the flexibility of
working hours.  For example, in 1994, the employer association Ge-
samtmetall and IG Metall signed a contract allowing management and
works councils to negotiate agreements that reduce working hours even
though these hours may deviate from the general provisions of the sec-
toral contract.
It is still common practice for employer associations and trade
unions to reach pragmatic compromises that exemplify the negotiated
workings of the system.  Nevertheless, the employer associations have
been uneasy with the centralized system and have offered proposals for
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revamping it.  Probably the most widespread of these is the demand for




) in sectoral agree-
ments.  These clauses explicitly empower management to bargain with
their works councils over the replacement, modification, or extension
of sectoral contract provisions (Gesamtmetall 1996).  Some form of
“opening clause” is now included in many contracts.  The chemical
industry employer association was among the first to negotiate opening
clauses with IG Chemie in reaction to “intensified international pres-
sure on costs” (BAVC 1996). 
Over the past few years, all members of the union federation
(Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund [DGB]) have proposed revisions to the
coordinated bargaining system.  Although many unions are still wary
of employer reform ambitions, the door to reaching a negotiated reform
remains open.  Sectoral and regional contracts negotiated by IG Metall
and Gesamtmetall for 1997–1998, for instance, call the sectoral collec-
tive agreement “a sound instrument, open to the future, for regulating
industrial relations . . . offering . . . sufficient room for tailored solu-
tions to specific company problems” (Hüsson 1997, p. 5).  Most union
leaders recognize the need to make revisions that reflect the enormous
structural changes in the economy.  Membership drops in the employer
associations support this view because unions depend on employer
associations as representative bargaining partners.
The position of the DGB unions is reflected in a policy statement
passed at an extraordinary congress of the DGB in November 1996.
Seeing the need to “recognize the differentiated interests of employ-
ees” and contribute to “shaping the different realities of individual
branches and enterprises,” the unions called for the introduction of
“packaged options” into the sectoral contract (Deutscher Gewerk-
schaftsbund 1996, p. 14).  For example, in the chemical industry, the
social partners have made a point of promoting company-level agree-
ments that are embedded in the structures of sectoral collective bar-
gaining (Terbrack 1997, p. 7).  Agreements reached in 1996–1997 in
the metalworking and electrical industries provide standard options for
regulating the relationship between bonus pay and absenteeism (Ar-
beitsstelle Nationale und Internationale Gewerkschaftspolitik 1997).
The unions remain basically opposed to relinquishing their negoti-
ating rights to company or workplace agents.  Not only do they shy




blanket deregulation, but they also fear for their own organizational
stability.  Although the German unions have fared well in comparison
with many unions in other industrialized countries, they too have been
plagued by organizational problems and membership flight (Fichter
1997).   Employer associations suffer from many of the same problems.
Mid-sized and small enterprises especially have become highly critical
of the wage negotiation policies of their associations, calling for more
resistance to union demands.  In many instances, dissatisfaction has
grown to the point that withdrawing from employer associations has
become an increasingly popular strategic alternative, and newly estab-
lished enterprises are refraining from joining at all.  This conflict of




 but is of no
less concern to a number of other associations, for example, those in
the pharmaceutical industry (Schnabel 1995, p. 59).
The burden on local management and works councils to find com-
pany-specific solutions to the complex issues of jobless growth and
employment insecurity has grown.   Works councils are under pressure
to assent to extensive cuts, which sometimes break from binding sec-
toral contracts (as is often tacitly acknowledged by employer associa-
tions) to avoid membership losses.  Below the level of contract
stipulations we find, as Streeck (1996, p. 91) noted, “coalitions
between employers, who want to lower their wage and possibly their
training costs, and employees, who prefer lower pay to no pay at all.”
Efforts by the unions to stem this tide and combat rising unemploy-
ment have been unsuccessful.  In January 1994, IG Chemie signed a
two-year contract allowing firms to hire new workers at 95 percent of
the contract rate for the first year of employment.  However, if a person
is hired who has been unemployed for 6 months or for at least 12
months within a 24-month period prior to being hired, then pay would
be at 90 percent of contract wages for the first year.  Such employees
would have only “temporary” status.  Similar plans exist in eastern
Germany, where special government regulations forced the unions into
such agreements.  IG Chemie decided on its own to pursue this path in
western Germany, hoping to create employment.  However, recent sur-
veys suggest this has not happened.  The union is now negotiating with
the employer association over the introduction of lower pay rates in
selected segments of the chemical industry such as plastics and syn-
thetic fibers.
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In late 1995, Klaus Zwickel, head of IG Metall, presented a three-





the union offered to forgo real wage increases if employers would
agree to create 300,000 new jobs.  This was an attempt to build on the
Volkswagen model, a highly respected 1994 agreement that saved
some 30,000 jobs by reducing the average number of weekly hours to
27.5 (Hartz 1994; Volkswagen AG and IG Metall 1994).   The Kohl
government tried to get substantive tripartite negotiations started on the
basis of Zwickel’s proposal.  The employer associations ultimately
demurred on the grounds that the prerogative for job creation lay with
individual employers.  Instead, they proposed company-level job alli-
ances.   These, however, turned into something quite different from
what IG Metall intended (Zeuner 1996): rather than giving up pay
increases to create new jobs, works councils found themselves negoti-
ating pay cuts (within the limits of sectoral contracts) to secure existing
employment and prevent further dismissals (Rosdücher and Stehle
1996, p. 325).  A full-scale national Alliance for Jobs would have to
wait for the election of a Red-Green government in 1998.  Although
already an important forum, tripartite Alliance negotiations remain dif-
ficult and often quite adversarial.
Codetermination and works councils have contributed to establish-
ing a climate of negotiation and compromise that has long had a posi-
tive effect on the stability and adjustment capacity of the German
economy (Bacon, Blyton, and Morris 1996).  In the past decade, how-
ever, the scope and complexity of issues bargained at the enterprise
level have increased tremendously.  Even those who champion the
instruments of workplace negotiations wonder how these negotiations
can deal with the problems of job loss, outsourcing, and the increasing
mobility of capital and labor (Dieterich 1997, p. 3).  Creating new pat-
terns of work organization and introducing concepts of group and indi-
vidual responsibility raises new issues that the existing channels of
employer, worker, and union representation must learn to handle
(Müller-Jentsch and Sperling 1995, p. 42; see also Baethge and Wolf
1995, p. 243).
Employment relations in eastern Germany since 1990 can be
understood largely as a battle on the part of German unions and large
employers to defend the high road for unified Germany.  Unions and




beginning in 1990 to establish comprehensive collective bargaining.
When employers backed down on their wage parity commitment in
1993, eastern workers, led by IG Metall, waged an extraordinarily suc-
cessful strike to defend rising wages along the high road (Turner 1998).
Management-led innovations in the east have also furthered high-
road potential for unified Germany.  Western managers, for example,
soon discovered that modern forms of shop-floor and office teamwork
could be introduced on the basis of socialist brigade legacies more eas-
ily and with less resistance than in the established west.  Eastern plants,
such as VW in Mosel and Opel in Eisenach, have become pattern set-
ters, not only for modernization in the east but also for work reorgani-
zation in the west.
Finally, the European Union (EU) contains a variety of systems of
employment relations.  Analysts argue about whether the weakness of
Europe-wide social regulations may lead to the eventual dismantling of
the existing structures of codetermination and works councils (cf.
Streeck 1997b; Turner 1998). 
 
The United States: Isolated High-Road Struggles 
in a Low-Road Context
 
Employment relations in the United States are characterized above
all by numerous approaches and relationships, both traditional and
innovative.  The traditional approach, as influenced by the concept of
“scientific management,” viewed employees to a large extent as
replaceable parts that could perform as directed.  As an outcome, the
assembly line revolutionized production in the United States, and fac-
tory-developed approaches to personnel management spread widely
throughout the economy in both the private and public sectors.  In reac-
tion, in the 1930s, industrial unions grew and engaged in damage con-
trol, establishing rules and workplace rights and improving wages and
benefits.  Although there were exceptions as well as considerable varia-
tion, employee relations in the twentieth century to a large extent con-
tinue to be largely adversarial.
In spite of many famous cases of innovation and countless quality
and employee involvement programs, the U.S. workplace remains sig-
nificantly hierarchical and authoritarian (Babson 1995; Milkman
1997).  Adversarialism is more muted in nonunion workplaces,
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although the decline of the labor movement has opened up a represen-
tation gap by removing the possibility of a meaningful, independent
voice in the workplace for many employees (Freeman and Rogers
1995).
Nonetheless, both successful and failed innovation has been wide-
spread since the 1970s as changing world markets have highlighted the
value of active employee participation.  In notable cases, unionized
workplaces have been transformed from conditions of “armed truce” to
showplaces of employee participation and labor–management collabo-
ration.  The auto industry, for example (the traditional model in adver-
sarial labor–management relations), has set new standards of
excellence and provided new patterns for emulation.  In 1984, an old,
highly adversarial General Motors (GM) plant in California reopened
as NUMMI (New United Motor Manufacturing Incorporated, a GM–
Toyota joint venture), demonstrating a reformed management approach
oriented toward shop-floor teamwork and active union participation in
decision-making processes.  These changes showed the potential for
transforming the U.S. workplace, with its experienced workforce, into
a more productive and less conflictual environment (Brown and Reich
1989; Turner 1991).  NUMMI provided Toyota’s now-famous “lean
production” model, which quickly succeeded in proving the value of a
new team structure with enhanced training and input from employees.
The dark side of lean production also became clear at NUMMI, as
employees complained about intense production pressure and only
very narrow participation opportunities—such as brainstorming how to
bring a 60-second work cycle down to 58 seconds (Turner 1991; Bab-
son 1995).
The highly successful Saturn experiment in Tennessee took United
Autoworkers–General Motors (UAW–GM) collaboration several steps
further (Rubinstein 1996).  Like NUMMI, this case is widely known
and intensively studied, and certain lessons stand out in sharp relief.
First, profound change is possible within the loose framework of
employment relations in the United States.  Second, close company–
union collaboration from the very start can foster quality-enhancing
information flows, consensual decision making, and active participa-
tion and commitment all around.  Third, extensive labor participation
can lead directly to pathbreaking innovation in production organiza-




Saturn model to spread to other settings reflects continuing organiza-
tional inertia at both GM and UAW and continuing ambivalence about
making high-road investments in a low-road economy (Wever, Batt,
and Rubinstein 1996).
Beyond the auto industry, there are numerous other successful
cases of labor–management partnership at unionized workplaces.
These include AT&T, NYNEX, BellSouth, Xerox, Corning, United
Airlines, and others.  Two recent examples in very different industries
offer tantalizing models for future agreements elsewhere.  Levi-Strauss
and UNITE (the apparel and textile workers union) agreed in the early
1990s to a broad framework agreement that incorporated union offi-
cials into decision-making processes throughout the organization.  It
pledged the company not to oppose union organizing campaigns at
nonunion Levi-Strauss plants.  Kaiser Permanente (a large, HMO-ori-
ented healthcare and hospital organization), after extensive negotia-
tions with its 14 unions, agreed in 1997 to a similar deal.  This
agreement included a provision applying to Kaiser’s 30,000 nonunion
employees (out of a total workforce of 80,000).  The company agreed
to recognize a new union as soon as 51 percent of eligible employees at
a given Kaiser workplace signed cards indicating their desire to union-
ize.  This breakthrough (known as card-check recognition) eliminated
the need for the bitter election campaigns that are usually necessary to
create a union in a nonunion workplace and that, win or lose, so often
leave an enduring legacy of hostility and adversarial relations.  Each of
these cases can be understood in part as an attempt by companies and
unions to shift from a low-road to a high-road orientation.
Numerous innovations in employment relations also exist at non-
union workplaces, many of which serve explicitly or implicitly to keep
unions out.  In the auto industry, so-called Japanese transplants (Toyota
in Kentucky, Nissan in Tennessee, and Honda in Ohio) run high-pro-
ductivity, lean-production operations similar to NUMMI but without
union representation.  Motorola and Hewlett-Packard are widely cited
examples of nonunion high-road approaches that emphasize good
working conditions, decent pay and benefits (relative to comparable
pay in a given geographical area), mechanisms for limited employee
voice, and a strong focus on skill development and employee training.
More common in nonunion workplaces is the low road.  This
reflects an enduring tradition, dating back to the beginnings of industri-
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alization, of authoritarian management that is focused on controlling
workers and holding down wages.  These, of course, are the very cir-
cumstances in which unions emerged as workers’ champions in the
1930s, but the long decline of the U.S. labor movement has permitted
the continuation and expansion of this hierarchical and/or paternalistic
trend.  Examples range from apparel sweatshops in New York City to
poultry processing plants across the South and Japanese-owned manu-
facturing plants, with the auto assembly plants standing out as rare
exceptions to the low-road approach (Milkman 1995).  Even as firms
modernize their production organizations both domestically and
through cross-national networks, low-road problems of labor sweating
and income inequality continue to persist and in many cases intensify
(Harrison 1994).
Low-road production persists in the United States largely because
there are so few obstacles or disincentives to low-road practices (such
as low wages and benefits, intensified pressure on the workforce, and
minimal skills development).  Positive incentives for high-road invest-
ment, such as adequate government support and regional labor–man-
agement partnerships for vocational training, are rare.  These are the
incentives one finds in Germany and in pathbreaking U.S. cases such as
the Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership (Parker 1997).
The current revival of the U.S. labor movement could encourage
more labor–management partnerships and is the most hopeful sign of a
possible solution to the U.S. low-road crisis.  New labor leaders and
activists at the AFL–CIO, as well as at some of its member unions, are
pouring increased resources into organizing campaigns and developing
innovative strategies to reach low-wage workers.  In the meantime,
some unions are encouraging labor–management partnerships at indi-
vidual companies and in regional skills programs as part of a proposed
broad union–employer “social compact” (Greenhouse 1996).
Although this current revival is in its infancy and may or may not suc-
ceed in the long run, the prospects appear more hopeful than at any
time over the past 20 years (Turner, Katz, and Hurd 2001).  The experi-
ence of numerous high-road countries in northern Europe demonstrates
that, in the interest of economy-wide domestic or export-oriented high-
road production, it is essential to close off low-road options.  One obvi-





In sum, the United States can boast important high-road innova-
tions and partnerships at particular companies and in certain areas.  Yet
such innovations continue to occur within a low-road context.  Because
employers in the United States are relatively unconstrained and face
broad choices in strategic planning, they can make high-road choices
while simultaneously continuing on the path of least resistance toward
new or continuing low-road production strategies.  Serious income
polarization and a generally weak skills base (Reich 1991; Harrison
1994) suggest that the low road occupies an all-too-large, if not a pre-
dominant, position in the U.S. economy.  Incentives necessary to pro-
mote the high road include expanded government participation and
legislation; employer and labor support, including joint efforts to pro-
mote skills training; and more labor–management partnerships like
those at Saturn, Levi-Strauss, and Kaiser-Permanente, as well as the
continued expansion of union organizing efforts.
 
CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
MUTUAL LEARNING
 
What can the United States and Germany learn from each other
regarding necessary reforms to contemporary employment relations in
each country?  Because their institutional contexts are so different, we
do not believe that employment relations in these two countries will
converge.  But we do believe that the key actors, including policymak-
ers in each country, have much to learn from the experiences of the
other.
It is clear that German employers, as well as unions, feel increas-
ingly intense pressure to decentralize the coordinated sectoral and
regional bargaining system that has been credited with much of their
post-war economic miracle.  Perhaps the most important lesson for
German unions, works councils, and employers and employer associa-
tions is the old saying, “Don’t throw the baby out with the bath water.”
The baby represents what still works well in the German system,
including the institutional mechanisms that can help negotiate success-
ful methods for addressing new and unfamiliar economic pressures
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(international pressures as well as those stemming from unification and
membership in the EU).  
Most Germans are aware of the most extreme dangers of U.S.-style
“cowboy capitalism” such as the low-road problems we have explored
in this chapter.  If significant deregulation and decentralization are ini-
tiated, the unions and employer associations would be enfeebled and
might end up with more U.S.-style problems, including significant
social problems (from poverty and crime to the rise of neo-Naziism).
One would hope that the unions remain strong enough and retain
enough overall social legitimacy that they could prevent such develop-
ments from going too far.  Germany cannot afford to take a path which
might result in social turmoil or in undermining the negotiating climate
which characterizes the German political economy; either would be an
economically costly outcome. 
A second important lesson for Germany is that truly flexible work-
place innovation can be compatible with high-road institutional struc-
tures.  As noted above, the low-road context, within which stunning
organizational innovations occur even in unionized settings, is far from
supportive of high-road innovations.  It is, in fact, an impediment.  The
low-road context of U.S. industry has isolated the Saturn innovations
and now threatens to undermine completely BellSouth’s labor–man-
agement innovations (see Batt and Darbishire, in this volume, p. 17).
In fact, if a larger portion of the U.S. economy were characterized by
high-road practices (union coverage, high wages, skills development,
and proactive labor–management partnership), locally developed inno-
vations would likely be easier to implement and transfer to other set-
tings.  
However, this is not to say that there are no features of the German
system of employment relations that might impede such innovations.
On the contrary, as noted earlier, possible impediments to innovation
can be found in the formal nature of relations between works councils
and personnel or human resource departments, in the relatively rare
occurrence of direct worker participation in decision making at the
point of production (see also Wever 1995b), and in the functionally
specialized and rigid aspects of organizational structures and manage-
ment strategies (see Finegold and Keltner, in this volume, p. 55).  In




retain and restructure appropriate institutional supports without cling-
ing to institutional constraints associated with the German model.
U.S. policymakers and practitioners can learn from Germany’s
experience that the benefits of an economy-wide high-road approach
cannot be achieved in a totally independent, company-by-company
employment relations setting.  To move toward a higher road in the
United States, employers must create forums for collective information
sharing, standard setting, and possibly even resource pooling.  The
Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership, mentioned earlier, represents
a rare example of regional efforts in this direction (Parker 1997; Parker
and Rogers 2001).  Similar, less developed efforts in this direction are
under way in the states of California, New Jersey, and Washington.
These regional development projects illustrate that institutions can be
created to support mutually beneficial outcomes without entailing
unacceptable institutional constraints on individual employers or
unions.
This lesson is reinforced by the fact that Germany’s efforts at imi-
tating low-road practices—in the rare cases where this has been possi-
ble—are not working.   For instance, employer-based agreements in the
chemicals sector for trading off job creation against wage or hour con-
cessions have often resulted in wage concessions in exchange for mere
employment security, not job creation.  
Finally, it can hardly be a coincidence that growing domestic,
social, and economic problems in the United States coincide with the
erosion of the national skills base.  As unions have lost power, wages
and benefits have stagnated, and skills have followed closely behind.
Absent the capacity of governments, companies, or employees to pay
for skills development, educational and training institutions have not
been able to slow the low-road descent.  Low-road jobs have swelled
the ranks of the “working poor,” who must now compete with former
welfare recipients in transition from welfare to low-paying jobs.  This
inevitably will continue to lead to increased homelessness, ill health
(absent national health care), and other social problems.  As these prob-
lems mount, employers will be less and less interested in hiring from
this large segment of the workforce.  As the flight of capital from urban
centers illustrates, employers may relocate because there is too much
cheap labor available (while their businesses depend on skilled or
 
150 Turner, Wever, and Fichter
 
highly skilled labor), just as easily as they may do so because there is
too little. 
In short, Germany cannot solve high-road problems with low-road
practices; in the United States, labor and management are confronting
the problems of trying to take the high road in a low-road context.
Solutions for the two countries are necessarily different, but they can
be unified in a common conceptual framework.  Actors must differenti-
ate between the constraining and supportive aspects of coordinating
institutional frameworks.  Centralized forums for setting standards,
sharing information, and pooling resources are important components
of a successful high-road strategy.  However, rigid, functionally spe-
cialized and hierarchically organized approaches to innovation and
change entail unnecessary institutional constraints.  The Germans have
a surfeit of both coordinating institutions and organizational rigidities;
they need to maximize the former and minimize the latter.  Political
economic actors in the United States must for the most part build high-
road institutions and practices from scratch (using Germany and other
countries as guides) while avoiding hierarchical rigidities and con-
straints.  Can this be done?  Not without a great deal of U.S.-style inno-
vation and experimentation.  Such innovation is currently revitalizing
the U.S. labor movement; there is no reason why it cannot also be




1. The German “negotiated” and the U.S. “unilateral” approach to competitiveness
are defined in Wever (1995b).  They refer to the institutional structures that engen-
der negotiations about organizational change between labor and management in
Germany and that discourage such negotiation, creating incentives for a more uni-
lateral managerial approach, in the United States.
2. In October 1997, IG Chemie merged with the miners and leatherworkers unions,
forming IG Chemie-Bergbau-Energie.
3. Two examples will illustrate this problem.  The Service Employees International
Union’s Justice for Janitors campaign organizes workers in an entire labor market
rather than in the legally prescribed company-by-company fashion.  The interna-
tionally acclaimed Saturn experiment, designed by General Motors and the
United Autoworkers union to include full-fledged union participation in all areas
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of management, is inconsistent with the law’s stipulation that union members can-
not perform managerial work and with its provisions for choosing union represen-
tatives.
4. For example, disputes between the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and
the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers date back sev-
eral decades.
5. It is important in this connection to note that some research suggests that the
union wage premium is more than compensated for by increases in unionized
employers’ productivity, which can be attributed to the fact that unions can spur
employers to seek more effective ways of organizing work and production and to
the fact that productivity and quality-enhancing participatory programs involving
unions, workers, and managers may be more successful and long lasting in union-
ized settings than in nonunion companies (Freeman and Medoff 1984; Applebaum
and Batt 1994; Kelley and Harrison 1992).
6. The most famous of these cases is that of Eastern Airlines in the mid 1980s.  A
more recent and still unfolding case is that of BellSouth, whose Excellence
Through Quality programs, designed together with the Communication Workers
of America, became in the late 1990s a lower priority for a management team
struggling to come to terms with increasingly heavy competition resulting from
the final phases of telecommunications deregulation.  In this connection, the tele-
communications industry is an interesting German–United States comparative
case study, because in Germany the union has been far more successful in defend-
ing the rights of workers in the wake of deregulation (Batt and Darbishire, in this
volume, p. 17).
7. The case of IBM leaving Gesamtmetall was more the result of the employment
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